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ABSTRACT 
THE JUDEO-ARABIC HERITAGE 
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS AND TEACHING CURRICULUM 
FEBRUARY 1988 
ELISE G. YOUNG, B.A., SARAH LAWRENCE COLLEGE 
M.F.A., COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
ED.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Meyer Weinberg 
Arab and Jew have shared a common world- socially, 
economically, politically- for centuries. Relations between 
them were cordial as well as hostile and the evolution of 
those relations can only be understood within the context of 
world historical developments. 
Tracing the history and evolution of the Judeo-Arabic 
heritage, this study emphasizes themes important to the 
survival of that heritage and developments that have 
undermined it. Instead of polarizing Jew and Arab by 
ascribing narrowly defined roles and characteristics to 
each, this method encourages students to analyze the 
complexity of forces at work for and against cultural 
survival. 
• • 
Vll 
This study constructs a pedagogy for Arab-Jewish 
studies by examining Arab-Jewish relations from an 
historical perspective. Research indicates that educational 
materials on the Middle East often convey erroneous ideas 
about Middle Eastern cultures, history and politics. 
Misconceptions about Jews and Arabs and about relations 
between them are fueled by racism, ethnocentrism, 
oversimplification, and lack of information. As a 
consequence the Judeo-Arabic tradition is virtually unknown 
in the West. 
This project is designed to assist teachers in learning 
about and conveying some of the central themes affecting the 
current Arab-Israeli conflict. Students are provided with 
tools to analyze that conflict and to envision possible 
resolutions through uncovering historical traditions that 
have for the most part been ignored or distorted. 
Understanding how relations between peoples are affected by 
world historical developments clarifies the forces 
controlling their worlds. They can become critically aware 
of the kinds of choices available to them; of the cultural 
tensions and social forces shaping their values, beliefs and 
learning process. They can become critically aware of the 
circumscribed conditions within which they actively 
construct their worlds and more readily able to relate those 
conditions and discoveries to the situation of Arabs and 
Jews in the Middle East. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of Problem 
This curriculum is a study of relations between Arabs 
and Jews from a historical perspective. 
In an analysis done by the Middle Eastern Studies 
Association, researchers note that: "For some time, scholars 
have recognized that secondary school textbooks in the 
United States and Canada often convey an oversimplified, 
naive and even distorted image of Middle Eastern cultures, 
history and politics(Middle Eastern Studies Association of 
North America, Inc., 1975:1) Three problems contribute to a 
lack of adequate teaching materials about Arabs, Jews and 
relations between them. They are 
Eurocentrism/ethnocentrism, racism and oversimplification of 
complicated issues. 
Standard histories of America do not acknowledge ways 
that historical developments, culture and education in 
America have been influenced by the contributions of both 
Arabs and Jews. William E. Leuchtenburg, in The American 
Perception of the Arab World, suggests that Arabs have been 
absent in histories of America because American historians 
saw no reason to devote attention to this subject, given the 
"lack of contact between the United States and the Arab 
world."(Leuchtenburg,1977:17) Another reason is that the 
Arab experience has been so different from that of Americans 
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that "the history of Arabs cannot serve as a measuring 
rod"(Leuchtenburg,1977:16) Finally, American historians do 
not write about Arab—American relations because they are "so 
densely ignorant of Arab history and of the Arab presence in 
the United States."(Leuchtenburg,1977:16) (In fact the 
Arab-American community in the United States is in the 
1980's around three million.) The explanations reveal the 
Eurocentric and ethnocentric focus of American education. 
Jews are also absent from most standard histories of 
America. The limited visibility of first and second 
generation Jews from Europe is distorted by stereotypes. 
Many North American students, Jews and others, are ignorant 
about the history and culture and even existence of Arab 
Jews. Many Jews with mixed family genealogies (Sephardi 
and/or Oriental as well as Ashkenazi) dissociate themselves 
from their non-western roots. Educational materials shaped 
by Eurocentrism invalidate the ancient kinship of Jews and 
Arabs in the Arab World. The Judeo-Arabic tradition is 
virtually unknown in the West. On the other hand the term 
Judeo-Christian tradition is a common catch-phrase giving 
lip service to the importance of interchange between Jew and 
Christian for the 'development of the West.' Jews and Arabs, 
however, are rarely presented in other than an antagonistic 
stance. The conseguences of this distortion are far 
reaching, precisely because both peoples have always and 
continue to play a major role in shaping the destiny of the 
world. Furthermore, a false sense of disconnection between 
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"East" and "West" distorts even the meaning of the term 
'Judeo-Christian' since the Jews and Christians who began 
that tradition did so within the milieu of the Arab world. 
An educational system that encourages segregation of 
cultures through lack of information, distortion of 
information and ethnocentrism thereby condones institutional 
racism. The assumption that whatever is non-western is 
dangerous, primitive, and in need of westernization 
impresses upon western students a sense of superiority. The 
history of peoples from the Middle East—Jews, Arabs and 
others— becomes the history of western influence upon them. 
Eurocentrism perpetuates racism. 
The media—T.V., radio, press, film—promote racist 
caricatures of Arabs. Arabs are presented as wealthy 
'sheiks' who are deceitful and corrupt, or as rootless 
nomads. Arab culture is 'primitive', in need of western 
enlightenment. Arab women are portrayed as passive, 
oppressed, 'behind the times.' Arab cultures are reduced to 
discussions of the 'Arab way of thinking.' The notion that 
all Arabs are terrorists is continously planted in public 
consciousness. 
Laura Nader an anthropologist, addresses the fact that 
questions raised about the Middle East are often based on 
stereotypes: 
Some fifteen years ago I went to the Middle 
East, to see if Islamic law, or religious law, was 
in fact operating in the villages, or had it, 
being an urban religion, never really penetrated 
into the villages. In the villages, when we 
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started talking about everyday conflicts and 
disputes and how they resolve them, lo and behold, 
I discovered there is no Islamic law operating at 
all. 
The procedures were very pragmatic. The 
neighborhood councils operated in a way we are 
trying to invent in certain parts of the U.S. 
today. It was an arbitration procedure, sometimes 
mediated rather than arbitrated, and it was very 
pragmatic, very secular. I had absolutely no 
trouble in this village being invited into the 
mosque. I was a woman, but that did not make any 
difference, and all of the stereotypes caved in, 
one after the other. Islamic women, who are often 
portrayed as being very compressed and repressed, 
were much freer in these vilages than middle class 
women I know in Berkeley. They come and go and do 
pretty much as they want. They often have the 
power of their lineage to back their position. 
There is probably less wife beating in this little 
village in Southern Lebanon than there is in 
Berkely, California, according to a recent study 
in upper, middle and lower income groups in 
Berkeley. 
These stereotypes are just that. Instead of 
trying to explain many things that may not exist, 
people who want to study the Middle East should 
find out what is there, what is happening in the 
area, rather than taking a stereotype and saying , 
"I wonder why they are so religious?" We do not 
even know whether they are or not. (Nadar, 
1977:183) 
Like the Arab, the Jew is often portrayed as deceitful 
and untrustworthy. The mission of the Jew is to control 
western civilization. Such anti-semitic notions, propagated 
by the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion' published in Russia 
in 1905 reflect centuries of persecution of Jews in the 
west. Students and others have absorbed and continue this 
legacy. Recently at a demonstration in support of self 
determination in Central America, in a small city in Western 
Massachusetts, a policeman accused the Jews of "stirring up 
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all the trouble on Central America." A student in a class at 
a state college in Western Massachusetts insisted that Jews 
control the educational system and believed that was why she 
was not getting adequate information about current events in 
the Middle East. 
Anti-semitism, a term generally attributed to Wilhelm 
Marr (1879) referring to anti-Jewish campaigns in Europe, 
continues to infect public opinion. In 1985, a movement was 
organized among farmers in the midwest of the United States, 
blaming their economic difficulties on the Jew. Anti¬ 
semitism preaches that Jews control money, the media, and 
the educational system. 
Racism contributes to the oversimplification of 
complicated issues. The polarization of Arab and Jew 
effectively conceals a complex history of cultural 
intermingling and conceals the historical developments that 
shape current relations. The formula 'oppressor-oppressed' 
has Jew and Arab locked into a fight for the 'survival of 
the fittest.' Students feel that they must choose between 
good and bad, win and lose. 
Edward Said points to the danger of "Large monolithic 
Platonic concepts such as 'Islam' or 'the Arabs' as if they 
had some unchanging existence of their own."(Said, 1977:184) 
The Koran is often treated as the key to 'the Arab psyche.' 
For example, passages are lifted out of context to prove 
whether or not Arabs had scorn for Jews, negating the 
multiplicity of ways the Koran has used in the past. 
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Complicated issues become oversimplified when 
historical developments are ignored or distorted by racist 
assumptions. Two clear examples are the treatment of Arab 
nationalism and of Zionism. The Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) is treated solely as a terrorist 
organization. The important evolution/history of that 
organization, the work that it does in areas of social 
reconstruction, education, medicine, recreation, are 
ignored. 
Proponents of the view that Zionism is racism ignore 
the fact that Zionism is a complex historical development. 
Popular knowledge and institutionalized teaching about 
Zionism focus on Theodore Herzl and Chaim Weizman. Few 
studies examine the work of Hannah Arendt, Martin Buber, 
Judah Magnes and the Ihud Association. 
It is also important to examine how simple or clear 
issues are overcomplicated. For example, arguments about the 
allegedly God-given right of Jews to Palestine can be used 
to conceal the sufferings of Palestinian Arabs who have lost 
their homes and livelihoods. That Israeli Arabs deserve 
civil liberties is a simple truth that is often obscured by 
arguments based on stereotypes of Arabs noted above—for 
example, that all Arabs are terrorists. 
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Statement of Purpose 
This curriculum examines Arab/Jew relations from a 
historical perspective informed by a critical awareness of 
how the above factors shape our view of history, access to 
information, and ability to process information. The 
history of Arab and Jew reveals a complex and rich symbiosis 
that was interrupted for periods of time, but never severed. 
The fact that Jews and Arabs shared a common world— 
socially, economically, politically—for centuries, tells us 
that relations were cordial as well as hostile and that 
variations over time and place were and are inevitable. Jews 
and Arabs have the ties—therefore the assets and 
liabilities—of kinfolk. 
Placing the Arab-Israeli conflict in historical 
perspective informed by a critical awareness of how history 
is written about and taught in our educational system, of 
necessity places it within a global context. The struggle 
against colonialism, for example, is a predominant theme in 
the history of both Arab and Jew, sometimes concomitantly 
(as in North Africa in the late 1800's). The effect of 
French, British, U.S., and Soviet Union interests in and 
actions upon the Middle East is a major factor shaping the 
survival of both peoples and affecting relations between 
them. 
Understanding how relations between peoples are 
affected by world historical developments gives participants 
clarity about forces controlling their worlds. Instead of 
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blaming particular peoples by the characteristics ascribed 
to them, participants can analyze the complexity of forces 
at work for and against cultural survival. They can learn 
about how the imbalance of power in the particular society 
in which they live has evolved. They can become critically 
aware of the kinds of choices they and others make; of the 
cultural tensions and social forces shaping their values, 
beliefs and their learning process. They can become 
critically aware of the circumscribed conditions within 
which they actively construct their worlds and are thus able 
to relate these conditions and discoveries to the situation 
of Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. 
In light of the above, the following are the goals of 
this study: 
1. To identify the main historical trends in relations 
between Arabs and Jews. 
2. To challenge the notion that Jews and Arabs are natural 
enemies. 
3. To challenge the notion that Arabs and Jews are by 
themselves responsible for the fate of the Middle East. 
4. To develop in participants an awareness of how racism 
affects the context and availability of information on the 
Middle East and how that information shapes their views of 
Arabs and Jews. 
5. To identify historical developments affecting the current 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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6. To assist students in learning how to approach 
controversial political issues. 
7. To contribute to improved relations between Jews and 
Arabs. 
8. To construct a pedagogy for Arab/Jewish studies. 
To achieve these goals, four chapters of interpretative 
analysis of the history are followed by a curriculum design. 
The curriculum is intended for secondary and higher 
education, as well as for use in community settings. For 
each chapter, the following are provided: 
1. Goals of chapter 
2. Outline of chapter 
3. Important themes of chapter 
4. Suggested activities for chapter 
5. Suggestions for evaluating content with students 
6. Materials, other resources 
7. Glossary 
Methods 
To understand the Jew and Arab in history requires 
first of all a critical examination of attitudes and biases 
that can affect our understanding of that history. 
The important work of Marshall Hodgson serves as a 
useful starting point: Hodgson teaches us ways that 
geography influences our view of history. For example, he 
notes that : 
"In the case of 'Europe' and 'Asia', at least, the 
artificial elevation of the European peninsula to the status 
of a continent, equal in dignity to the rest of Eurasia 
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combined, serves to reinforce the natural notion, shared bv 
Europeans and their overseas descendants, that they have 
formed at least half of the main theatre (Eurasia)of world 
history, and of course, the more significant half. Only on 
the basis of such categorization has it been possible to 
maintain for so long among Westerners the illusion that the 
mainstream1 of world history ran through Europe. Acceptance 
of such terms by non-Westerners too is a sign of their 
continuing cultural dependence on the West. The other major 
pair of popular world-historical conceptions 'West' and 
'East' (or Orient) form a variant on the pair 'Europe' and 
'Asia' and serve the same function of reinforcing Western 
ethnocentric illusions."(Hodgson, 1974:49) 
While I have not adopted Hodgson's terminology, for 
instance the use of the term 'Oikoumene' to indicate the 
Afro-Eurasian agrarian historical complex, I consider this 
discussion central to any discussion of the history of Jew 
and Arab. 
Chapter One focuses on the origins of the Judeo-Arabic 
tradition in the Middle Eastern lands. Like the Arabs, those 
Jews indigenous to the Middle East, who continued through 
the centuries to make their homes there, are neglected in 
the Eurocentric historical view which places the Jews of 
western Europe in the foreground. Called 
'Oriental','Sephardi', and 'Middle Eastern', Arab Jews are 
the link to the Arab world; in the ideologies of many 
regarding Arab-Jew relations, the missing link. Lack of 
research and therefore information on Jews indigenous to 
Middle Eastern lands is one of the unfortunate consequences 
of this bias and concomitantly, lack of research and 
information on the history of Arab/Jew relations. 
One purpose of Eurocentric historical research, coined 
by Lewis as 'colonialist' history,(that is history recorded 
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from the perspective of the colonizing government) is to 
justify colonialism.(Lewis, 1973:51-56) Hence it distorts 
the historical experience of the 'colonized' peoples. 
European colonialist interpretations of history distort 
Arab/Jew relations. Researchers who present a wholly 
negative historical purview of Arab/Jew relations are 
serving colonialist history. Not coincidentally, those 
researchers who present a more balanced view of the history, 
most often include an analysis of the effects of colonialism 
on Arab/Jew relations, however minimal that analysis might 
be. A more balanced view is one that embraces the positive 
elements of Arab/Jewish coexistence, as well as the 
problematic ones, and that stresses the effect of outside 
forces on relations rather than focusing solely on Arab 
versus Jew. 
A second consideration in the area of historical 
research that affects our discussion is the erasure of 
women. Descriptions of reality by men often exclude women, 
and are necessarily distorted. History becomes literally 
'his' story and is nothing more than male interpretations of 
their own exploits and failures. 
Yael Katzir, in his article, 'Preservation of Jewish 
Ethnic Identity in Yemen: Segregation and Integration as 
Boundary Maintenance Mechanisms," notes that : 
"Women played a most important role in the infusion of 
Arab folk culture elements into Yemeni Jewish society, 
thereby contributing to the integration of this ethnic 
minority into its environment. Women, who were marginal to 
the perpetuation of religious and vocational traditions and 
who did not carry the daily burden of keeping and guarding 
the formal features of Jewish ethnicity, were far more free 
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Wnmpn^fhi t0 ?!?SOrb the local non-Jewish cultural elements. 
Women thus often served as the cultural mediators within the 
sociocultural environment."(Katzir, 1982:277) 
These important statements appear in the last few 
pages of this article and offer us no further information 
about the process he describes. Other historians have (also 
in passing) corroborated Katzir's insights. Absence of 
research in this area is an indication of lack of validation 
for such research. 
Arab and Jewish women have shaped the history of Arab- 
Jew relations in every sphere—economic, religious, 
cultural, political. And it is also true that the silencing 
of women in history has affected the history of Arab-Jew 
relations, as has the resurfacing of those voices in recent 
decades. In Chapter One, I note that in pre-Islamic times, 
Arabs and Jews participated in the worship of female deities 
based on agricultural cycles. Later, Arab and Jewish women 
continue to share a spiritual life as they create together a 
folk religion based on saints and pilgrimages to holy sites. 
As stated in Chapter One, Baron notes that Jews may have 
been open to worship of female deities because of the 
importance of women in field and agricultural labor.(Baron, 
1983) Jewish and Arab women as noted in Chapter One, 
created a literature of political and social commentary in 
the form of poetry and song. 
Jewish and Muslim women were business partners in the 
12th and 13th centuries sometimes owning homes together or 
stores.(Goitein, 1978) In early years of Ottoman rule, 
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Sephardi women played a central role in those economic 
ventures open to Jews. Clearly in all areas of importance to 
the subject of Arab/Jew co-mingling— economics, religion, 
culture, and politics— women are a major force contributing 
to peaceful co-existence. While not exploring this theme 
extensively, this curriculum will indicate areas for further 
research and emphasize the importance of this research in 
the field of Arab/Jew relations. 
One final bias informing historical research is 
discussed in Chapter One and throughout this work. An 
example is the fact that much historical research on Jews in 
the Ottoman period focuses on the experience of the 
Sephardi, who for the most part, by virtue of their 
connection to Europe, represent an elite class. The issue 
of class makes clear that the question of Arab/Jew relations 
is not so much a question of what was it like for Jews under 
Arab rule, but rather, what was it like for different 
groupings of Arabs and Jews, depending on economic status, 
religious leanings, politics, sex, during the particular 
centuries under discussion. With the development of a 
powerful Muslim merchant class in the sixth and seventh 
centuries, the potential for conflict with the Jewish 
merchant class had to be confronted. Further, inter-group 
conflict is stimulated by economic stratification. 
Effective forms of social organization and economic 
mutuality that had evolved between Jews and Arabs for 
centuries continue to provide workable solutions. Business 
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partnerships in the 12th and 13th centuries are one example. 
Patron relations are another important example that will be 
explored in Chapter Two. The factors contributing to a 
breakdown in economic complementarity in the period of Arab 
Muslim and Turkish Muslim rule, will be explored extensively 
in Chapter Two. 
Chapter One makes clear that forms of social 
organization and economic mutuality between Arab and Jew 
represent elements contributing toward peaceful co-existence 
In the face of world historical developments in the 17th- 
20th centuries however,they become elements contributing to 
dissension. Another element noted in Chapter One 
contributing both to peaceful co-existence and dissension is 
transformation in the area of religious life. Arab and Jew 
shared religious practices in connection to strategies for 
daily survival, resulting in the creation of a 'folk 
religion' emblematic of a shared 'folk culture'. Where 
religion becomes tied to power and in particular to the 
state, religion becomes an element contributing to 
dissension between Jew and Arab. This theme is further 
elaborated in Chapter Two in relation to the question- how 
do western values impact on Islam and on Judaism? The final 
theme introduced in Chapter One contributing both to 
peaceful co-existence and to dissension, is the impact of 
outside forces. The impact of the intrusion of Europe on 
economic, social, religious and political life raises the 
central questions of Chapter Two. First, what were the 
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roles that Jews and Arabs filled in the creating of the new 
world order, coined by European historians as the 'modern 
age'? Secondly, what were the range of responses to the 
shifting economic base and changing cultural values inhering 
in that shift, of the 17th- 20th centuries? Third- how did 
Europe view Jew and Arab in this process? And finally, how 
did Arab and Jew view one another in that process? 
Chapter Three examines historical developments that 
shape the choices made by Jews and Arabs as national 
identifications become solidified. This Chapter makes clear 
that both national movements were complex and many-faceted, 
and that Jews and Arabs related in a multitude of ways 
within both movements and between both movements, to the 
question of how nationalism could benefit Jew and/or Arab. 
The central questions of Chapter Four arise out of the 
founding of the Jewish state. What were the consequences of 
the new political status of Palestine for the Judeo-Arabic 
heritage? The historical methodology applied in this work 
makes possible an in-depth exploration of this question. 
That is, how have historical developments contributed to the 
situation in which Jews and Arabs find themselves in the 
twentieth century? What elements of the Judeo-Arabic 
heritage have survived? From this perspective, it is 
essential to note that resolution of current tensions in 
Israel depends upon response to this question. 
16 
References 
Goitein, S.D. A Mediterranean Society. Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London: University of Chicago Press, 1974. 
Hodgson, Marshall. The Venture of Islam. Vol.I. London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1974. 
Katzir, Yael. "Preservation of Jewish Ethnic Identity in 
Yemen: Segregation and Integration as Boundary Maintenance 
Mechanisms." Comparative Studies in Society and History. 
(Vol. XXIV, No.2. Cambridge University Press, 1982 ) 
Leuchtenburg, William. "The Arab Perception of the Arab 
World." In Arab and American Cultures. Atiyeh, George(ed.). 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 
Washington, D.C., 1977. 
Nadar, Laura. "Can Cultures Communicate." In Arab and 
American Cultures. Part V. Atiyeh, George(ed.). American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, 
D.C.,1977. 
Said, Edward. "Can Cultures Communicate." In Arab and 
American Cultures. Part V. Atiyeh, George (ed.). American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, 
D.C.,1977. 
The Image of the Middle East in Secondary School Textbooks. 
Middle East Studies Association of North America Inc.: New 
York, 1975. 
CHAPTER II 
THE JUDEO-ARABIC HERITAGE - ARAB/JEW RELATIONS 
PRE-ISLAM THROUGH OTTOMAN RULE 
Chapter Two establishes the historical background of 
the Judeo-Arabic heritage. It examines Jewish-Arab 
coexistence in pre-Islamic times, the period of the 
emergence and consolidation of Islam beginning in the 
seventh century, and the period of Ottoman rule, beginning 
in 1517. 
The Judeo-Arabic heritage was based on cultural 
sharing, complementary systems of social organization, 
economic livelihood, religious life and political life. In 
all these areas the Judeo-Arabic heritage made crucial 
contributions to life in the Middle Eastern lands and to the 
world at large. 
Geographic proximity of Jew and Arab in the Middle 
Eastern lands and world historical developments have been 
critical factors in the evolution of relations between the 
two peoples. In the centuries immediately preceding Islam, 
relations between Arab and Jew were shaped by three 
interrelated forces: shared geograpahic challenges, 
religious life and the impact of outside forces. Arab and 
Jew were subject to similar conditions affecting daily life: 
shared traditions evolved in response to those conditions. 
Economic competition stimulated by the struggle between 
the Roman-Byzantine and Persian Empires and the 
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institutionalization of monotheism were two factors 
challenging traditional relations of economic 
complementarity and shared religious practices of Jew and 
Arab in the seventh century. with Islam the dominance of 
the Muslim Arab and shift in status of the Arab Jew and 
Christian Arab further challenged traditional relations. 
However, in spite of these changes, the participation of 
both Jew and Arab in the creation of a new world order is 
testimony to the fact that mutual relations continued to 
benefit both. Relations between Jew and Arab continued to 
shape the course of history as well as being shaped by it. 
This chapter will begin with a general view of Judeo- 
Arabic social organization, religious life, economic life 
and cultural expression in the period immediately preceding 
the rise of Islam in the seventh century. The interchange 
between Jew and Arab was a critical factor in the survival 
of both. On a daily basis Jew and Arab evolved forms of 
mutually beneficial exchange. Each culture resonated with 
the creative impact of absorbing knowledge and ideas from 
the other. 
Secondly, this chapter will examine the circumstances 
of Muhammad's rise to power, the Arab conquests and the 
ensuing centuries of Muslim rule. Jew and Arab were thrust 
into a new relation to one another as the Judeo-Arabic world 
became subject to the Muslim world order. Jews became one 
of the 'dhimmi', minorities who followed a monotheistic 
religion other than Islam. The dhimmi were second class 
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citizens protected by the Islamic state in exchange for 
payment of the 'jizya' or poll tax and adherence to a number 
of restrictions defining their role in Muslim society. 
Within this general structure, many circumstances affected 
the quality of dhimmi life over time and place. Arab and 
Jew continued to share a common language and social world. 
Judeo-Arabic traditions continued to provide a basis for 
mutually beneficial exchange. 
Finally, this chapter closes with a discussion of the 
patterns of Arab-Jewish relations that evolved as a 
consequence of changes instituted under Ottoman rule. While 
the Turkish-Muslim state for the most part adhered to the 
social norms defined by the Arab Caliphate, a shifting world 
economy, challenges to Turkish dominance internally and 
externally and the impact of both on the dhimmi communities 
created new challenges to Jewish-Arab relations. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European 
dominance precipitated a new world order which challenged 
Judeo-Arabic traditions and radically changed the nature of 
relations between Jew and Arab. Those developments are 
critical to understanding how Arab and Jew stand in relation 
to one another in the 1980's, since both played a central 
role in creating this new world order. But the shifting 
economic base, changes in social organization, religious 
life and political power, how Europeans viewed Arab and Jew 
in this process and how Arabs and Jews viewed Europe in this 
process, fundamentally affected the norms that had evolved 
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for centuries in the Judeo-Arabic world. It is crucial to 
examine the kinds of choices made by both peoples in 
response to those challenges. The historical imperatives 
guiding those choices have shaped the complexity of 
relations between Jew and Arab in the modern age. This 
critical period will be introduced in Chapter Two. 
Close relations between Jews and Arabs were in evidence 
long before the rise of Islam in the early seventh century. 
Both peoples emerged from desert populations, some of whom 
formed agricultural communities, in 'the Middle East', the 
current name for the Nile Valley to Oxus basin, Fertile 
Crescent (Syrian lands and Mesopotamia (Iraq)), Iranian 
highlands and Arabian peninsula. Prior to the rise of Islam 
in the early seventh century, Jews and Arabs were subject to 
a series of conquering empires; the Assyrians, Neo- 
Babylonians, Ancient Persians, Macedonians, Romans. In the 
sixth century, the Jews had suffered religious persecution 
and dispersion by the Romans who controlled the Syrian 
lands, the Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt and the eastern parts 
of North Africa (Tunisia and Algeria). Sasanian Iraq became 
the center of Jewish life, where the Mishnah and Babylonian 
Talmud evolved and the ancient law and traditional ritual of 
the Jews were codified. As the struggle between the Roman- 
Byzantium and Sasanian Persian Empires weakened both, Jews 
increasingly faced discrimination. 
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In Northern Arabia, the birthplace of Islam, Jewish 
Arab and other Arab tribes evolved a way of life based on 
complementarity between the settled and nomadic populations. 
The sedentary populations built agricultural communities 
around river banks as far as systems of irrigation would 
permit. Bedouins( from Arabic, badawi, referring to the 
steppes and semideserts of Arabia), called themselves Arab, 
a name that became associated also with the settled 
tribespeople who lived from the date palms and grain of the 
oases as well as engaging in commerce.(Hodgson:1974) 
Co-operative systems developed in response to the 
challenges of daily life were one element that contributed 
toward peaceful co-existence among Arabs and between Arabs 
and Jews. On the Arabian peninsula, as cited above, Arabs 
and Jews had to develop a viable way of life on arid steppe 
lands, areas of rock or sand and occasional oases where 
water was close to the surface and accessible for regular 
irrigation. Extensive agriculture was possible in some 
areas, such as southern Arabia or Yemen where a sedentary 
agricultural way of life had existed for centuries. In 
areas where cattle were raised, wheat and dates grown in the 
oases could be exchanged for meat. Arabs and Jews had 
extensive experience in developing irrigation systems for 
cultivation: the refinement of irrigation systems encouraged 
more extensive development of crafts and subsequently, 
commerce in the towns. 
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A second element contributing to creative 
intermingling, hence, peaceful co-existence, between Jew and 
Arab was the close connection between economic, cultural and 
religious life, and daily survival. Some information about 
the conditions and social life of Arabs in the fifth and 
sixth centuries comes from pre-Islamic Arabic poetry. Poets 
were recognized as tribal spokespersons, respected for their 
faithful renditions of all phases of tribal 
life.(O'Leary,1972) This period was also one of the most 
creative in the development of Hebrew poetry which was 
influenced by the unique stylization and recitation of Arab 
poets. Poets were culturally and politically respected 
through their associations with tribal chiefs. The women of 
Arabia were famous for songs and poems reflecting not only 
the details of their daily lives, but also the political 
circumstances of their times. The Jewish women of Yemen, 
following local tradition, utilized satirical poetry to 
reflect on public events. This form of commentary gave 
meaning to the everyday circumstances that affected most 
them. 
Religious life among the cultures of the river valley 
was intimately connected with agriculture. Planets whose 
movements guided agricultural endeavors, were considered 
'givers of the harvest'. Folk tradition centered on the 
worship of the Mother Goddess and fertility. The Arabs of 
the Sinai offered animal sacrifices to three Goddesses; al- 
Uzza, identified with the planet Venus; Allat, the Sun 
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Goddess and Manat,Goddess of Fate. When the Jews entered 
Canaan, they adopted many of these practices in spite of 
warnings from their prophets.(Baron,1983) Similarly Arabs 
adopted Jewish prayers for rain observing success of the 
Jews in raising crops. Religion and economic survival were 
further linked in that pilgrimages to the holy places of the 
Arabs led to the development of markets for exchange of 
goods at those sites. 
The increasingly important role of women in orchard and 
field labor may have been connected to worship of female 
deities. Jewish legends,for instance the story of Sarah, 
reveal that in early times Jewish women had many rights, 
including that of owning property .1 In Arab societies, 
kinship and marriage laws underwent significant change in 
the time of the Prophet. With changes in the economic 
structure and in religious life in the days of Muhammad, 
Ba'al marriage, in which the husband is 'lord' over the wife 
was predominant, particularly among the wealthy. There is 
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evidence that pre-Islamic societies were matnlineal. 
Marriage could be dissolved at will by the wife who remained 
in her own tribe and kept her children who became members of 
her tribe. (O'Leary, 1927) 
Judaism and Christianity gradually replaced the 
prevalent religious cults based on agriculture with a new 
concept of a single God whose presence as an ethical force 
became the organizing factor for a new notion of community. 
Those who responded to the worship of the new deity had an 
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historic responsibility to create a social order harmonious 
with the dictates of that God. Monotheism called for a new 
moral order and for the reorganization of cultural 
priorities. The Monophysites and Nestorians of the Eastern 
Christian Church spread in Mesopotamia (Iraq), Syria, 
Palestine and among the tribes of northern and western 
Arabia. Jewish tribes were strong in Yathrib (Egyptian) or 
(Medina, Aramaic for the city) and in other parts of 
Northwestern Arabia. In the fifth century, Judaism became 
the religion of the Himyarite kings of the Yemen, until they 
were superseded by the Ethiopian Christians in 525 A.D. 
Meanwhile, an autonomous form of monotheism, Hanifism, 
evolved in Arabia and probably influenced Muhammad's vision 
of unification of the Arab tribes under Islam.(Stillman, 
1979 et al.) 
The influence of monotheism as a social as well as 
religious force in the Arabian lands took hold slowly. 
While Judaism had evolved for centuries before Islam unified 
the Arab world, folk culture continued to embody the 
mutuality of religious beliefs, social customs and cultural 
modes, of Jew and Arab. 
In the area of social organization Jew and Arab had 
much in common. The type of societies developed by Jew and 
Arab were based on respect for human dignity and 
freedom.(Goitein,1974) Social groups known as clans were 
internally autonomous but were most often grouped in larger 
associations known as 'tribes'.(0'Leary,1927 et al.) Tribes 
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were organized in loose confederations with loyalty based on 
kinship groupings and alliances, rather than obedience to 
one authority figure. 
In the century preceding Muhammad, the Qurayzah, an- 
Nadir and Qaynuqa were the most powerful of the Arab Jewish 
clans on the Arabian peninsula. The two dominant Arab 
clans, Aws and Khazraj settled on those lands forming 
confederations of 'jiwar', protected as neighbors, with the 
Jewish tribes.(Watt,1956; 0'Leary,1927). With an influx of 
new settlers the Arab tribes expanded and were unified under 
Malik ibn Ajlan,which precipitated a reversal in this 
relation. But the basis of social organization remained the 
same. Tribes of Arabs and Jews formed alliances that 
afforded each protection and ensured mutual support when 
faced with external threats or in settling internal 
disputes. 
The Arab Jewish tribes of Yathrib or al-Medina , "the 
city", may have been refugees from rebellions against Rome 
in 70 and 135 C.E., or Arabs who converted to Judaism. The 
Quaynuqa made and sold crafts at a market they supervised. 
The Qurayzah and an-Nadir settled the richest lands in the 
oasis of Yathrib and raised palm trees. The structure and 
dynamics of tribal life were conducive to economic 
complementarity, rather than economic competition. Because 
the state and its institutions had not yet evolved, there 
was no central authority with decision-making power over all 
within its domains. Several manifestations of economic 
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complementarity are apparent. These included: co-operation 
between settled and nomadic tribes; the imperative within 
each tribe of responsibility for the welfare of all who were 
'kin, either through blood ties or through acquired tribal 
affiliation; and political confederations that ensured the 
providing of protection for the weaker tribes by those who 
were stronger. 
While these economic factors contributed toward 
peaceful co-existence between Arab and Jew, there were 
elements in the pre-Islamic period that contributed toward 
dissension. Three factors are important. The first is that 
the development of various branches of the economy had 
consequences for the internal structure of tribal life as 
well as for relations between Jews and Arabs. The second 
factor is tensions generated as a consequence of 
developments in religious life that reach a turning point 
with the rise of Islam in the seventh century. The third 
factor is the effect of external forces, such as the 
\ struggle between the Roman-Byzantium Empire and Sassanian 
Persian Empire, on economic, social and political life. 
An important shift in social organization based on the 
development of the economy came about as a class of land 
owners emerged. The wealthier members of the Arab tribe 
were those who owned more cattle and hence claimed 
privileges of land use. By asserting rights over property, 
they acquired surplus produce which they sold within Arabia 
and in neighboring lands. Those left without land, 
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therefore with no means of production, became a separate 
class resisting the tribal aristocracy and living outside of 
the proscribed tribal mores. Gradually the power of tribal 
elders based traditionally on respect and custom, became 
identified with economic strength.(Belayev,1969) 
The consequences of this development over time, were 
felt by the Jews of Medina who had control over much of the 
fertile land of the oases. While tensions were dealt with 
in the form of political confederations representing 
alliances between Jew and Arab, the Jew was nonetheless 
viewed as a power to be reckoned with. 
Jews and Arabs were affected by the struggle between 
the Roman-Byzantium and Sassanian Persian Empires. Their 
presence in the Syrian desert made them a natural buffer 
between Rome and Persia, who manipulated tribal animosities 
to win allies. From the third century Jewish communities at 
Hirah near the Euphrates were controlled by the Lakhmids, 
Arab vassal princes of Sasanian Persia until 
602.(Baron,1983) The stimulus of competition for control of 
international trade resulted in increased wealth for the 
Arabs who controlled the important trade routes. Merchants 
gaining access to merchandise, knowledge, and customs from 
other lands became an increasingly important and powerful 
class. Within their own cultures and between cultures, the 
potential for exploitation of the less powerful had to be 
confronted. 
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These initial remarks on Jewish Arab co-existence in 
the centuries preceding Islam have demonstrated that daily 
survival for Jew and Arab was enhanced by the exchange of 
ideas, beliefs, cultural expression and complementary forms 
of economic and social organization. Further, relations 
between Arab and Jew have been influenced by the impact of 
outside forces in the economic, political,and religious 
fields. 
Simultaneously, Judeo-Arabic culture has been shaped by 
the traditions of ancient Babylonians, Egyptians, Persians. 
Both communities had inherited the administrative language 
of the Assyrians—Aramaic— and the traditions of 
Hellenistic culture, which at first the Jews had resisted 
only to finally absorb through its assimilation by Arab 
culture. Jew and Arab have been nurtured by the traditions 
of civilizations that have stimulated each culturally: they 
have also been bound by the effort to maintain autonomous 
existences, cultural integrity, and economic viability. In 
the next century the potential for Arab dominance is 
realized, as Arab culture becomes solidified by the unifying 
force of Islam. 
The Emergence of Islam 
The emergence of Islam in the seventh century, its 
subsequent unification of the Arab world and expansion of 
the Muslim Empire to include the Arab peoples and most of 
the Jewish communities of western Asia, North Africa and 
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Spam, resulted in a new order restructuring Arab-Jewish 
life. From the time of the hijra(migration of Muhammad to 
Medina in 622), Islam meant a new sense of community, 
structured by faith and submission to the authority of the 
Prophet Muhammad; and later to the Empire and Caliph 
(ruler). 
The Muslim state emerged as a resolution to societal 
conditions in Medina in the seventh century. Tensions among 
feuding tribes were resolved by a structure that affirmed 
tribal autonomy. In exchange for that autonomy, recognition 
of the community of Umma, the Muslim community, ruled by 
divine law, provided an acceptable structure for resolution 
°f differences. Muhammad became the religious and 
administrative head of the community overseeing its armies, 
tax collection and legal system. The resulting 
interpenetration of faith and power, religion and authority 
shaped political and social organization.(Lewis,1982) 
The Muslim community was governed by the holy law, 
Shari'a, developed by jurists from the Qur'an and traditions 
of the Prophet. This code reflected an ideal pattern of 
conduct toward which society must strive. According to the 
Shari'a, the Caliph, or ruler, was elected by God and had 
ultimate power in military, civil and religious matters. 
His charge was to maintain the spiritual and material legacy 
of the Prophet. Support came from the 'Ulama'- doctors of 
divine law, who interpreted and advised. The status of 
dhimmis accorded minorities under Islam, was based on 
30 
recognition of this structure; a recognition expressed in 
payment of a special poll tax, jizya, and obedience to a 
series of restrictions defined by holy law. 
The following section will examine Muhammad's rise to 
power,his relations with the Jews, and the circumstances 
surrounding the consolidation of Islam. Under Caliphal rule 
which culminated in assumption of power by the Ottomans in 
1517 regional variations, sectarian movements and political 
upheaval resulted in a range of consequences for minorities 
under Islam. We will ascertain how the events of these 
years influenced life for Jews and for Arabs and how these 
events affected the evolution of Arab-Jewish relations. 
Circumstances of Muhammad's rise to power 
Prior to the Hijra, migration of Muhammad to Medina in 
622, the struggle for dominance between the two large 
federations of Arab tribes dominated life in Medina. Abu- 
I-Qasim Muhammad B. Abd-Allah was born in Mecca, the major 
trading center of western and central Arabia. At this time 
the Meccan economy was in significant transition. An 
emerging class of merchants became increasingly powerful as 
they claimed trade monopolies. Muhammad's teachings 
counteracted the trend toward individualism and accumulation 
of wealth in this period. He contradicted the claim of the 
merchant princes that the significance of life lay in power 
and wealth. He taught that God has an eternal punishment 
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awaiting those who are unjust and an eternal reward for 
those who are upright. This was an appeal to the merchant 
princes to fulfill the obligations of the chief of the tribe 
or clan and to look after the interests of the weaker 
members instead of oppressing them.(Watt,1956) 
The emphasis by the merchant class on freedom for the 
individual that emerged in Mecca along with the shifting 
sconomic order, did not accord with tribal expectations. 
Muhammad gained many adherents from among marginal people 
who were not benefiting from the shift to individualistic 
commercial life. Islam introduced a moral conception that 
retained the sense of security of the old moral order in a 
form that could be and would be adopted to the new order. 
The Meccan ruling class however was not open to clear moral 
sanctions for behavior based on a new concept of authority. 
Because of their resistance, Muhammad was forced to leave. 
Invited to Medina in 622 by members of the Aws and 
Khazraj who were drawn to Islam and who saw an opportunity 
to utilize Muhammad as an arbitrator of intertribal 
disputes, Muhammad became chief magistrate of the city. 
Negotiations involved two meetings near Medina, at al- 
Aquaba. In June, 622, at the second meeting, seventy five 
Medinese accepted Islam.(Belayev,1969;Watt,1956) 
Several factors affected the successful emergence of 
Muhammad's empire. The Persian/Byzantium struggles allowed 
Muhammad to step in, accruing allies dissatisfied and 
oppressed in those respective kingdoms. Because of the 
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chaos engendered by continuous warfare, the Jews were 
hopeful that the Age of the Messiah was imminent. Conflicts 
between Jews and Christians in Palestine contributed to 
disunity. The Jews had already begun to lose their power 
with the influx of Arabs from South Arabia. Muhammad seized 
the opportunity to unite the Arab world under a new concept 
community informed by religious revelation. 
Muhammad and the Jews 
Muhammad was cautious in his attempts to reconcile the 
Jews. He affirmed the reality of his prophethood by 
asserting that his revelation ( known as the Qur'an, which 
means 'recitation'), was in line with that of Jesus and 
Moses. He honored Arab traditions affirming practices 
adopted from the Jews. Both religions practiced an ethical 
monotheism. Muhammad kept the idea of the Sabbath, without 
complete abstention from work and shifted it to Friday in 
commemoration of the Hijra and to differentiate between 
Muslim community and that of Jews and Christians. As a 
result of the negotiations of 622, Muhammad introduced a 
document defining relationships between the Medinese tribes 
and confirming Jews as members of the Medinese community 
with certain rights and responsibilities, with the 
stipulation 'as long as Jews did not act 
wrongfully'.(Stillman,1979:11) 
In spite of these and similar efforts, Muhammad's 
attempts at persuading the Jews that he was only renewing 
33 
the faith which "was in the books of yore-the book of 
Abraham and Moses", were unsuccessful.(Watt,1956:197) His 
critics accused him of being a false prophet. Recognizing 
the Jews as a threat to his vision, Muhammad turned against 
them. Shortly after his first victory over the Meccans at 
Badr in 624, Muhammad defeated the Banu Qaunuqa, weakest of 
the three Jewish tribes. In 625, the Banu Nadir were 
defeated and two years later the Jewish oasis of Kaybar were 
subdued. Quranic arguments against the Jews reflect 
Muhammad s change in relation to the Jews and his insistence 
that believers regard themselves as a community distinct 
from both Jews and Christians. His teachings now emphasized 
that: 
1. Abraham was not a Jew. 
2. Jews broke their covenant with God at Sinai by 
worshipping a calf. 
3. Jews disbelieve in the part of the Book given to them and 
act wickedly in disobedience to the commands of God through 
usury and worldliness. 
4. Jewish and Christian scriptures are textually corrupt 
5. Jews and Christians denied one another's exclusive claims 
to election. They could not both be true because they are 
similar. Both go beyond what their revealed scriptures 
justified.(Watt,1956:205) 
The agreement between Muhammad and the Jews of Kahybar 
who did not flee became the basis for future relations 
between Muslims and their newly acquired populations. In 
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return for personal safety and the right to retain their 
homes and property, the Jews agreed to pay one half of their 
annual date harvest.(Stillman,1979) in exchange for this 
settlement, Jews and others (now known collectively as the 
dhimmi,or protected minorities) were to be shown tolerance. 
Those who did not follow a monotheistic religion were not 
entitled to be classified as dhimmi. 
The Consolidation of Islam 
Eighteen months after the conquest of Kaybar, Mecca 
surrendered peacefully and accepted Islam, many tribes 
requesting missionaries to teach them the new faith. 
(Tribes already Christian were not expected to 
convert.) (Watt, 1974 ; Hodgson,1974) The Jews and Christians 
of Yemen in the south and of Yamana, Nejd and Bahrayn in the 
East began to pay tribute.(Stillman,1979) In the years 
following, each minority paid an annual tribute to the 
Muslim treasury and a poll tax per head. In return the 
dhimmi received protection from external enemies and were 
entitled to the same protection from 'internal' crime as 
given to Muslims- a concept deeply embedded in the 
traditional life of the Arabian world. Just as an Arab 
could not raid his own tribe or a friendly tribe, so the 
Muslim could not raid other Muslims or groups in alliance 
with Muhammad. Because the Islamic federation was open to 
Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians and other monotheists as 
'protected minorities', once settlement was made with them 
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they could no longer be attacked. The custom of smaller 
tribes forming protected federations with larger ones was 
continued in this way. (Watt,1974) 
The Period of the Caliphates 
Abu-Bakr (632-634) (of the Quraysh tribe) became 
Muhammad's successor, assuming the title of Khalifat 
(Caliph) rasul Allah (successor of the messenger of 
God).(Goldschmidt,1979) His main task was to subdue the 
tribal rebellions that broke out in response to Muhammad's 
death. The agreements made by Muhammad with Jews and 
Christians were solidified by Abu Bakr's successor, Umar in 
the Document of Surrender, presented to the Patriarch of 
Jerusalem. Umar pardoned the tribes renouncing Islam and 
enlisted them in a jihad (holy war) to expand the lands of 
the Umma. Christian Arab tribes also participated in the 
conquests. During the Caliphate of Umar and his successor 
Uthman (644-656), all of Syria, Iraq, Iran, Egypt and 
Cyrenaica became part of the 'ummah'.(Stillman,1979) 
The effectiveness of the Caliphate in its early years 
was due to its ability to synthesize the existing legal, 
religious, and cultural life of the conquered populations 
with Islamic practices. Muslims of Jewish descent, for 
example, Ka'bal-Ahbar or Al-Habr, the rabbi, of Yemenite 
origin, influenced the evolution of the Hadith (sayings 
transmitted in Muhammad's name) through which Islam absorbed 
Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian teachings and legal 
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concepts. (Goitem, 1955) While the conquering Arabs formed 
an elite class, they relied on the conquered populations to 
maintain the administration of their own communities. in 
this way they acquired support for the new regime and were 
able to focus on the expansion of Islam. While there was 
differentiation from one Muslim region to another the goals 
and visions of Islam provided a common thread, weaving 
together the developing ideas and customs of the newly 
identified Arab world, the Dar al-Islam. 
Islam and Dhimmi Status 
The Muslim religion, like Judaism, is a religion of 
1Halaka', in Arabic, 'Shari'a'- God given law regulating 
every aspect of life: law, worship, ethics,and social 
etiquette. There was no hierarchy of religious dignitaries 
who sat in official synods or councils mandating social 
practice, as was the case with Christian churches. For non- 
Muslims, life was regulated by a contract that 
institutionalized attitudes and practices regarding their 
status. The Muslims conceived of society as an association 
of separate groups- religions, nations, classes, held 
together by a system of rule dictated by God.(Lewis,1973) 
The origins of the dhimmi status go back to the first 
period of the Arab conquests.(Lewis,1983:25) Policies in 
regard to conquered peoples were incorporated into Holy Law. 
Some of the restrictions placed on the dhimmi may have been 
security precautions, and/or ways of distinguishing among 
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various groups. For instance, limitations were placed on 
what clothes might be worn, by the dhimmi. In the ninth 
century the Caliph of Baghdad forced dhimmi to wear a yellow 
badge.(Lewis,1973:25) The prohibition against dhimmi 
owenership of certain animals and against bearing arms, 
limited mobility and potential revolt of these groups. Some 
types of discrimination such as limits on building and uses 
of places of worship were inherited from the previous 
empires of Iran and Byzantium.(Lewis,1973:25) 
In exchange for payment of the jizya, or poll tax, and 
in theory,there were theoretically no restrictions on dhimmi 
regarding settlement or occupation. However, in certain 
periods dhimmis engaged heavily in trade and 
finance,vocations scorned by Muslims because they 
necessitated contact with unbelievers. In later centuries, 
dhimmis were represented in trades such as cleaning 
cesspools and drying the contents for fuel, a common 
occupation for Jews in Morocco, Yemen, Iraq, Iran and 
central Asia. Dhimmis were tanners, butchers and hangmen 
and engaged in other 'despised' occupations necessitating 
dealings with unbelievers- diplomacy, commerce, banking, 
brokerage and espionage. They were workers in gold and 
silver- regarded by strict Muslims as endangering the 
immortal soul.(Lewis,1973:28) 
While the actual situation of the dhimmis varied from 
century to century depending upon political developments and 
individual rulers, it seems clear that certain of the 
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restrictions must have been particularly burdensome for the 
poor, such as the paying of the jizya.(Lewis,1984:26) Jews 
traditionally had mechanisms for dealing with this since the 
Jewish community organization was structured around 
egalitarian principles, and the institutionalization of 
charity was a moral obiigation.(Baron,1983) 
In most Muslim political thought: "the central duty of 
the government, the justification of its authority and the 
cardinal virtue of a good ruler, was 
justice. (Lewis,1984:53) In later years, this meant the 
maintenance of social and political order with each group in 
its proper place:" giving what it must give and getting what 
it should get."(Lewis,1984:53) In what ways did this system 
encourage cultural survival for Jews and for their Muslim 
rulers? What kinds of interactions did it stimulate and how 
did those interactions contribute to the common good of 
both? 
Jews Under Islam 
For their part, Jews and Christians (Nestorian and 
Monophysites suffering from oppression in Byzantium) viewed 
the Arabs as liberators. The persecutions of Heraclius 
(610-641) after the recapture of Palestine from the Persians 
in 629 had severely disrupted Jewish life. The Jewish 
communities of the Near East, North Africa and Spain 
suffered from legal, material and spiritual restrictions, 
which became far less onerous under Islam. Writing during 
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the period of the Arab conquests, Rabbi Simon bar Yohai 
described Caliph Umar as 'a lover of Israel who repaired 
their breaches: "The Holy one is only bringing the kingdom 
of Ishmael in order to help you from the wicked one 
(Christians)"(Swartz,1970:7) 
By the third century of Islam, with the downfall of the 
Umayyads, the locus of power shifted from Damascus to the 
province of Iraq (ancient Babylonia) where the Abbasids 
ruled. Babylonia was the home of the important Jewish 
academies of Sura and Pumbedita and the place from which the 
Babylonian Talmud emerged. The head of the community was 
recognized by the Arab invaders and Jews increasingly became 
integrated into the mainstream of Arab 
society.(Stillman,1979) 
Jews Under Abassid Rule- Eighth Century 
The Abassid period saw a resurgence of Persian 
(Iranian) influence from Iraq accompanied by a dramatic 
growth of mercantile economy. Jews were employed by Muslim 
rulers as advisors and chief ministers to Caliphs in Iraq, 
Egypt and Spain, the three major political centers of the 
Arab world. (Goldschmidt,1979) 
During the time of Abassid rule, tribal soldiers from 
Arabia slowly gave way to salaried troops, Iranians from 
Khurasan and Turkish tribal horse soldiers. As a result of 
the increased role of the Turkish bodyguard in Caliphate 
politics, two Turkish war leaders acquired the throne who 
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favored an orthodox policy and for a brief period imposed 
harsh measures restricting Christian and Jew . However, 
Abu-Yusuf, advisor to the Caliph in Baghdad, opposed taxing 
the needy and warned that the dhimmis " should not be dealt 
with unjustly, nor mishandled, nor overburdened; nor should 
anything be taken from their property over and above their 
rightly dues(Lewis,1984:61) 
Tenth through thirteenth centuries- The Fatimids and 
Avvubids 
The Fatimid Caliphs claiming descent from the Prophet 
Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and ascribing 
supernatural powers to its religio-political leaders, ruled 
an empire extending from Syria to Morocco.(Goldschmidt,1979) 
Under their liberal rule, Christians and Jews attained high 
government positions without for the most part, the 
necessity to convert. The rule of the third Fatimid Caliph 
of Egypt, Al-Hakim (996-1021) was an exception to the 
efflorescence of Jewish/Arab symbiosis during this period. 
Al-Hakim, in what is considered to be a fit of insanity, 
revived and attempted to institute restrictions on dhimmi; 
wearing distinguishing clothing and prohibitions on 
ownership of property and use of churches and 
synagogues.(Goldschmidt,1979) On the other hand, documents 
discovered in Old Cairo, provide adequate testimony to the 
over all stability of Arab/Jew co-existence. The Cairo- 
Geniza documents and letters, buried in the vault of the 
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synagogue in Old Cairo ( due to the custom that documents 
bearing the word 'God' could not be destroyed), details the 
Muslim-Jewish world, from Spain and Morocco in the west, to 
Aden and India in the East.(Goitein,1967) 
During the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
evidence in the Geniza documents makes clear that dhimmis 
were regarded as responsible members of a society that 
afforded them protection and basic freedoms. Non-Muslims 
and Muslims were bound together by one government and 
economic system. The fate of the country was shared. The 
sense of commonality established by place of origin is 
expressed in this passage from the Genizas. A Jewish judge 
of Barqa (eastern Libya) wrote: 'On this very day a big 
caravan is setting out for Barqa under the common of Ibn 
Shibl. I have booked in it for myself and for my goods at 
the price of three dinars and have already paid the 
fare.Most of the travelers are Barqis. They have promised 
me to be considerate with regard to the watering places and 
the keeping of the Sabbath and similarities. For in the 
whole caravan there is not a single Jew beside myself. 
Notwithstanding, I confide in God that everything will work 
out fine according to his will."(Goitein,1967:274) 
Partnerships 
Commercial partnerships between Jews, hristians and 
Muslims were common, often with one party supplying the 
capital or goods and the other doing business. Houses and 
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shops were often held in partnership. The Jewish statute 
forbidding sale or rent of parts of houses to Muslims was 
often overlooked because of economic considerations.In spite 
of fears that Muslims would hinder observance of the 
Sabbath, and that Jews would violate the Muslim custom of 
secluding women in separate sections, cohabitation was not 
uncommon.(Goitein,1967) The following inquiry to Maimonides 
indicates that differences were not insurmountable barriers 
to cooperative ventures: 'What does our master say with 
regard to partners in a workshop some being jews and some 
Muslims, exercising the same craft. The partners have 
agreed between themselves that the (gains made on) Friday 
should go to the Jews and those made on Saturday to the 
Muslim. The implements of the workshop are held in 
partnership; the crafts exercised are in one case 
goldsmithing,in another the making of glass. Maimonides 
rules that the arrangment was legal, as long as the Jewish 
craftsmen did not partake in any profit on 
Saturday.(Goitein,1974:278) 
Legal Matters 
Institutional practices affecting legal and economic 
life continued to be influenced by the proximity of Jewish- 
Muslim communities. For example, Muslim contracts were 
informally recognized by the participants of the 
transaction, while Jewish contracts were of religious 
import, requiring symbolic acts for confirmation. Contracts 
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were often instituted in both courts in order to secure 
religious legality as well as judicial authorization. While 
Jewish law, influenced by the agricultural nature of Jewish 
society alloted the bulk of an inheritance to a few, Muslims 
distributed small shares to many. Medieval Egyptian Jews 
began to write wills according to the laws of Muslim 
inheritance, in order to discourage Jews from going to 
Muslim courts.(Goitein,1967) 
An indication of the range of religious and civil 
liberties enjoyed by Jews during the Fatimid period is that 
a wide range of legal matters- marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, status of slavery and freedom, and religious 
matters- were brought before rabbinical courts. As in the 
Muslim world, Jewish religious law encompassed economic and 
social life. Jewish laws and procedures diverged from those 
of Muslims and while dhimmis could apply to a Muslim judge, 
there was no need to do so, except in areas of criminal 
jurisdiction related to the state. Application to a state 
court was further discouraged by the fees, tips and bribes 
involved. Juridicial continuity provided stability and 
coherence for the dispersed and mobile Jewish population who 
would find the same laws applicable in all communities. 
(Goitein,1967) 
Leadership 
The Fatimid Empire relied on members of the dhimmi, Jew 
and Christian, for leadership in government as well as in 
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commerce. A Jewish convert to Islam became a vizier in the 
Eastern part of the Fatimid Empire, assisted by a Christian 
finance director in charge of Egypt and a Jew in charge of 
Syria. There is evidence that Muslim Jewish and Christian 
religious scholars and officials of various kinds maintained 
friendly cooperative relations. A Geniza document of 1182 
indicates that Moses Maimonides, ibn Sana al-Mulk, gadi of 
Cairo and a famous poet ( 1151-1211) and other Jewish and 
Muslim intellectuals, were closely connected. (Goitein,1967) 
Jewish Vulnerability 
The close development of Arab and Jewish cultures in 
pre-Islamic times continued under the Islamic Caliphate, 
which was influenced by Arab/Jewish traditions (notions of 
confederation and protection), as well as by the 
administrative systems of Persia and Byzantium. As dhimmi, 
Jews were not singled out from other non-Muslim populations 
except positively, in so far as they maintained an already 
existing special place in the Arab world. Those aspects of 
life affected most immediately by the conservatism of 
orthodox Islamic tenets were the most exacting for Jews and 
other dhimmis. For example non-Muslim religious practices 
had to be inconspicuous. In 1123 the Fatimid vizier decreed 
that Jewish and Christian funerals could only take place 
during the night.(Goitein:1967) Other dhimmi restrictions, 
that Jewish physicians could not treat Muslims and the need 
for distinguishing dress, were not enforced during the 
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Fatimid or early Ayyubid periods and in general were only 
instituted when a particularly weak or cruel government led 
to persecutions. The Fatimid Caliphate of Al-Hakim, 
mentioned previously, and the rule of the Almohads in North 
Africa and Spain during which Christians, Jews and 
dissenting Muslims were slaughtered, are examples. 
Examples of discrimination do not seem to indicate a 
continuous state of strife between Jews and Muslims. The 
term sin'uth, 'hatred' and sone, 'a hater', appears in the 
Geniza to indicate a Jew baiter, but is applied to 
particular groups or persons rather than as an indication of 
generalized anti-semitism.(Goitein,1967:278) For instance, 
the town of al-Ma'ara in northern Syria was known for its 
sin'uth: one merchant is congratulated on escaping from it. 
A son writes to his father from Fez, Morocco to Almeria 
Spain: "Anti-Semitism in this country is such that, in 
comparison with it, life in Almeria is salvation. May God 
in His Mercy grant me a safe departure." At the same time 
he refers to friendly relations with Muslims with whom he 
does business.(Goitein,1967:279) 
Prohibition of ritual slaughter was imposed at times 
upon Jews in Jerusalem, Old Cairo and Acre, when market 
police were not willing to grant Jews the privilege of 
reserving space for special slaughter houses. Natural 
devastations could also result in additional burdens for 
dhimmi: for instance in a time of famine in Egypt, it was 
reported that Jewish houses were plundered on the Sabbath 
46 
with the contention that the household had hidden food 
supplies.(Goitein,1967) 
The administration of the Muslim state was carried out 
m part by officials and in part by agents and tax farmers. 
Those within the Jewish community who served the government 
became the elite. While during the Fatimid and most of the 
Ayyubid periods non-Muslims were well represented in state 
administration,as mentioned above, these positions could 
become precarious in times of shifting power struggles 
accompanied by religious propaganda. For this reason Jews 
tended to prefer areas of business and industry that could 
prove less dangerous and more lucrative. Because of their 
vulnerability and subsequent close adherence to the notion 
of loyalty to the state, Jews were put in positions that 
could not be entrusted to Muslims; for instance, the 
manufacture of coins remained largely in the hands of 
Jews.(Goitein,1967) 
Government Interference 
One Geniza document indicates the extent to which Jews 
could turn to prevailing political conditions to their 
advantage. The Ayyubids were Kurds who maintained an 
orthodox position on Islamic law. Opponents in the Jewish 
world of innovation within Judaism addressed the following 
query to Imad al-Din, 'legal expert of the realm of the 
Caliph': "Jewish prayer on workdays, Sabbaths and holidays 
follows ancient patterns and long established customs. Now 
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certain people want to introduce changes. Are such 
innovations permissible in the days o£ Islam, may God make 
them permanent?" The expected answer was that they were 
not.(Goitein,1967:296) 
Jewish/Arab intermingling 
At the time of the Arab conquests, most Jews spoke 
Aramaic and used Hebrew for religious and literary purposes. 
By the end of the third century of Arab rule, Arabic had 
become the language of daily life for Jews, as well as most 
of the conquered populations. Literary and religious works 
were translated into or written in Arabic: for example, the 
Old Testament, the Mishna, and a major work on Hebrew poetry 
composed by Moses ben Ezra. (Goitein,1974) Religious 
poetry, a tradition of the Arab world incorporated by Jews 
in pre-Islamic times, continued to be influenced by the use 
of different meters, arrangments of stanzas and themes 
developed in Arabic. In the area of philosophy and 
theology, Jews were influenced by the Arab encounter with 
Greek-Hellenistic thinking.(Stillman,1979 et.al.) The early 
Muslim pietists influenced the development of Hasidism, 
originally a Jewish pietist movement. In both religious 
communities, religious-political movements led to the 
proliferation of sectarian communities, the most influential 
being the Jewish Karaites and the Arab 
Shi'ites.(Goitein,1974;Stillman,1979) Both communities, in 
the face of monumental changes in the early centuries of 
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Islam, experienced many messianic movements, as well as 
ascetic movements, resisting the transformations and 
mourning an ideal of a religious life in the Holy Land. 
The Jewish Talmud and Midrash and the Muslim Hadith 
reflect the incorporation by both communities of shared 
ideas, customs and patterns of behavior. The similarity of 
Jewish and Arab folklore reflects the commonality of local 
life. In Yemen, for example, both populations followed the 
same Muslim or Jewish holy men and healers and worshipped at 
the same holy places.(Katzir:1982) In both urban and rural 
settings Jewish and Muslim customs and dress, physical 
appearance, and patterns of daily living were similar. 
Within Yemen Jewish society and in general, women were 
responsible for the integration of Arab folk culture into 
Jewish life. Their greater freedom to intermingle allowed 
them to absorb and integrate elements of the majority 
culture with their own. This exchange is manifested in 
traditions of folksong and dance as well as in Jewish 
women's love songs which follow a local Muslim 
tradition.(Katzir,1982) 
In summary, the transformation of the economy resulting 
from the Arab conquests, and of social and religious life, 
had a variety of consequences for Jews (and other minorities 
within the Islamic world) and for relations between Arab and 
Jew. The imposition of the conquering Arab elite upon a 
social structure that was already burdensome to the 
peasantry resulted in unrest and uprisings. The transfer of 
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goods (wealth) Into the hands of this new class resulted in 
what Goitein calls a 'bourgeois revolution’. The market 
became glutted and a new reserve of cheap labor was created. 
Consumerism was stimulated by the expanding international 
market.(Goitein, 1974) 
In the early years of these transformations, Jews to 
adjusted to a change in status that had already begun in the 
sixth and seventh centuries. Increasingly Jews lost their 
agricultural base. As the Muslim Empire acguired land Jews 
were forced into towns where they were poor and had to rely 
on crafts for a living. However the new world order 
reguired skills that Jews had developed in pre-Islamic times 
as merchants. Jews became suppliers of goods to rulers, to 
the army, and to the general populace. Using their 
connections with the widely settled Jewish communities of 
the Diaspora they became an important link in the 
development of international trade. 
As noted above, restrictions on Jewish life in the new 
Empire were initially rooted in the imposition of the jizya 
(poll tax), a burden especially for peasants who maintained 
a subsistence existence tied to the land. According to an 
Arab papyrus of the ninth century an agricultural laborer 
received as a yearly wage six gold pieces and had to pay one 
as a poll tax, which was a considerable loss of 
income.(Baron, 1983) Restrictions on dhimmi detailed in the 
Covenant of Umar were enforced to varying degrees depending 
upon the state of the Empire and the discretion of the 
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Caliph in power. For the most part they were not enforced: 
the benefits of dhimmi life became the basis for widespread 
reports on the positive experiences of Jews in Islamic 
lands. Stories are told about Caliphs who wanting to assist 
their Jewish friends by lifting the obligation of jizya were 
told by those friends that it would bring more harm than 
good.(Baron,1983) The obligation of jizya initially 
restricted life (Jews could not leave town without tax 
receipts in their pockets) but on the other hand, it was an 
obligation that kept intact a system from which benefits 
were derived. The promise of protection of life, religious 
freedom and property in return, was with few exceptions, 
rigorously kept. 
Thus in the period of the rise of Islam, as a result of 
transformations in the Middle Eastern lands, Jews were 
transformed from a people mainly engaged in agriculture, 
small crafts and other manual trades, to a people whose most 
important occupations were in the areas of commerce. Strong 
inner migratory movement related to commerce brought about a 
renewed sense of the community of Jewish people within the 
Muslim world. Because the economic and social advantages of 
conversion to Islam were not strong, Jewish religious 
cohesion was not threatened. 
In pre-Islamic times Jews and Arabs developed shared 
strategies for daily survival, including 'religious' 
practices to bring rain, healing by magical means, and the 
development of a viable social system affording protection 
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and valuing loyalty between affiliated clans. m the early 
centuries of Islam these interactions continued in a new 
form. While Islam was dominant, this did not inhibit a 
monumental interchange on all levels of practical and 
philosophical existence that shaped the form, content and 
future of both Islam and Judaism. 
From the seventh century, political and therefore 
economic control by the Muslim state shaped the 
institutional nature of Arab/Jew relations. in daily life a 
shared folk culture kept alive traditions of mutuality 
between Arab and Jew . From the seventh century on, the 
interpenetration of both factors,' Muslim' as well as' Arab' 
is significant for the evolution of Arab/Jew relations. 
In the Islamic world, Christians, Jews and Muslims 
shared a common language, and were participants in a common 
economy mediated by separate communal administrative systems 
that were intact, under their own initiative. Jewish 
communal life continued to draw upon and develop survival 
strategies that had been evolving for centuries of living in 
the diaspora. As a consequence of persecution, Jews 
experienced exile and disfranchisement. In response they 
constructed a world within a world; a communal life that 
insured a measure of safety allowing for the creative 
evolution of social, religious, literary, juridical, life. 
This fact was not inhibited by Islam; rather for the most 
part, it was encouraged. Arabs had a history of productive 
association with Jews. The Arab world continued to benefit 
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from that mutuality and interdependence, and from the 
recognition that while different, Arab and Jewish cultures 
were not separate. 
Thirteenth-Sixteenth Centuries- The End of the Caliphate 
From the thirteenth century until the Turkish-Ottoman 
conquest of the Middle East and North Africa in the 
sixteenth century, a succession of invasions, beginning with 
the Spanish Reconquista and Crusades of 1098-1291, and 
Mongol invasions that brought an end to the Caliphate in 
Baghdad in 1258, transformed the spiritual, social and 
economic climate of the Muslim world.(Stillman,1979) 
By 1124, the Crusaders controlled the Syro-Palestinian 
coast. The Crusaders were overcome by the Ayyubid dynasty, 
who ruled in Egypt and Syria from 1171 to 
1250.(Stillman,1979) In 1250, the Mamluks, former slaves of 
the Ayyubid sultans, overthrew the Ayyubids in Egypt and 
conquered as well parts of Libya, Syria, Palestine and 
Western Arabia.(Stillman,1979) 
Two factors contributed to the deterioration of Muslim- 
Jewish relations under Mamluk rule. General corruption on 
the part of the feudal military aristocracy and religious 
fanaticism as a result of the Mamluk campaign against the 
Crusaders, created an atmosphere of dissatisfaction and 
oppression. 
The Mamluks presented themselves as defenders of Islam 
against the Christian invasions, devout Muslims who 
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emphasized the role of the Ulama (Muslim clergy)and 
enforcement of dhimmi restrictions.(Encyclopedia Judaica, 
V°1*6• 1971) in 1301 and 1354 there were severe 
persecutions of non-Muslims, including forced conversion, 
closing of churches and synagogues and dismissal of 
government officials. in 1301 the Mamluks decreed that 
dhimmis wear distinguishing turbans- blue for Christians, 
yellow for Jews, red for Samaritans. The dhimmi were 
forbidden to ride horses and mules, and synagogues or 
churches built after Islam could be destroyed. Although the 
thrust of hostility was against Christian subjects of the 
Mamluk state, the Jew as 'non-Muslim' was also vulnerable to 
charges of 'treason' and therefore to 
persecution.(Stillman:1979) 
A crushing tax burden, weakening economy and frequent 
extortion of the indigenous bourgeoisie, exacerbated 
tensions between Muslims and dhimmis throughout the 
fifteenth century. 
In North Africa, at the time the Mamluks were coming to 
power in Egypt, Jews were emerging from the traumatic period 
of Almohad rule. The Maghreb (the westernmost part of 
Morocco was called the Maghreb or Arab west, while Algeria, 
Tunisia and Tripolitania were coined the eastern Maghreb 
Zenner and Deshen,1982:6) was divided into three main Berber 
kingdoms in which the social and economic status of Jews was 
stable. The Merinid dynasty in Morocco appointed Jews to 
high administrative positions. However, the appointment of 
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one such vizier, Aaron B. Batash, provoked a pogrom that 
decimated the inhabitants of Old Fez, where Jews had been 
living in special quarters (the mellah) since 1438, and 
brought down the Merinid dynasty.(Encyclopedia Judaica, 
Vol.6, 1971) 
With the arrival of exiles from Spain and Portugal 
after 1492, Jewish life improved. Some Jews joined Muslim 
guilds while others fulfilled economic functions as 
moneylenders, jewelers, smiths, weavers. Jews formed their 
own guilds and professional associations as well as 
continuing to engage in joint business ventures with 
Muslims. 
Three important generalizations can be made regarding 
Arab/Jewish relations during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and 
fifteenth centuries. The Mamluks were Turkish Muslims whose 
relations to Jews were shaped by a relentless drive against 
Christianity. As we have seen, during the Arab-Muslim 
conquests, Jews and Eastern Christians were allies to Islam 
in response to Roman-Byzantine persections. However, in 
response to the Crusade invasions, the Mamluks regarded all 
Christians as allies of the Crusaders and Jews as their 
potential allies. Religious fanaticism, provoked by the 
success of the Crusades, reversed the favored position of 
the Jew. In periods of religious fanaticism , religious 
rivalry prevailed over shared cultural traditions. 
Secondly social tensions created by war and 
governmental corruption reversed the favored position of the 
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Jew. Economic competition stimulated social discrimination. 
Many Jews in secure positions (physicians, government 
employees) were pressured to convert. The government 
strengthened itself by deflecting criticism onto minorities. 
A third observation about this period is important for 
the history of Muslim-Jew relations in general. Even within 
a single geographical area, the experiences of Jews could 
significantly vary. For example, in Morocco, Jews suffered 
less in territories under Berber control. Jews in the 
Berber regions of the High Atlas Mountains carried weapons, 
rode horses and did not pay the jizya.(Stillman,1979) 
The Ottoman Empire 
In 1517, the Mamluk Empire crumbled before the assault 
of Turkish Muslims, the Ottomans.4. 
Throughout their campaigns, Ottoman practice was 
consistent with their predecessors. Local leaders retained 
their positions in exchange for tribute and troops. Two new 
policies facilitating Ottoman expansion were the Surgun and 
the Devsirme. Surgun was forced migration and was used to 
establish a Turkish presence in newly conquered areas, as 
well as to remove unreliable elements fromm sensitive areas. 
Jews, like other minorities, suffered from Ottoman practices 
of colonization and transfer of populations. Such policies 
were responsible for the disappearance of everal Jewish 
communities, such as Salonica, which were later re¬ 
established by Spanish Jewish immigrants.(Braude and 
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Lewis,1982) The devsirme, or impressment of Christian youth 
of the Balkans who were converted to Islam, provided an 
educated trained military with important bureaucratic 
status. The mounted troops of the Ottomans eventually came 
to replace local lords in the provinces as they were granted 
'benefices' in exchange for service. (Braude and Lewis,1982) 
Societal Organization 
Governing institutions in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries kept intact the fundamental principle of Muslim 
social and political organization. The Ottoman Sultan, head 
of the House of Osman, was considered to be the leader in 
the struggle of Islam against non-believers. Important 
matters of state were dealt with by the Sultan and the 
divan, a council of ministers who included the highest 
officers in the civil-military bureaucracy as well as 
religious heads.(Epstein,1980) 
Like other Muslim dynasties before them, the Ottomans 
accepted the proscriptions of the Shariat, Islamic law. 
Situations dictated by the diversity of conditions in newly 
conquered lands, not handled by Islamic law were dealt with 
through Turkish customary practices and the promulgation of 
new statutes. Consistent with Muslim tradition, non-Muslims 
were allowed to retain authority over matters of personal 
status in their respective communities. Thus, the subjects 
of the state were organized into carefully defined corporate 
bodies. Members of the multiplicity of bureaucracies, each 
with its carefully proscribed social role, fell into two 
57 
broad categories- those in service of the state and those 
not in service of the state. Members of the military and 
religious establishments fell into the first category. 
Although in theory only Muslims could be defined in that 
way, converts to Islam could also obtain high positions in 
the state apparatus. The basic division in society, between 
the askeri, military, and other officials of the state and 
the raya, the subjects, was not defined by religion. All 
raya were subject to the same taxes, with non-Muslims paying 
the additional jizya.(Braude and Lewis,1982) 
The 'Covenant of Umar' or classic formulation of the 
general status of dhimmi, found practical expression and 
refinement during the period of Ottoman rule, in the 
establishment of the 'millet'. The millet allowed the 
Ottoman state to make the best possible use of its dhimmi 
subjects by defining clear roles in relation to the state 
that did not threaten cultural autonomy. Non-Muslims were 
treated as members of a community with a specific ethnic and 
linguistic heritage. Survival of ethnic groups in the 
millet was reinforced by a system of local administration in 
rural(village) or town (malle) communities. Jewish 
communities of the empire lived in 'Kehillot', each Kehilla 
grouped around its synagogue and subject to its own 
rabbi.(Braude and Lewis,1982) 
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Economic Life 
Ottoman and European documents from the late fifteenth 
century show Jews continuing to be engaged in commerce and 
having a predominant role in the textile trade.(Braude and 
Lewis,1982) They acted as middle persons between European 
and local merchants. The Jews in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries occupied economic roles complementary 
rather than competitive to the Turks. The Sephardic 
immigrants from Spain brought useful knowledge of European 
technology- printing, medicine, navigation, gunnery. Jews 
had the advantage of being trustworthy allies not suspected 
of treasonable sympathies with European Christendom. They 
were encouraged to function as an economically productive, 
revenue producing element.(Lewis, 1984) 
Jews and Ottomans were aware of sharing interests in 
relation to Christian dominance in Europe. Jewish aid to 
the Ottoman struggle against Christian Europe accorded them 
special favors.(Lewis, 1984) Since economic privilege was 
contingent upon access to the economic activities of the 
state, court Jews who had increasing influence during the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were able to assist 
aspiring tax farmers. Jews such as Hekim Yakub (Jacob of 
Gaeta) who had a European education and knowledge of 
European languages and developments, were utilized as 
advisors by the Sultan. Dona Garcia Mende and her nephew 
and son-in-law, Don Joseph Nassi were two Sephardim who 
attained considerable economic and political power through 
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tax concessions for lumber, wine and other alcoholic 
beverages. (Epstein, 1980,-Lewis, 1984) Nassi became the head 
of an enormous tax farming network and in his capacity as 
banker and financier maintained a network of agents in 
Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Similarly Jewish court 
physicians obtained high status and wielded influence, 
earning themselves an important role in the life of the 
community. 
In addition to tax farming, shop keeping and trade in 
foodstuffs, immigrants introduced cloth weaving adapted from 
the Spanish wool industry. Between 1453 and 1492 Jews 
played a major role in developing the economy of the 
capital. They collected fees and taxes on goods such as 
candles, candle-wax and port taxes collected on wine 
imported for use of non-Muslims, on whom an additional duty 
was levied. They negotiated commercial exchanges between 
foreign traders and local merchants and collected a fee from 
both parties on all transactions. For more than one hundred 
and fifty years Jews were involved in the activity of the 
Danubian ports, backbone of the transportation system of the 
Balkan region. The Jewish trade network assured the 
government of tax income and decreased the governments' 
burden of fiscal administration. In addition to dock 
functionaries and merchants, Jewish money changers formed an 
important element in the economic life of Istanbul and the 
countryside.(Epstein,1980; Lewis,1984) For purposes of 
trade, freedom of movement was assured. 
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Economic interdependence between Jew and Muslim grew 
out of the relation between Ottoman Sarrafs and Jewish 
merchants. Sarrafs were government agents who distributed 
and recalled coinage. They served as agents for tax 
farmers, collecting fees for their services. Jewish customs 
and dock employees had knowledge of day to day affairs 
necessary to the Ottoman Sarrafs whose knowledge of economic 
fluctuations were critical to the Jews. The successful 
functioning of both groups depended upon keeping abreast of 
political and economic developments within the government 
and the Empire. Their successful operations assured the 
treasury of income and assured funds to support officials 
whose salaries were derived from tax farm concessions. 
Jewish tax farmers of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries whose affairs were critical to the government 
represented a small percentage of the Jewish population. 
Local shopkeepers, peddlers, artisans, maintained a level of 
vitality necessary to the success of the more privileged. 
They distributed goods throughout the society and developed 
client-patron relationships with local potentates. In 
return for wares and services to local patrons, the latter 
extended protection. In areas where these relations were 
less fixed, Jewish traders were able to maintain a relative 
degree of freedom by playing off one potentate against 
another. 
In rural areas, Arab Jews engaged in occupational 
specialties useful to their Muslim neighbors. Everyday 
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relations were based on mutual need and expediency. Jews 
were smiths, traders, Shaman. Indigenous custom often makes 
difficult economic transactions that can be performed with 
ease by the outsider population. The role of trader is a 
case m point since trade practices are in conflict with the 
expectation of reciprocity among kinsfolk.(Deshen and 
Zenner,1982) 
Because economic relations provided patron protection 
for Jews, an attack on a Jewish trader was considered an 
attack on the patron also. Retaliation by the patron was 
not uncommon- a practice continuing into modern 
times.(Deshen and Zenner, 1982) 
Iberian Jews 
The influx of Sephardi Jewish immigrants changed the 
character of the Jewish community and had a marked influence 
on the Ottoman world. Jews exiled from Spain and Portugal 
had a history of vulnerability in the face of hostility from 
the Catholic church. Called al-Andalus by the Arabs, this 
western border of the Islamic world had been inhabited by 
Jews since before the third century. The Council of Elvira 
in 300 C.E. forbade close social relations between 
Christians (still a persecuted minority at the time) and 
Jews. In spite of this and other repressive policies of the 
Church synods of the Councils of Toledo, Jews remained an 
important and integrated population in Iberia. Synodal 
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canons required royal approval and this was not always 
forthcoming. 
The turning point came with the conversion of the 
Visigothic ruling houses in the six and seventh centuries to 
Catholicism in an effort to unify their kingdom. in 613, 
the ruler Sisebut renewed an earlier church decision that 
children of mixed marriages had to become Christians. The 
sixteenth Council of Toledo in 693 forced Jews to sell any 
slave, buildings, lands or vineyards they had acquired from 
Christians. Taxes were increased and commercial 
transactions with Christians overseas were forbidden. When 
the Muslims overran the Visigothic kingdon (711) Jews 
welcomed them as more tolerant and many returned who had 
fled to North Africa in the face of 
persecutions.(Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol.15, 1971) 
In 929 the Umayyad ruler 'Abdal al-Rahman I declared an 
independent Caliphate in Spain establishing his capital at 
Cordoba. Muslim Spain proved to be a refuge for Jews who 
were free to engage in medicine, agriculture, commerce,and 
crafts. Judeo-Arabic culture flourished. Andalusian Jews 
were physicians, diplomats, statespeople. With the decline 
of Umayyad rule and the Berber conquest of Cordoba (1013), 
various Berber and Arab principalities became cultural and 
commercial centers. Lack of centralized control resulted in 
more opportunities for a class of court Jews to emerge. In 
the Berber kingdom of Granada, Samuel b. Naghrela held the 
viceroyship for over three decades. The Jewish and Arab 
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upper classes were strengthened by a shared social 
milieu.(Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol.15, 1971) 
The Christian initiative in Spain brought about the 
weakening of the Caliphate hold. Alfonso V of Leon (999- 
1021) encouraged Jewish migration from the Muslim south to 
the Christian north through granting economic privileges to 
new settlers.(Stillman,1979) When Alfonso X (1252-1284) 
extended the Christian reconquest, Jews were employed in the 
king's army and requested to setttle in towns evacuated by 
Muslims. As more Jewish shops opened in towns, the 
municipalities revolted. In 1263, 'Las Siete Partidas' 
defined the conditions of Jewish existence in Christian 
Spain. Prohibitions on the number and size of synagogues and 
against holding positions of authority over Christians 
reflected the triumph of earlier church policy. 
By the first quarter of the thirteenth century the Jews 
had outlived their usefulness as colonizers; more frequent 
legislation began to limit their effectiveness. However, 
because they still were economically useful the state was 
reluctant to part with such a valuable sourceofincome. As a 
result, state policies vacilated from the resolve of Alfonso 
XI to root out Jewish usury, to the liberation of Alfonso's 
successor in bringing Jews back into his 
employment.(Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol.15:1981) 
Jews were linked with the plagues in Aragon and 
massacred in Sargossa, Barcelone and other Catalonian cities 
in 1354. The anti-Jewish campaigns of the archdeacon of 
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Ecija, Ferrant Martinez (1378, 1390) and riots in Seville in 
1391 were followed by the decree of Ferdinand I (1415) that 
all copies of the Talmud must be submitted for censorship of 
anti-Christian passages. In 1432, Castilian Jewry held a 
convention in Vallahlia of Spanish communities and adopted 
new regulations to reinforce centralization. The marriage 
of Isabella, heiress to the throne of Castile and Ferdinand, 
heir to the throne of Aragon, united those two kingdoms in 
1479. In 1476 the right of criminal jurisdiction was taken 
from Jewish communities. The Inquisition extended its 
activities so that between 1481 and 1488, more than 700 
Conversos (Jews who had converted to Christianity) were 
burned at the stake. In 1483 Jews were expelled from 
Andalusia and in 1492 from Granada. Many sought temporary 
refuge in Portugal, but were expelled from there in 1496- 
1497, and fled to North Africa and the Ottoman Empire, the 
only major country to open its door and in fact welcome and 
encourage them to settle there.(Encyclopedia Judaica, 
Vol.15,1981) 
The union of Jewish and Muslim culture in Spain had 
produced an efflorescence of literature, philosophy, 
science, religious thinking and architecture. The 
development of poetry in the Arab world was once again 
integrated by Jewish poets to produce a flowering of Hebrew 
poetry. The Spanish academy for Talmudic study became the 
most important in the world. Muslim Spain was the 
birthplace of two outstanding poets in the history of Jewish 
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literature, Solomon ibn Gabirol and Judah Halevi as well as 
of the influential Jewish philosopher, Moses Maimonides 
(1135).(Stillman,1979) 
The influx of Sephardi Jewish immigrants diversified 
Jewish life in the Ottoman Empire. Their Ladino speech and 
Sephardic ritual superseded the language and ritual of most 
Balkan and western Asian communities. Many Sephardi 
communities established a unique system of Jewish self rule; 
for instance in provinces established at Salonika. Along 
with smaller groups of Italian and Ashkenazi Jews, they 
instituted a municipal council in representing each group. 
The council granted tax and customs exemptions and 
reductions in exchange for payment of tribute. In the 
course of the sixteenth century these new immigrant 
communities outnumbered Jews in old communities. Local 
rabbis led communities in accordance with agreements drawn 
by the communities themselves, turning on occasion to Jewish 
religious authorities in the largest 
communities.(Baron,1942) 
In summary, Jews dependent upon the state apparatus for 
their livelihood were able during the period of greatest 
Ottoman expansion to attain a considerable degree of wealth 
and status. They were also suspect among some Muslims as 
dhimmi who had overstepped their bounds, and as well, they 
were vulnerable to the machinations of the court. As a 
small class of Jews acquired wealth and gained influence in 
the capital, traditional elements within Jewish society 
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complained that these men and women spent all of their 
energy in financial enterprises. Although the wealthy Jews 
paid not only their own taxes, but also those of the Jewish 
poor, a large gap separated them from the rest of the 
community. At times well connected bankers and government 
officials proved dangerous rivals of the established 
leadership. Class struggle, deviation from traditional 
norms and criticism of leadership were the result of Jewish 
vulnerability in a world where much depended upon individual 
Jews who could influence rulers and advisors. Jews who were 
not satisfied with their treatment by the Rabbinic court 
could use the Muslim courts. It was difficult to enforce 
laws under these circumstances. Jews such as the Karaites 
whose practices were criticized by traditional Jews could 
gain power by stirring discontent against recognized 
leaders. 
The rise to power of court bankers, physicians and 
diplomats created a system of rule parallel to that of the 
established administrative systems within each community. 
On the other hand, Jews in positions of power used their 
influence in ways that benefited the entire community. 
Likewise the backbone of Jewish community life and survival 
were the small traders and artisans whose activities 
supported those of the more powerful Jews. 
While the Ottoman government did not enforce laws 
requiring changes in ritual or belief, in periods of 
religious conservatism they did attempt to enforce laws 
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infringing on freedom of worship, such as forbidding the 
building of new synagogues. Such laws were evaded by giving 
the synagogues the external appearance of private houses, or 
by assering more lenient policies of former rulers. 
According to Jewish law, if the government demanded 
violation of religious fundamentals Jews were not to obey 
because their own laws relating to religious conformity were 
divinely ordained, hence superior to enactments from human 
beings." (Baron, 1942) However, Jewish thinkers considered 
the state a God willed institution. Individuals or groups 
in power could behave sinfully without reflecting on the 
institution. Fear of retribution for adverse criticism may 
have contributed to a policy of praying for the welfare to 
the country and rulers where they resided. While for Jews 
everywhere obedience to the state was a necessary condition 
for their survival, Jews in Middle Eastern countries did not 
experience the pattern of expulsion- readmission- expulsion 
experienced by Jews in western countries during the late 
Middle Ages.(Lewis,1984) 
State policy toward Jews under Turkish Muslim rule 
continued the traditions defined by Muslim Arabs under the 
Caliphates. In the period of Ottoman rule, Jew and Arab 
continued to interact on a local level according to 
traditions evolved over centuries. On the institutional 
level, Turkish-Muslim rule was accepted by both Arab and Jew 
in their respective rule, until the events of the eighteenth 
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and nineteenth centuries began to alter the foundation upon 
which those respective roles were based. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has delineated two models of Arab-Jewish 
co-existence. 
Before Islam, Jews and Arabs influenced one another in 
daily survival and the evolution of their repsective 
cultures and societies. Jews and Arabs spoke the same 
language and faced the same challenges geographically, 
economically and to some extent politically. Each was 
influenced by the religious practices, customs and beliefs 
of the other. 
Many of the practices, customs and beliefs shared by 
Jews and Arabs in this period shaped the evolution of Islam, 
which also had to incorporate and adjust to changing 
economic conditions in the final years of the struggle for 
dominance between the Roman-Byzantine and Sassanid-Persian 
Empires. The expansion and consolidation of Islam brought a 
re-ordering of society and a transformation of Arab-Jewish 
relations. Under Islam, the second model of Arab-Jewish 
relations considered in this chapter emerges. Jews were one 
of several minorities relegated to dhimmi status. The 
dhimmi were treated with respect but were second-class 
citizens within the Muslim autocracy. Within this 
institutionalized characterization of dhimmi status there 
was much movement and variation. On the local level, Jews 
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maintained autonomous communities with legal jurisdiction 
over their own affairs. Jews and Arab-Muslims continued to 
develop complementary social, religious and cultural modes 
of survival. Those Jews who became part of the government 
bureaucracy assimilated Muslim social customs. Jews spoke 
Arabic, wrote in Arabic and absorbed Arab philosophical, 
literary, scientific ideas and developments. Arabs also 
were similarly influenced by movements within the Jewish 
world. Jews under Islam were not subject to the disruptions 
of Christian anti-semitism resulting in a patterns of 
expulsion, characteristic of western European countries. 
There were however situations that repeatedly proved 
threatening to the dhimmi: and the gradual weakening of the 
Muslim hierarchy brought a worsening of conditions for 
minority groups. 
The Ottoman Empire was a Turkish-Muslim state that 
encouraged settlement of Iberian Jews, who, along with 
indigenous Jews, were invited to occupy important positions 
in developing the economic life of the Empire. The patterns 
established under various Caliphates continued to effect 
Jewish-Muslim interaction: class was an important variable 
in determining both the degree and kind of interaction. 
In the seventeen and eighteen hundreds the emergence of 
European hegemony began to shake the foundations of Jewish- 
Arab life. Until this century Jews were a favored minority, 
ally of the Muslim, fighting in support of the Ottomans 
against Europe. But in this period, with the support of 
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Christian Europe, competition from Greeks and Armenians 
began to erode Jewish stability. Christian Arabs were 
beginning to be influenced by European political ideologies: 
and the Ottoman Empire, facing military losses and economic 
crises in the face of Christian European expansion, 
initiated a series of reforms that challenged the 
foundations of the Muslim state. This very critical period 
in the history of Arab-Jew relations is the subject of 
Chapter Two. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 Baron suggests that :"It is therefore not surprising that 
the Israelite farmer should have been more susceptible to 
belief in a Goddess enjoying a standing more or less egual 
to that of his Lord." He goes on to point out that:" Later 
Mosaic religion, while insisting upon the singleness of God 
tried at the same time to improve in many ways the woman's 
position within the family and in society at large." (A 
Social and Religious History of the Jews, Vol.1:151). This 
phenomenon, simiarly to the shift in Arab societies with the 
institutionalization of Islam, signifcantly differed within 
the development of Rabbinic Judaism. See 'The Separation of 
Women in Rabbinic Judaism', Judith Baskin and 'Islam, Women 
and Revolution in Twentieth Century Arab Thought', Yvonne 
Haddad, in Women. Religion and Social Change. Edt. Haddad 
and Findley, State U. of N.Y. Press, 1985. 
2 "After the time of the Hijra then, matrilineal and 
patrilineal features were found in Arabian society side by 
side, and often intermingled. This much is fact. The 
explanation of this fact, which is to be adopted here as a 
working hypothesis isthat the matrilineal system had been 
prevelant in Arabia for along period, whereas the appearance 
of thepatrilineal was comparatively recent and was bound up 
with the growth of individualism." (Watt, Muhammad at 
Medina, pg. 273) . 
3. Osman was a Turkish tribesman who had converted to Islam. 
By 1300 Osman's gazi state had captured Bursa and begun to 
overrun the Balkans. In 1402 a family schism resulted in 
the Ottoman domains being divided among the four sons of the 
Turkish sultan Bayezid. In 1413, Sultan Mehmed I reunited 
the Empire. In the next sixty years, Syria and Egypt, Iraq 
and all the territories of Islam and Eastern Judaism, became 
part of the Ottoman Empire. The conquest of Constantinople 
and its reconstruction as Istanbul under Sultan Mehmed in 
1453 consolidated the political power of the Ottoman Empire. 
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CHAPTER III 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC LIFE OF 
ARAB AND JEW, 18th - 19th CENTURIES 
To review, relations between Jews and Muslims after 
1453, when Sultan Mehmed consolidated the political power of 
the Ottoman Empire, were shaped by three important 
factors.First consistent with Muslim tenets governing social 
and religious organization, non-Muslims were allowed to 
retain authority in their respective religio-ethnic 
communities. Organized into distinct corporate bodies, the 
subjects of the state were respected as members of 
communities with unique ethnic and religious traditions. 
Second, in the area of economic livelihood, Jews were 
encouraged to function as an economically productive 
element. Jews engaged in commerce and the trades, 
fulfilling economic roles complementary to those of the 
Turks. The third related factor was based on Jewish aid to 
the Ottomans in their struggle against Christian Europe. In 
the seventh century Jews had welcomed the Muslims as 
liberators from the oppressiveness of Byzantine rule. The 
Ottoman state, based on a tradition of Jews as ally of the 
Muslim, accorded the Jews special favors and employed them 
in areas where they could be trusted in this role. Jews 
were influential as advisors in the Ottoman court, held 
important positions as tax farmers, bankers, court 
physicians and negotiated commercial exchanges between 
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foreign traders and local merchants. These three factors 
contributed to reports of stability regarding relations 
between Jews and the Muslim world during the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. 
Events germinating in this period and surfacing in the 
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought 
about deep transformations, disruption and re-ordering, in 
regard to all three of the above factors. Economic 
complementarity between Jew and Muslim was eventually 
disrupted. The stability of socio-religious organization 
disintegrated. Contrary to the historical experience of Jew 
as ally to the Muslim, in some strata of society, the Jew 
came to be regarded as having shifted allegiances to the 
Christian world. These changes were stimulated by the role 
of Jew and Arab (Muslim and Christian) in the creation of a 
new world order, the range of responses to the shifting 
economic conditions and changing cultural values during the 
period addressed, how Europe viewed Jew and Arab in this 
process and how Jew and Arab viewed one another. 
During the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries Muslims and non-Muslims had profited as part of a 
rising middle class of merchants and craftspeople in Ottoman 
society. Trade with Venice involving the transport of Asian 
spices and silk was a predominant feature of Middle Eastern 
commerce until the first decades of the seventeenth century. 
When the spice trade was rerouted via the Cape of Good Hope, 
the Venetians were superseded by the superior naval capacity 
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of the Dutch and eventually the British and French 
(Hodgson,1974) 
The rising national states of Europe were supported by 
the power and stability of the Ottoman state, which 
controlled a solid area of the European continent:they 
benefited economically and politically from their 
association with the Ottomans. Beginning in 1352, trade 
agreements or 'capitulations' were made with Genoa, which 
granted extraterritorial privileges, that is the right to be 
under the jurisdiction of their own governments in cases 
arising related to trade in the Ottoman lands. As Ottoman 
possessions in Europe expanded, comparable trade agreements 
were made with Venice and Florence and in 1569, with 
France.(Hurewitz,1975) The rise of France as a nation state 
was facilitated by her alliance with the Ottomans whose 
fleet in the western Mediterranean protected southern France 
against attack, while the French monarchs concentrated their 
power in the north (Karpat,1974) The Ottoman alliance with 
France, as well as Ottoman support of the English and Dutch 
resistance helped to check Hapsburg supremacy in Europe. 
(Inalcik,1974) . 
The Ottoman state also influenced European developments 
in the religious sphere, through military support of 
Protestant Calvinist success in Southern Hungary and 
Transylvania, and by offering military help to Lutheran 
princes because "they did not worship idols, believed in one 
God and fought against the Pope and Emperor."(Inalick, 1974) 
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In spite of these and other examples of the close 
interdependence of all societies of the 'Afro-Eurasian 
historical complex'(Hodgson,1974) European historians often 
ignore the impact and contributions of the Ottoman Empire in 
the unfolding of the 'modern era'. Contrary to the 
characterization of the Ottoman Empire as the 'sick man of 
Europe', Ottoman economic life, made viable by Jews and 
Arabs Turks and others, supported and helped make possible 
the developing nation states of Europe. 
The rise in social, political and economic power of the 
European nation-states in the western European lands between 
the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries came about as a 
result of the Industrial revolution and capitalist industry. 
The drive of the European nations to pursue industrial- 
capitalist developments through Imperialist policies, 
precipitated changes in traditional patterns of social 
organization in the Islamic lands. The rapid pace of the 
Industrial Revolution stimulated the need for foreign 
markets and land resources. Military and economic 
interventionism (supported by a legalistic framework), 
affected all elements of society. 
These transformations challenging the centrality of the 
Islamic lands in cultural and commercial spheres, depended 
upon inventions and discoveries originating in the Eastern 
hemisphere:gunpowder, printing and the compass from China, 
and science and philosophy in the Mediteranean societies. 
(Hodgson,1974) But the interdependence of Islamic and 
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Western European societies was disrupted by the ways those 
inventions and discoveries were put to use. 
The Industrial Revolution in Europe was characterized 
by three general movements. The growth of technical 
specialization created a new class of independent 
technicians supported by non-agrarian sectors of the 
economy. Social organization itself became 
technicalized:that is, all aspects of social organization 
were transformed by and subordinated to the goal of maximum 
efficiency and the profit motive. In this process, 
traditional values and customs receded as the goal of 
creating a 'rationalized' economy and society, informed by 
and subordinate to technical efficiency, took precedence. 
Both of these factors encouraged values of individualism, 
independence and self reliance. As the rising bourgeoisie 
supplanted or merged with the landed aristocracy, social 
relations underwent a transformation: impersonal legal 
status rather than agreements based on personal commitments, 
became the norm. The new notion of progress- 'continuous 
practical improvement' was accompanied by a disdain of those 
societies, labeled 'underdeveloped' who became the object of 
imperialist policies under the guise of economic 
development. (Hodgson, Vol 111,1974) 
In the Ottoman lands where tribal loyalties, the millet 
system, guild rules and traditional customs and values 
shaped social and economic life, the transformations of 
economic and political conditions affecting the European 
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lands were also being felt. Using examples from Turkey, 
Syria-Palestine, Egypt, Libya, and Morocco, this chapter 
will examine areas in which those changes were experienced: 
social organization, religious life, economic survival, 
relations with outside forces. How did transformations in 
those areas contribute to peaceful co-existence and/or to 
dissension between Jew and Arab? Finally this chapter will 
consider the role of Jew and Arab in the creation of a new 
world order, the responses of Jew and Arab to shifting 
economic conditions and changing cultural values, how Jew 
and Arab viewed one another in this process, and how 
European attitudes and actions toward Jew and Arab affected 
relations relations between them. 
The Ottoman Reforms 
By the end of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman 
government confronted within its domains internal problems 
problems that stimulated far reaching administrative 
changes. The Ottoman reforms were a vehicle for those 
changes. Outside forces affected the Ottoman reforms in two 
ways. First, the infiltration of western ideas into the 
Empire stimulated changes that were dealt with through the 
application of western principles. For example, national 
revolts in Serbia and Greece contributed to reform of the 
millets and to the subsequent concept of Ottomanism 
(national identification) as a way of unifying the diverse 
peoples of the Empire. Second, growth of trade with Europe 
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stimulated changes within the Empire that the Ottoman 
government responded to with a series of reforms. Whether 
in response to internal conditions or to the impact of 
outside forces, the Ottoman Reforms disrupted traditional 
relations between Jew and Arab (Christian and Muslim) and 
between Muslim and Christian Arabs. 
Background 
Decentralization of the Ottoman government in the 
seventeenth century accounted for a number of problems 
within the Empire. Provincial governors increasingly used 
their power to build personal wealth at the expense of the 
state. In response the state supported a new rural group, 
ayans or notables, composed of successful merchants and 
local craftspeople. By the eighteenth century the ayans 
were in a position to increase their own share of local 
revenues and began to control commercial transactions in 
major towns. Strain on the Ottoman treasury resulted in 
lack of funds to maintain an army overtaxed by military 
challenges; the annexation of Crimea by the Russians in 
1783, Serbian and Greek revolts in 1804 and 1821 and the 
Crimean,Russo-Ottoman wars of 1853 and 1877. This led to 
further loss of control in the provinces where standing 
armies were needed elsewhere and therefore 
dissolved.(Owen,1981) 
Insecurity in rural areas in the absence of the 
tax farmers taking advantage of the 
military and abuses by 
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increased rate of taxation and holding rural surpluses for 
their own use, stimulated peasant unrest. Finally the 
principle of state controlled land was challenged by 
merchants and other increasingly demanding the right to 
control rural land in order to profit from the rising prices 
of exports to Europe. 
French occupation, the westernizing reforms of Muhammad 
Ali,(1805-1849) and the opening of the Suez Canal (1869), 
opened up the economy of the Middle Eastern lands to Europe 
and provoked administrative reform designed to accommodate 
shifting relations with the west. Westernization of the 
military and of the civilian government destablized 
traditional relations between Jews and the institutions of 
the Ottoman government. The Reforms threatened traditional 
structures ensuring Muslims of their respective roles in 
relation to one another and ensuring the relation of Muslims 
to the dhimmi. 
Tanzimat 
The Tanzimat, or regulations, instituted by Abdulmejid 
(1839-1861) utilized European standards of law 
administration, and notions of 'civil liberties'. The first 
in the series, Hatt-i-Serif (Imperial Edict of Gulhane), 
November, 1839, stated the commitment of the government to a 
program of future reform, including a regular system of 
military conscription and abolition of the tax farming 
system. The Hatt-i-Humayn, February, 1856, granted equal 
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status to the dhimmi. it granted freedom of worship, 
equality in the administration of justice, and abolished the 
poll tax and the prohibition to carry arms that for 
centuries were expressions of the inferior status of non- 
Muslims. A Council of Justice was appointed with 
jurisdiction over provincial administration, taxation and 
the status of non-Musiims.(Ma'oz,1968) 
Reforms and the Millet 
The transformation of the millet system, stimulated by 
the Hatt-i-Humayn, represented a critical stage in the 
evolution of relations between Arab and Jew. The Ottoman 
state was a theocracy- a state shaped by religious tenets of 
Islam. The Ottoman reforms reflected the influence of a new 
concept of a secular state, necessarily at odds with 
traditional concepts of Islamic rule. The millets were 
religious communities shaped by ethnic-religious values and 
traditions. Once those communities were secularized- and 
religious authorities replaced by lay councils- their 
members were no longer identified as members of autonomous 
communities: they were now first of all, in a legal sense, 
Ottoman subjects. Non-Muslims were in the ambiguous 
position of, for the first time, facing a contradiction 
between loyalty to their autonomous communal governments and 
loyalty to the Ottoman government. 
How did Jew and Arab benefit from this change and how 
did they suffer? Dhimmi status, as prescribed by Islamic 
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law, was no longer applicable. All minority groups were 
'equal before the law'. All minority groups were therefore 
equally vulnerable before the law. No longer protected by 
their dhimmi status, Jews were vulnerable for the first time 
as Jews. Religious differences could become a focus for 
persecution and they did. Competition became the primary 
field for relations between diverse groups all struggling 
for economic and political power. Prescribed modes of 
relating that ensured economic viability through economic 
mutuality were no longer applicable. Jews and Arabs who had 
been privileged within the old system now suffered from the 
reforms. As we will see, those Jews and Arabs who were able 
to take advantage of the reforms to secure power and wealth 
were those who had or who were able to take advantage of 
ties with the Ottoman government and/or with European 
governments. Since Jews were not favored by the European 
Christian nations, those Arab Christians with livelihoods 
connected to European interests benefited the most. 
However, Arab Christians suffered from the hostility of 
Muslims who resented their new status and privileges. 
Muslims and non-Muslims were faced with two choices: to 
fight to perserve the privileges they had enjoyed under the 
old system, or to conform to Ottoman law in order to take 
advantage of new benefits. The relative class position of 
Jew, Muslim, or Arab Christian, was a critical factor. As we 
shall see in some strata of Ottoman society, Jews and 
Muslims and Arab Christians preserved traditional systems of 
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economic mutuality and shared religious and cultural values 
throughout this period of transition and into present times. 
In other strata of Ottoman society, economic competition and 
religious differences came into the foreground and 
restructured, sometimes destroying, traditional relations 
between Arab and Jew. 
For example, direct tax collection by the state was 
opposed by sarrafs and by Jews and Turkish and Muslim 
peasants who found new state collectors more 
demanding.(Davison,1982) Sarrafs had provided valuable 
information to Jewish farmers concerning monetary matters 
and were paid for their services. Economic mutuality 
between sarraf and Jewish tax farmer was replaced by a new 
direct relationship between individuals and the state. 
Monetary affairs were now in the hands of bankers who 
monopolized currency and charged excessive 
interest.(Khalaf,1982) Bankers (Muslim and non-Muslim), 
Muslims who were large landowners, and non-Muslims whose 
numbers in government service increased, predominantly 
Christian Arabs, were among those who benefited from 
Reforms. 
The Tanzimat accentuated interethnic rivalry based on 
religious differences as well as class differences. In the 
process of redefinition stimulated by the reforms, the 
millets broke down into sub-groups (confessional groups with 
distinct religious ideologies).(Ma'oz,1968) The European 
nations took advantage of ensuing tensions by supporting and 
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establishing rights over various confessions to ensure their 
own decision-making power. 
Dependency on the west was stimulated in another way by 
changes in the millet system. Armenian leaders influenced by 
the French Revolution and Protestant missionaries in the 
Ottoman Empire, fashioned the Constitution of 1876 providing 
for lay control and based on Anglo-Saxon 'democratic' 
principles; for example, lay control of an elected assembly. 
(Davison,1982) . In this way some dhimmi became 'agents for 
change' within the Ottoman Empire. The new statute for 
administration of the Ottoman provinces, the Vilayet Law of 
1869, providing for provincial councils bore a resemblance 
to the electoral provisions of the Armenian millet 
constitution. The provincial councils, like the lay 
councils given jurisdiction over the millets, were not 
'representative'. In so far as changes took hold in the 
millet, power passed from the religious patriarch to those 
powerful through wealth. In the provincial councils or 
meclis, few seats were given to those not in service of the 
state, and fewer still to non-Muslims. In Jerusalem, for 
instance, the meclis was composed of seven to ten Muslims 
and four to five non-Muslims representing a Jewish and 
Christian population greatly outnumbering the Muslim 
population. As was historically true, the degree to which 
non Muslims were allowed to take a more active role in the 
work of the Meclis and the degree of discrimination in 
matters of taxation, economic affairs and religious matters 
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against Jew and Christians, varied from place to place. In 
some places, local notables who became meclis deputies were 
the chief oppressors of the people, replacing the tyranny of 
the Ottoman Pasha whose power was diminished by the reforms. 
Deputies from the lower and middle classes were rare and 
Muslim religious leaders and notables used their official 
status to further their political and economic 
interests.(Ma'oz,1968) 
Changes in the millet system stimulated interethnic 
rivalry by upsetting traditional modes of relation that 
maintained a balance of power. During the nineteenth 
century the French, British and Russians established 
political and economic ties with Christian communities 
throughout the Ottoman lands.(Ma'oz,1968) These ties were 
maintained through a network of political and economic 
intermediaries known as proteges. 
The Capitulations 
As noted, the Capitulation Agreements, or granting of 
extra-territorial privileges, were initiated by the Ottoman 
government as early as the nineteenth century to encourage 
trade with Europeans. The Europeans were allowed to appoint 
consuls in the Ottoman lands, who were immune from Ottoman 
law. This privilege was extended in the nineteenth century 
to all 'agents' of Europe under the protege system. The 
Capitulations forbade taxation of European governments and 
of their proteges, those resident within the Empire who were 
89 
representatives, generally in some commercial capacity, of 
those governments. 
The Capitulations and protege system created a new 
mercantile middle class, predominantly Christians, Greeks 
and Armenians especially, usurped the role of Jews as 
commercial intermediaries. The protege system heightened 
economic rivalry between Jew and Christian who had to 
compete for favors from the European governments. For 
example, in 1763 in Egypt, Syrians belonging to the Greek 
Catholic Church gained control of the customs administration 
formerly in the hands of Jews. Syrians acguired a virtual 
monopoly over European consular positions in Egypt.(Zenner 
and Deshen,1982) Growing economic tensions between 
Christian Arab and Jew supplied the arena for anti-semitic 
propaganda imported from Europe. Jewish proteges were 
subject to the anti-semitism of British consuls who 
complained that the Jews took advantage of extra¬ 
territoriality in commerce through money-lending 
activities.(Landau,1969) As the Ottoman Christian 
communities benefited from European capital in the Empire, 
the interdependence of Jew and Muslim was both reinforced 
and threatened. On the one hand, Jews tended to side with 
Muslims and Muslims with Jews. Many Jews felt a loyalty to 
the Ottoman state where they enjoyed communal-religious 
privileges and economic opportunities.(Ma oz,1968) On the 
other hand, those Jews who took advantage of the protege 
system were subject to European cooptation. Some Muslims, 
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sensitive to changes in the traditional forms of social and 
religious organization, reacted against all dhimmi in the 
era of the reforms. Another factor affecting Musiim/Jewish 
relations was the attempt of Christians to divert Muslim 
hatred of them to the Jews. The Damascus Affair of 1840 in 
which the European-Christian anti-semitic blood libel was 
leveled at Jews is an example. In 1840, a Jewish barber in 
Damascus was accused of murdering a Capuchin monk and his 
servant, both of whom had disappeared. Encouraged by the 
French consul, Ratti-Menton, fellow monks claimed that 
Father Tomasco had been killed by Jews for ritual purposes. 
Jews were arrested and tortured. The communal leader, 
Joseph Laniado died under questioning. Syria-Palestine was 
under the rule of Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman governor of 
Egypt at the time. Pressure from the European powers led to 
release of the survivors. Shortly after, Syria was returned 
to full Ottoman control. The British made use of the affair 
to have Muhammad Ali removed.(Lewis,1984) 
The Damascus Affair, disturbances in Aleppo, Jerusalem 
and Latakia in 1856 and in Damascus and Aleppo in 1860 were 
the result of increasing xenephobia, rejection of 
westernization, and economic hardship. The increasing gap 
between the Muslim masses, the traditional leadership, and 
Christians and Jews benefiting from European intervention, 
provoked tensions. Riots erupted in Aleppo and Damascus in 
which 5,000 Christians died and in the Mosul region where 
killed. (Issawi,1982) 3,000 Jews were 
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Intervention by European governments was facilitated by 
the dhimmi who operated as intermediaries between Europe and 
the Ottoman Empire. Traditionally, 'outsiders' have filled 
that economic role. The Capitulations and protege system 
however had a disastrous effect on interethnic relations 
because of the disruptions created within Ottoman society. 
Through abusive extension of treaty privileges, the European 
nations obtained the right to intervene with Ottoman 
authorities whenever it served their goals. The attitudes 
of the Europeans toward the local population were also a 
source of antagonism. For example, Lord Cromer, the British 
consul in Egypt, 1883-1907, considered the Egyptians a 
'backward race, needing to be protected and guided by Europe 
for its own good.'(Hodgson,1974:241) 
Local intermediaries, Christian and Jew, were the 
buffers between Europe and the local population. Europeans 
depended on them for their knowledge of Middle Eastern 
commercial practices, and knowledge of Arabic or Turkish. 
Local intermediaries were in a better position to recover 
loans made to shopkeepers or cultivators. In return for 
their services, they were granted or sold a 'berat' ensuring 
protection by a European consulate.(Owen,1981) The berat 
enabled the protege to avoid arbitrary taxes imposed by 
local authorities and entitled the protege to the same low 
customs duties as Europeans. Proteges served as agents or 
employes of European banks, insurance companies, brokerage 
houses and as local shipping agents of the French, 
Austrians, Russians, British.(Owen, 1981) 
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Those dhimmi involved in the protege system were 
sometimes agents for control by the European governments, 
who co-opted the various millets in order to further their 
economic interests. In 1774 Russia established a 
protectorate over the Greek millet. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, France had established rights over the 
Catholic subjects of the Empire These and other forms of 
intervention encouraged destablization of the Empire. 
Increasingly internal economic stability depended upon the 
world market and the role of the European governments in 
internal affairs. 
The protege system stimulated cultural and economic 
tensions within communities and between communities, 
creating ever widening gaps between rural and urban peasant 
and landholder, large merchant and small craftsperson. 
Urban communities, experiencing closer contact with foreign 
lands were influenced by cultural and political values from 
Europe.(Hodgson,1974) The monopo]y of the Christian Arab on 
careers and contracts resulted in the increased isolation of 
the Muslim Turk, Muslim Arab and Jew. Those Muslims and 
Jews who did benefit often swung radically into 
westernization. In the nineteenth century, the protege 
system was one factor stimulating polarization in Ottoman 
society: traditional religious mores were increasingly in 
conflict with the option of Westernization and assimilation. 
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Commerce, Agriculture. Industry 
The change in the scale and pattern of foreign trade 
from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century and its 
effects on agriculture and industry, were central factors in 
the widening disparities among religious communities and 
between co-religionists of different classes. Muslims and 
dhimmi who carried on the new commerce as bankers, financial 
advisors or moneylenders, identified with the ruling powers 
rather than the peasantry whose way of life was jeopardized. 
An infrastructure supported by Europeans, local 
intermediaries and the Ottoman reforms (machinery from 
Europe, imported gins, steam cleaning machines, cotton 
presses, European business practices and capital), 
threatened the prestige, power and wealth of the traditional 
elite. (Owen,1981) While the traditional village had been a 
self contained unit, peasants and craftspeople became 
dependent upon urban creditors who in turn were dependent 
upon European subsidiaries. The demands and fluctuations of 
the world market controlled economic stability and 
undermined local self sufficiency. 
In response to growing demand for raw materials and 
agricultural commodities as central and western Europe 
became urbanized, the Ottoman government encouraged 
agriculture and industrial development. In the 19th 
century,during the Tanzimat era, measures were taken that 
reinforced foreign privileges and were harmful to internal 
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trade and industry. The Commercial Treaty of 1832, for 
example, lowered customs duties on foreign imports, and on 
exports by foreign merchants. Local merchants were not 
granted similar concessions either at home, or in European 
countries.(Ma'oz,1976) 
The economy of Egypt became dependent upon the 
production of cotton for export. In Syria and Mt. Lebanon, 
silk and cotton production was stimulated; in Anatolia, 
fruit and wool and cereal production within easy reach of 
the coast were stimulated. Imports of British cotton 
manufactured goods to Turkey, Egypt and Syria-Palestine and 
cheap European fabrics protected by minimal tariffs harmed 
many Middle Eastern spinners, weavers and dyers.(Owen,1981) 
With the growth of the Ottoman debt to European 
countries, European control within the Empire moved from 
commercial to financial. (Owen,1981) The first loan 
agreement had been in 1854 when the British and French had 
supported the Turkish military effort against the Russians 
in the Crimean War. New financial institutions in Europe 
encouraging foreign investment made borrowing easier. Large 
profits were obtained by European controlled banks in the 
Middle East connected with state finance. Although the 
stated goal was economic development of the region, local 
people did not benefit. By 1875 the Ottoman government was 
bankrupt. 
Increased revenues to meet interest payments on the 
state debt were most devastating to the peasantry. The 
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Capitulations protected Europeans and proteges resident 
within the Empire from taxation. In rural areas, the 
government was unable to control the misuse of tax surpluses 
and other abuses of the tax system. 
Another factor stimulating European economic 
penetration in the Ottoman lands was the construction of two 
European owned railways. The Capitulations freed management 
from interference by Turkish courts. The Ottoman government 
was compensated with further financial support. 
Increasingly foreigners providing working capital 
employed a system of share cropping: in return for half of 
the produce, they provided seed and equipment. Rural co¬ 
operative banks were created, supplying cheap credit to 
farmers; but terms of loans prohibited poorer farmers from 
participating. To control abuses of tax revenues, the 
Ottoman government incorporated landowners and merchants 
into local administration. This and other polices to assist 
the local population benefited only the upper classes, who 
used their new authority to press the peasant 
further.(Owen,1981) 
Land Reforms 
Peasants also suffered from land reforms redefining 
land ownership and control. According to traditional 
Islamic practice, most cultivated land was classified as 
miri, or state land. Individuals and communities had a 
variety of ways to establish rights over the land, without 
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full legal ownership. Some areas (Upper Egypt, Southern 
Syria and Irag) maintained communal systems of land 
ownership and regular distribution of land among the local 
population. (Owen,1981). Increasingly control of land by 
'absentee landowners' defined new forms of rural property. 
The Land Law of 1858, amended in 1867, gave land titles to 
people with local influence rather than to the cultivator. 
Title deeds were granted and registration reguired. 
Communal ownership was forbidden. The Ottoman government 
hoped to encourage agricultural production by assisting in 
the emergence of a class of small cultivators with clear 
title to the land. (Owen,1981). However several factors 
discouraged peasants from registering their land. One was 
fear that registration might involve them in more tax 
demands. (Owen,1981) Secondly, registration meant that 
owners were more vulnerable to manipulation by others 
seeking control of the land. In addition, land holdings 
were accumulated by Christians and by Jews in Turkey, Egypt 
and Syria, through foreclosure for debt.(Owen,1981) 
The Law of 1867 granted foreigners the right to own 
land in the Ottoman Empire and ensured privileges making it 
impossible to enforce land laws of local courts.(Owen,1931) 
Control of property rights by Europeans and their proteges 
signified fundamental changes in the land system. 
(Karpat,1974) 
Reorganization of the basic economic resource, the land, 
threatened the power of the traditional elites. They were 
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replaced by new social groups whose dominance in government 
and society depended upon ownership and operation of the 
land. In areas where the European powers were not able to 
gain assurance of property rights they established direct 
rule by creating 'protectorates'. The complexities of 
customary law were reduced to a single European standard, 
described and validated as 'international law'. 
Transportation,Demographic Changes 
Another factor responsible for reorganization of 
social, economic and political forces was the shift from 
caravan trade routes to water transport. Improvements in 
transport, for example, the establishment of regular 
steamship routes between Egypt and the Levant, and 
improvement of transport along the rivers, had several 
important consequences. The Hijaz caravan grew out of the 
yearly pilgrimage to Mecca and was a source of important 
revenues for the Ottoman government. The livelihoods of 
many Jewish and Muslim merchants were connected to the 
Hijaz. As Jews sought livelihoods in the expanding port 
cities, many Jewish communities were depleted. Inland towns 
where Muslim traders had been predominant suffered 
economically as the focus of trade shifted. 
Improvement of several Red Sea canals linking the 
Mediterranean with the southern seas through Egypt, and the 
construction of the Suez Canal, proved a political liability 
rather than an asset to Egypt. Rejection of earlier plans 
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for construction of a major canal, based on fear of 
political consequences, proved justified as Egypt became a 
focus of European rivalry for control of trade routes. 
(Turqay,1982) Demographic changes as Jews immigrated to the 
development towns of the canal zone, disrupted continuity 
within each community and isolated Jews from the local 
culture with which they had been familiar. (Landau, 1969) The 
shift in trade routes from caravans to steamships hurt 
Muslim traders in the inland towns while ports, such as 
Salonica, Izmir, Beirut and Alexandria, where millets were 
an important part of the population, thrived. (Issawi,1982) 
Similarly, in Iraq, the move of Baghdadi Jews to the port of 
Basra in search of greater business and financial 
opportunities resulted from the creation of new transport by 
the British. (Rejwan,1985) 
Class Conflict 
Social tensions between poor and newly rich Jews 
reflected a similar pattern of growing class disparities in 
Egypt, the Syrian Provinces, and Turkey. In Egypt the 
wealthier Jews took advantage of legal equality granted 
under the British occupation in 1882 by forming business 
links with powerful Muslim and Copt landowners and 
politicians. (Landshut,1950) Business people involved in 
the cotton trade, banking and the stock exchange comprised a 
growing entrepenurial middle class tied to European 
interests. The poorer Jews, small peddlers or craftspeople, 
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silversmiths and coppersmiths were for the most part 
descendants of the original Jews of Egypt. These Jews spoke 
Arabic, while the Jews of the middle and upper classes, of 
Spanish, Italian and other foreign origin, tended to speak 
French. 
In Palestine also, demographic changes were further 
stimulated by the protege system. The protection of 
European consuls encouraged Jewish immigrants from Europe to 
settle in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed and Tiberias. While in 
1839 there were 5,000 Jews in Jerusalem, by the late 1850's 
Jews had purchased land in and around Jerusalem and 
comprised half the total population of the city.(Ma'oz,1968) 
The reforms of Muhammad Ali (1805-1848) (see page 102) 
and the opening of the Suez Canal brought commercial 
prosperity and brought prosperity to other parts of the 
Egyptian economy through connections with Europe, 
encouraging Jewish immigration.(Encyclopedia Judaica,1971) 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, communities of 
Italian and Eastern European Jews had settled in Alexandria, 
which became a commercial center equal to that of Cairo. 
Yet a large number of Jews were poor and had to apply for 
assistance from abroad. (Landau,1969) Competition with 
other minorities destroyed economic viability for many Jews. 
Similarly in Aleppo and Damascus, a high percentage of Jews 
were either beggars or lived off of charity. By the end of 
the nineteenth century, the typical Jew was a member of the 
lower class- porter, water carrier, window cleaner, tinker, 
100 
cobbler, seasonal laborer, harvesting agricultural export 
products and a mill or factory worker. (Zenner and 
Deshen,1982) Women and children worked in the tobacco 
factories of Istanbul and Salonica, and in Izmir, as 
laundresses, servants, nurses, lacemakers.(Drumont,1982) 
Their lives became increasingly alienated from those of Jews 
who were bankers, money-changers or international merchants. 
While the occupation of Muhammad Ali in Egypt and of 
his son Ibrahim Pasha in the Syrian Provinces brought 
conditions that allowed some Jews prosperity, those 
conditions created hardships for other Jews and threatened 
the stability of Jewish/Muslim relations. For example, 
changes in customary tax exemptions eliminated exemptions 
for religious scholars. This was significant in a community 
where the work of religious scholars was crucial to cultural 
continuity. Competition between Jews and among Jews and 
Christians for employment as bankers for provincial 
governors encouraged Jews to identify with official 
interests. (Zenner, Deshen,1982) Under the rule of Ibrahim 
Pasha, Christians and to some extent Jews, attained high 
positions in Syrian administration. They were allowed to 
build and repair places of worship, ride horses publicly, 
wear similar dress as a Muslim.(Ma'oz,1968) When the 
Ottomans regained control of the Syrian provinces and 
maintained these privileges, which had been forbidden to Jew 
and Christians as dhimmis, anti-Christian riots resulted. 
Because of their strong links with foreign powers, 
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Christians rather than Jews were the target of hostility 
resulting from economic and political insecurity. However, 
changes in government tended to create chaotic conditions 
dangerous for Jews, both rich and poor. 
Oppressive regimes created conditions that threatened 
Jewish-Muslim relations. For example, Muhammad Ali 
reasserted the state's right of ownership of miri land. 
(Owen,1981) He took control of tax income from miri land, 
confiscated agricultural wagfs and used village shaikhs as 
agents of the central government. He increased government 
monopolies on agricultural produce and other industries, 
arousing the enmity of the Ottoman government and the 
British. Changes in the relative positions of social 
groups, the old merchant Muslim class and craftspeople and 
the peasantry, created a new hierarchy in which the European 
dominated and the native Christian prospered. Jewish 
communities were divided- but ultimately all suffered a 
similar fate. Where reforms and privilege based on European 
intervention improved conditions for Jews, hardship created 
in other sectors of the population threatened their 
stability. In remote areas ,for example in some North 
African countries where social conditions remained intact, 
Jewish-Muslim relations continued in traditional forms of 
stability. 
Under the rule of Ibrahim Pasha (1831-1840) in the 
Syrian provinces, local chieftains were disarmed, the 
Bedouin tribes were subdued and new taxes instituted to pay 
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for an army numbering 90,000 by 1839. (Owen,1981) Forced 
labor, conscription, compulsory disarmament and heavy 
taxation created social unrest among the peasantry and among 
landowners whose powers were curtailed.(Hourani,1947) While 
the introduction of new crops, loans and tools increased 
agricultural output and the export of silk and cotton from 
Syria doubled, the opening of Damascus to European commerce 
had a mixed impact. Intercommunal fighting in Mt. Lebanon, 
the Syrian provinces and Palestine emerged in response to 
the growth of European influence and changes in the balance 
of power between social groups; for example Maronite 
Christians and Druze.(Owen,1981) 
Changes in social structure promoted by political and 
economic goals of the Ottoman government and by the 
political and economic goals of the European nations 
provoked interethnic conflict based on widening disparities 
among classes. Traditionally in the Islamic lands the 
interests of wealthier Jews were bound up with those of the 
Ottoman government. The commitment within Islamic ideology 
to protection of dhimmi rights ensured that cooperation 
would benefit everyone. When dhimmi status was revoked by 
the Tanzimat, widening social and economic disparities among 
Jews had more far reaching implications. Jews continued to 
support the Ottoman state, investing money and even siding 
with Muslims against Christians in the Syrian lands. As the 
Ottoman government lost financial viability, those Jews 
connected to the state also suffered. One alternative, 
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whenever it was in the interests of the European 
governments, was to become agents of the Europeans. 
Alliances with European governments meant commitment to 
interests which did not benefit the poor. 
In this period Muslim peasants experienced widening 
disparities between their interests and those of the 
wealthier Muslim merchants allied with Europe. The critical 
economic gap in Islamic society however, was between Muslims 
in general and Arab Christians who were the chief 
beneficiaries of European intervention. 
North Africa 
The situation of Jews in Morocco and other parts of 
North Africa illustrates the ways that social economic, 
political and religious tensions unfolded in the seventeenth 
through twentieth centuries. Like the Jews of Egypt, Iran 
and Yemen, Jews "lived in imperial cities, smaller 
administrative centers, mountain villages and oasis towns." 
(Meyers,1982:88) . They engaged in similar occupations; 
trade, commerce, crafts. In the urban areas Jews were an 
underclass of day laborers, bath keepers, butchers, 
prostitutes. They were gunsmiths, making weapons for 
imperial soldiers and dissident tribes, farmers, shepherds, 
rabbis, teachers, customs agents, interpreters, money¬ 
changers . (Meyers , 1982 : 90 ) Jews traded in small market towns 
on the fringes of the Sahara, the Atlas mountains of 
Morocco, Kurdish areas of Turkey, Iraq and Iran, the 
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Caucasus and Yemen. Many urban Jewish craftspeople traveled 
for extended periods among isolated tribes. (Zenner and 
Deshen,1982:15) 
In many rural areas traditions of economic mutuality 
and complementary forms of social organization remained 
untouched by the upheaval in urban areas. Jews had for 
centuries formed bonds with Arab and Berber tribespeople 
with whom they traded. Often referred to as 'client-patron' 
relations, agreements between rural craftspeople and 
peddlers afforded them protection in exchange for goods. 
The social distinctiveness of the Jew, expressed by the 
various proscriptions of dhimmi status, allowed Jews 
flexibility in economic transactions. Lawrence Rosen 
characterizes this fact in describing the economic role of 
Jews in the Moroccan town of Sefrou: "By turning to the Jew 
there was neither risk of unforeseen entanglement nor a 
potential loss of one's superior position of power. Jews 
could thus form bonds with individual trading partners that 
were characterized by mutual economic advantage but devoid 
of social competition. This served the Muslim's wish to 
avoid the undesirable bonds of obligation and the Jew's wish 
to maintain religious separation." (Rosen,1984 : 153) Jewish 
peddlers obtained goods from a Jewish importer in the city 
and traveled to rural areas where they supplied clients 
needs. A formal bond ritualized by sacrificing a sheep at 
the door of the client, ensured that Jew protection from 
On his travels through tribal lands the Jew was 
attack. 
105 
accompanied by an armed guard secure in the knowledge that 
anyone who violated him would be avenged. (Rosen,1984) 
In urban areas also Jews "formed highly personalistic 
clientele relations with individual Muslim 
buyers(Rosen,1984:136) In Sefrou a relatively small 
number of Jews obtained protege status. Economic viability 
was maintained by the interconnections between Jewish 
merchants and artisans and Muslims. As was traditional in 
Egypt and the Syrian lands, Jews formed real estate 
partnerships with Muslims as well as investing in mutually 
beneficial agricultural endeavors. In Aleppo, Jews involved 
in trade of agricultural products, livestock, dairy 
products, grains, fruit and vegetables formed partnerships 
with peasants and herders.(Zenner and Deshen,1982) 
While, as local artisans and small traders, Jews, 
like Muslims, were affected adversely by competition with 
European industry and the decline of the caravan trade, both 
were adept at finding new markets for their goods. Some 
Jews moved into more secure industries (such as tobaccc 
factories). Jewish and Muslim craftspeople produced new 
types of products that Europeans found difficult to imitate. 
Craftspeople also took advantage of European imports to 
improve their products, for example, high quality thread. 
Depending upon the situation in Europe it was often possible 
for local craftspeople to produce goods cheap enough to find 
a market among the expanding poorer classes in the towns, 
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and among nomads and agriculturalists in areas where 
European goods were less available.(Owen,1981) 
Four factors resulting from European penetration in 
North Africa contributed to social, economic, religious and 
political upheaval. As we have seen in the Arab provinces, 
demographic changes disrupted communities and traditional 
relations between communities. Changes in occupation had a 
similar effect and both factors were affected by the role of 
education in supporting European intervention. Finally, as 
in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, the need to 
'modernize' the army and administer tax reform involved 
European advisors and financial support. In 1901, the loan 
obtained by Mawlay Abd al-Aziz (1894-1908) from French banks 
began a process which eventually placed the Moroccan 
peasantry in the hands of French finance.(Laskier,1983) 
Finally, economic penetration was again supported by the 
protege system, a major factor in disruptions between social 
and ethnic-religious groups. 
European merchants hoping to gain control of the 
economy in agriculture and crafts appointed Jewish merchants 
as local agents. As merchants of the Sultan for many 
years,some Jews controlled major imports of sugar, coffee, 
tea, metals, gunpowder, and tobacco.(Laskier,1983) European 
merchants in Gibraltar, Tangier, and Mogador, in the hope of 
gaining influence over internal commerce, utilized these 
Jews as intermediaries. The special legal status of the 
Jewish proteges, exemption from military duty, from Moroccan 
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juridical authority and from payment of the jizya, was 
resented by Muslims for whom there was no escape from 
oppressive economic conditions. in their role as economic 
intermediary, whenever and wherever that was allowed and/or 
encouraged by European governments, Jews were caught between 
the traditional society that was being challenged and the 
tensions emerging between Arabs and Europeans and between 
their own community and Europe, as a new society was taking 
shape. Those Jews who were able to utilize the advantages 
of the new society often became identified as "foreigners" 
at odds with the economic cultural and spiritual universe of 
the Judeo-Arab world. 
Interethnic rivalry and class conflict were fueled by 
the proliferation of European styled schools in North Africa 
and other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Efforts on behalf of 
those Jews affected by accusations of blood libel in 
Damascus in 1840 represented a growing movement among 
European Jews to 'assist' Jews in the Islamic lands. Among 
the organizations created with this end in mind the Alliance 
Israelite Universelle, formed in Paris in 1860, became one 
of the most powerful and influential. The work of the 
Alliance rested on several assumptions about the nature of 
life for Jews in Islamic lands. One was that anti-semitic 
incidents were endemic. Another was that ignorance and 
poverty condemned Jews to oppressive conditions of life in 
the Islamic lands. The Alliance set about to correct both 
problems, utilizing the structures already set in place by 
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the European governments. Diplomatic representatives in 
countries where Jews were harassed were urged to take action 
to support them. Schools were created offering a European 
curriculum. Jews were urged to attend with the promise of 
better employment opportunities and cultural 
enrichment.(Laskier,1983) 
The Alliance, working with the growing European 
presence, encouraged appointment of Jewish consuls by first 
of all teaching the necessary languages- French, English 
and Spanish. Ironically Jewish agents of the Ottoman 
government working with European governments had suffered 
from the proliferation of Commercial treaties (for example, 
the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty, 1856), allowing increased 
privileges for European diplomats in Ottoman territories. 
These agents had been replaced by Christians appointed by 
the European consulates. Whether or not Moroccan officials 
approved of their schools, the Alliance was supported by the 
growing dependence of Morocco on European banks and other 
institutions. The Alliance created an educated Jewish elite 
to fill the roles of clerk, interpreter, diplomat, skilled 
to meet the demands of the new economic and political 
challenges of the late nineteenth century.(Laskier,1983) 
Knowledge of English, French and Spanish proved a great 
asset for Jews acting as commercial intermediaries between 
Muslims and Europeans. The cost of a curriculum based on 
European culture and history was high. Jews attending the 
schools became alienated from their communities- from other 
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Jews and from Muslims. Alienated from their culture and 
history those Jews were often rejected by the Arab world 
where for generations they had been involved in deep 
cultural, linguistic, philosophical, religious sharing. 
The purpose of an education in an Alliance School- to 
provide students with practical skills as well as personal 
enhancement- contradicted the sense of education that Jews 
had known and experienced for centuries.(Katz,1975) Within 
traditional Jewish society the purpose of schooling was to 
pass down from one generation to the next, the traditional 
religious and cultural mores, providing cultural continuity 
and survival. Resistance to the Alliance schools reflected 
a new kind of disparity among classes. Many rabbis and 
traditional elites- leaders of the community- were opposed 
to the Alliance schools. Rabbinic schools were after all 
vital to the survival of the Moroccan Jewish community. 
Proteges supported teaching the language and using the 
educational systems of the European powers they represented. 
Many Jews whose occupations were threatened or no longer 
relevant as the economy was restructured, turned to the 
Alliance school in hopes of improving their situations. 
Often this meant a change in class status, a new self image. 
In fact the Alliance school while ostensibly seeking to 
improve the Jewish 'self image' was based on patronizing 
Eurocentric attitudes. School directors and teachers 
whether European or educated in Europe, misunderstood and 
misinterpreted the customs of Moroccan Jewish communities. 
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For example, the impoverished facade of the Jewish quarter 
often concealed a more luxurious interior. This was because 
of a traditional cultural desire for privacy, and often, 
too, reflected the motivation to conceal wealth from the tax 
collector.(Zenner and Deshen, 1982) Such customs and 
attitudes were unknown or overlooked by educational 
representatives who characterized the Mediterranean Jew as 
having 'bad habits', as impoverished and backward. The 
Alliance reflected a common European attitude: that France, 
for example, had a 'civilizing mission' among the Muslims, 
Jews, and Christians of the Middle East and North Africa, 
and part of that mission was to improve them morally. Such 
rationalizations for colonial rule fostered false 
perceptions of Jewish life, and explains why the school 
curriculum met the needs of the colonizer rather than of the 
Jew. Some AIU teachers, however "realized that LaFontaine's 
fables were reflections of a sophisticated society ruled by 
Louis XIV and hence not always applicable to the children of 
the mellah. Interestingly, Israel Pisa, director in 
Casablanca, explained this position eloquently in 1906, 
contending that in Morocco education had to differ from 
education in the developed nations: the young should not be 
taught about their counterparts in France, who belonged to 
the affluent bourgeoisie, and enjoyed pretty clothes and 
pleasant games; they would be better off learning about the 
somber conditions of their coreligionists in the Russian 
Empire, with whom they shared unfavorable conditions. 
Ill 
Familiarizing them with their counterparts in far away lands 
would surely contribute to Jewish 
solidarity."(Laskier,1983:116) In 1894, for the first time 
lessons were prepared on Moroccan history by the director (a 
woman) of the Tangiers girls school.(Laskier,1983:103) 
While a few Alliance schools were meeting places for 
Muslims, Christians and Jews, most Alliance schools did not 
attract Muslims, particularly because they were for the most 
part run by Christians. The few Muslims who did attend were 
most often children of proteges. In 1909 of the 32 
candidates presented by the AIU and other consular sponsored 
schools for the certification examination for French primary 
school certificates, in Tangier and Casablanca, 21 were 
Jews, 11 European Christians, and two were 
Muslims. (Laskier,1983:107) 
Demographic shifts related to economic insecurity 
affected Jews and Muslims in the interior and southern 
regions of Morocco. Many relocated in coastal towns, 
seeking better living and employment opportunities and 
seeking freedom from the arbitrary impositions of feudal 
chieftains. Developing trade activities and ties with 
already established Jewish financial circles, motivated many 
Jews to abandon their towns. As a result of such migrations 
Jews of diverse backgrounds might find themselves in the 
same Alliance classroom, recreating a sense of community 
based on learning and speaking French together rather than 
Arabic or Hebrew. 
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In Southern Tunisia under the French protectorate Jews 
were drawn away from their ancient occupations of nomadic 
herding and fishing, and from the commercial links 
established over centuries with semi-nomadic Berbers. The 
French established outposts where Jews became engaged in 
service trades, crafts and petty commerce. On the Island of 
Djerba, Berbers experienced a similar dislocation as they 
took advantage of opportunities provided by French 
penetration to become migrant traders. The 6,000 Jews on 
the Island of Djerba were the more settled element, engaging 
in local trade, wool processing and crafts. Generally 
peaceful relations between Jews and non-Jews continued to 
hold within this context. (Deshen,1982) 
In the urban areas, including newly established 
colonial outposts, Alliance graduates found employment in 
the protectorates administration. They were placed in 
banking institutions, post offices, commerical houses. Many 
graduates dissatisfied with lack of access to top 
bureaucratic managerial positions, joined a growing 
emigration movement to other Middle Eastern countries, the 
U.S., England, France and Portugal.(Laskier,1983) 
During the last decades of the nineteenth century, the 
AIU attempted to supplement traditional Jewish occupations 
with modernized vocational and agricultural training. 
Opponents of peddling and moneylending advocated vocational 
workshops for men and women promoting modern vocations and 
those practiced by Muslims. Many Jews benefited from a 
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modern education and increased employment opportunities: 
women's schools helped women break away from traditionally 
circumscribed roles within their communities. Loss of 
traditional occupations and roles had a range of 
consequences as cultural sharing and traditional notions of 
power and respect crumbled. As traditional sources of 
identity, strength, and survival were replaced, social 
tensions reflected the ambiguities of the new situation. 
Jews who were newly educated in European styled schools were 
alienated from the experience and memory of their 
community's past. Proteges tended to treat those less 
privileged with arrogance, disregarding elements of their 
own communities. Assuming that consulates would bail them 
out they relied less upon their own innder resources, 
communal solidarity and intercommunal complimentarity to 
solve problems. Impoverished Jews were sometimes hostile to 
wealthier members who shunned them and who aroused the fear 
of their Muslim neighbors. In this way the differences in 
how various elements reacted to changing conditions had a 
range of consequences for solidarity among Muslims and Jews. 
Anti-European sentiment often was extended to include Jews 
some of whom were among the small privileged minority 
enjoying relative comfort as proteges or naturalized 
citizens. While these Jews had economic influence over the 
lives of many Muslims, the majority of Jews lived in 
subservience to Muslims and were vulnerable to bitterness 
among Muslims resulting from abuses propagated by the Jewish 
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elite and by Christians, European and Arab. (Bowie,1976) At 
the same time the Jewish elite became the target for 
reactions to abuses that were the direct result of 
imperialist policies by the British, French, Italians. 
In spite of the enormous disruptions of intercommunal 
sharing propagated by European policies in the Islamic 
lands, social, political, economic and religious 
complimentarity continued to feed a long history of 
mutuality and stable relations between Jews and Arabs 
(Muslim and Christian). Where Jews owned land profits were 
shared by Muslims who tended their flocks. Where Muslim and 
Berber Chieftains were served by Jewish craftspeople and 
traders, those relations were honored by client-patron 
relations protecting those Jews. Folk culture reflected in 
language, religious practices, healing practices and 
responses of solidarity to natural disasters such as drought 
or plague, continued to provide a solid basis for daily 
interaction. Phrases used by Jews and Muslims, such as 'if 
God wills' (in Shiallah), "Thank God" (al-hamdah l'llah) 
reflected shared cultural beliefs. (Zenner and Deshen,1982) 
Muslims, Jews and Druze use the color of light blue and the 
number five as protection against the 'evil eye'. Jews 
might ask a sheikh for healing, while a Christian might 
consult a Rabbi. (Zenner and Deshen,1982) In periods of 
natural crises, all religious leaders come together to pray. 
While Kurdish Jews were bound by social and economic ties to 
Kurdish lords, Muslims often lived in Jewish households, as 
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lodgers or workers performing tasks on the Sabbath. The 
Jews of North and East Iraq were highly acculturated to the 
environmental Kurdish culture. They shared values of 
family, humor, common magical beliefs and worshiped at the 
same holy graves. In Libya the daily struggle to survive, 
shared exposure to continual threats of nature, war and 
internal upheaval and the whims of those in power, had 
brought the two communities together for centuries. In a 
cave just north of Sefrou in Morocco, Jewish and Muslim 
women gathered strength at a saintly shrine.(Rosen,1984) 
When rain was needed, Jew and Muslim engaged in prayers from 
a centuries old history. Stephen Sharot notes- "The trend 
from local religious diversity to Talmudic uniformity which 
had occurred under the Roman and Persian Empires and which 
was at first strengthened under Islam, was reversed in the 
later Middle Ages when local religious customs again assumed 
importance."(Sharot, 1974:336) 
Conclusion 
Internal changes and external influences in the 
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries stimulated 
changes in ethnic-religious relations that continue to 
unfold with troubled complexity in the twentieth century. 
The role of Jew and Arab in the creation of a 'new world 
order' based on high speed industrial development, 
capitalist economic structures accompanied by imperialist 
class mobility. The revolution in policies, depended upon 
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transportation- introduction of railway systems and 
improvements in sea-transport- allowed for rapid demographic 
changes, easier access to foreign governments and as a 
result of both, a rapidly changing class structure. 
In Turkey, in the Arab provinces, Syria-Palestine and 
Mt. Lebanon, in the North African countries, Jew and Arab 
transformed traditional mores. They reacted to and 
initiated changes in administration, social organization, 
religious life, economic roles and relations with outside 
forces. Some Jews and Arabs were initiators, other were 
victims. For the most part, transformations in the Islamic 
lands in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries contributed to dissension between Jew and Arab 
based on widening class disparities, competition for 
economic survival, increased religious tensions created by 
changes in social organization and divisiveness created by 
outside forces. On the other hand, economic mutuality, 
shared forms of social organization, shared religious 
practices and shared responses to outside forces, continued 
in many areas to provide a stable basis for Arab-Jewish co¬ 
existence. While these forms of mutuality survived on all 
class levels, mutuality was most clearly sustained where 
European penetration could not reach. 
The Ottoman Reforms, Tanzimat, in conjunction with a 
proliferation of commercial treaties, and Capitulations 
agreements, represented a strategy by the Muslim-Turk ruler 
to control social unrest, tensions between religious 
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communities and pressures from outside forces. The new 
centralized policy of the Ottoman government was directed at 
undermining the local authority of feudal 
chiefs.(Khalaf,1982) The central government tried to 
control its growing debt by increasing and assuming control 
of tax revenues. It tried to reclaim land ceded to 
villages. While the Ottoman government initiated policies 
designed to encourage the agricultural pursuits of small 
landowners, these policies were contradicted by attempts to 
gain control of the land, for example through enforced 
registration of title deeds. Competition for rural economic 
wealth and for control of tax revenues heightened social 
tensions. In Mt. Lebanon, in the Spring of 1859, peasants 
demanding an end to tax and other abuses, revolted. In the 
Christian districts of the North, Khazins, or feudal 
families were evicted from their homes. 12,000 Christians 
lost their lives, 4,000 perished in poverty and 100,000 were 
left homeless. (Khalaf,1982:128) 
During this period, developments in relations between 
Muslims and Jews and Jews and Christian Arabs diverged. As 
relations between the Ottoman government and its Christian 
subjects deteriorated, tensions between Muslims and 
Christians surfaced. On the other hand the Ottoman 
government tended to continue to protect its Jewish subjects 
and Jews and Muslims tended to see one another as allies 
suffering a similar fate, as Christians began to take 
advantage of and benefit from the changes of the Reform Era. 
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The Capitulations contributed to Ottoman bankruptcy. 
For example, they protected Europeans and proteges resident 
within the Empire from taxes on exports, while Ottoman 
subjects paid taxes on moving goods from one province to 
another.(Owen, 1981) The Capitulations allowed the French, 
British and Russians to establish vast networks of 
political, economic and cultural links with Christian 
communities throughout the Islamic lands. The Ottoman 
government tried to use its own resources and labor for 
purposes of economic development but was forced to rely on 
European assistance. Those who administered the new 
financial systems, those who played a role in the new 
commercial systems, and whose who acquired new scientific 
and intellectual skills related to those endeavors, became 
alien to the main body of Muslims and Jews.(Lewis, 1984) 
When Ibrahim Pasha occupied the Syrian provinces the 
Egyptian troops marched like Europeans through the cities 
playing musical instruments, and using places of worship as 
barracks.(Ma'oz,1968) Effective forms of social 
organization and economic mutuality developed over the 
centuries began to crumble. 
In the area of religious life, the Ottoman reforms 
redefined the status of the dhimmi replacing communal 
autonomy with individual citizenship. Religious communities 
with traditional roles broke up into confessional groups 
fighting among themselves for economic and political power. 
European governments adopted confessional groups, exploiting 
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them to further their own interests in the Empire. 
Resistance to the changing character of the Islamic state 
was evident even in resistance to the Sultan's order that 
the male head-dress be replaced by the European Fez.(Rejwan, 
1985) . His decree emphasized that the dhimmi should no 
longer be distinguished by their attire. Disruption of 
social organization and economic mutuality preserved by the 
millet system contributed to dissensions between Muslim and 
Jew and between Arab Christian and Muslim and Arab Christian 
and Jew. 
To the extent that the situation of some Jews improved 
in civil and political security with the growing influence 
of western ideologies and economic and political power Jews 
became linked with the 'west'. The Ottoman reforms were 
used by advocates of the Jews to insist on protection of 
their rights. For example, after accusations of blood libel 
were made in Damascus in 1840, Sir Moses Montefiore 
requested that Sultan Abdulmecid guarantee the complete 
security of Damascus' Jews.(Ma'oz,1968) Intervention by 
Europeans had two faces. At the same time that with the 
encouragement and influence of European political 
ideologies, traditional relations between 'believer' and 
'unbeliever' were no longer instituted in the Islamic lands, 
European anti-semitism first appears among Christian Arabs. 
Thus begins a process in which the dual relation of European 
governments to the Jews begins to affect their fate in the 
Islamic lands. In the seventeenth century Jews were being 
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supplanted by Greeks and Armenians in international commerce 
and the trades. As the rising power of Christendom in the 
Islamic lands solidified in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the situation of Jews worsened. This situation 
was only alleviated where Jews were considered a necessary 
and useful tool for economic penetration by the European 
governments. 
Increasingly in the nineteenth century, association 
with the west ensured economic and political viability. The 
acculturation of some Middle Eastern Jews to western 
cultural, political and religious mores contributed to their 
alienation from their indigenous communities and from Arabs, 
whether Muslim or Christian, who were not beneficiaries in 
this process. The first anti-semitic tracts in Arabic 
appear at the end of the nineteenth century introduced by 
Arab Christians who were educated in Europe or by European 
missionaries, and who were caught in the cycle of economic 
and political rivalry, use the Jews to deflect Muslim 
hostility from themselves.(Lewis, 1984) As Armenians and 
Greeks were faced with an invasion of cheap European goods 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, and as Jews 
began to catch up with Christians by investing in well- 
chosen industrial sectors- cigarette paper factories, 
spinning mills, brickmaking, tobacco-packing, factories- 
economic competition fueled European style anti-semitic 
incidents. For example, in April, 1872, the discovery of a 
Christian body in a sewer provoked charges of blood libel 
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among the Greeks of Izmir. The Vali was obliged to protect 
the Jewish quarter. Anti-Jewish riots were accompanied by 
economic boycott- Christians forbade Jews access to their 
quarters and stopped trading with Jewish bazaar merchants. 
(Drumont,1982) 
In the area of education the colonial experience also 
redefined Jews' social relations with and attitudes towards 
Muslims. Alliance schools, established in Edirne (Turkey), 
1867, Aleppo, 1869, Istanbul, 1875, Fez, 1883, Teheran, 
1898, prepared Jews for work in westernized sectors of the 
economy. As well as providing material support, outside 
intervention by directors of the school sometimes ensured 
physical safety. Jews learned French and English and were 
drawn into a cultural world that excluded their Arab 
neighbors. Bernard Lewis remarks: "In British-ruled Aden, 
Egypt and Iraq, in French ruled Algeria, Tunis and Morocco, 
in Italian ruled Libya, imperial rule ushered in a new era 
of Jewish and educational progress and material prosperity. 
(It) also ensured the ultimate doom of those 
communities."(Lewis, 1973:172) 
On the other hand, Lawrence Rosen notes that in rural 
areas of Morocco, for example, in the town of Sefrou where 
there were few proteges, interconnections between Jewish 
merchants and artisans and individual Muslims favored a 
continuation of stable and fruitful relations, beneficial to 
both. He notes, that: "one encounters people from all 
sectors of Sefrou society who deeply regret the departure of 
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the Jews from the religion and blame the decline of the 
Sefrou economy in no small part on the absence of Jewish 
merchants.... One never hears remarks that suggest a 
collective economic cabal by the Jews: there is no notion 
that the Jews have tried to gain financial control of the 
marketplace to the detriment of the Muslims.»(Rosen, 
1984:155) In a revealing analysis of Arab attitudes toward 
Jews he notes that Jews were respected both as members of a 
community with its unique customs and beliefs and as 
persons with whom one could establish mutually satisfying 
individual relationships. in a series of comments that 
underline the differences between Christian European and 
Muslim attitudes toward Jews, Rosen notes that:Mone does not 
hear remarks implying Jews are politically dangerous, that 
they are individually or collectively undermining the 
nation, plotting the overthrow of the Kingdom, or that they 
are responsible for the country's various political 
problems."(Rosen,1984:156) 
Cultural commonality bond Jew and Arab in many ways. 
For example in Aleppo all house lots were equivalent and 
were divided into one third interior courtyard and two 
thirds building, whatever means the inhabitant had and 
whether muslim, Christian or Jew.(Chevailier,1982:160) The 
creation of common social space is one way that social 
culture and organization can create bonds between diverse 
peoples. Many devices served the Jew in maintaining his/her 
own culture within the Islamic world. Jews in Aleppo, for 
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example, would 'rent the city' from the governor for 
specified time in order to symbolically enclose the space so 
that they could 'carry' within its walls on the Sabbath. 
Jewish law proscribes that nothing be carried on the Sabbath 
other than in an enclosed area, such as a home. (Zenner and 
Deshen,1982) The editorials of a Jewish newspaper editor in 
Egypt, James Sanua, are an example of the solidarity that 
many Jews felt for their countries. His editorials rebuked 
the exploitation of the current ruler, Khedive Ismail and of 
the new class of Europeans who exploited others by taking 
advantage of their protected status.(Landshut,1950) In 
reviewing how Jew and Arab viewed one another in the process 
of changing conditions, political affiliations and class 
status were more significant than religious or cultural 
differences in determining alliances and tensions. For 
example, the increasing western orientation of some Jews and 
of some Christian Arabs was a major cause of hostility, fed 
by xenophobia, of some Muslims. Furthermore, Jewish 
communities in different countries and different areas of 
one country followed different paths.(Lewis,1984) While in 
some countries, such as Iraq and some areas of Morocco, 
ancient traditions and alliances were preserved, in others, 
such as Egypt, the lower classes remained Arabic-speaking 
while many middle and upper class Jews and Christians and 
Muslims became alienated from their culture and nationality, 
using European languages and obtaining citizenship from a 
European country. The threat of 'modernization' to folk 
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culture had far reaching consequences for relations between 
Arab and Jew. 
How did the attitude and actions of the Europeans 
toward Jew and Muslim affect relations between them? Some 
Europeans, for example, Lord Cromer, British consul to Egypt 
(1883-1907) considered the Egyptians "a backward race" and 
imagined that Europe had been: "in the forefront of human 
progress for two or three thousand years and might be 
expected to remain there." Hostility toward and fear of the 
Muslim world had a centuries long history. After the fall 
of Constantinople in 1453, Europeans feared the Turks would 
attack the west and destroy Christianity. On the other 
hand, the economic and political successes of the Ottoman 
Empire commanded respect in the sixteenth century. (Karpat) 
Political manipulation and economic exploitation accompanied 
a change of attitude as respect turned into contempt in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Allan and Helen Cutler, in The Jew as Ally of the 
Muslim (1986), maintain that :" Anti-Musiimism was the 
primary though not only, factor in the revival of anti- 
Semitism during the High Middle Ages (1000-1300), the 
effects of which have been felt in all subsequent centuries, 
including our own."(Cutler and Cutler, 1986: Introduction) 
Their research substantiates their central thesis that 
medieval western European Christians tended to associate Jew 
with Muslim, equating the two non-Christian groups and to 
consider the Jew as an ally of the Muslim, as well as an 
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Islamic fifth columnist in Christian territory."(Cutler and 
Cutler, 1986:89) As western Christian attitudes towards 
Muslims in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries changed 
from tolerance to antagonism so did their attitudes toward 
Jews. The Cutlers quote Julian Amery, former British 
minister of state, describing Arab-Jewish affinity in an 
address to the B'nai B'rith Lodge:"Disraeli once said that 
Arabs were really Jews on horseback; today it would perhaps 
be more apt to say that Arabs were Jews in 
Cadillacs(Cutler and Cutler, 1986:119) As social and 
economic dislocation and political unrest penetrated the 
Islamic lands, Jews and Muslims were confronted with an 
ambivalent Europe which sought to win them over only to 
control them. Strategies for winning over one group or 
another, often created hostility between the two, as when 
Jews received privileges in association with Europe that 
helped to solidify imperialist policies. Christian Arabs 
were the chief players in this scenario, since they were 
favored by the Christian European powers. 
On the other hand, the threat of Europe and the 
tensions arising in the nineteenth century convinced many 
Arab Christians, Muslims and Jews that a common secular 
ground was more important than religious loyalties. In 
Istanbul in 1877, the attempt of the Ottoman government to 
create a secular constitution drew together Muslims, 
Christians and Jews in support of a political cause. The 
constitutional experiment was halted however, by the Russo 
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Ottoman wars. At the Congress of Berlin, following the 
Russian-Ottoman wars the Treaty of San Stefano proposed the 
partitioning of Ottoman territories. 
The development of a legal secular concept of state as 
opposed to the traditional concept of nationality rooted in 
religious identity raised the fundamental guestions to shape 
Jew/Arab relations in the twentieth century. In the 1860's 
and 1870's Christians and Muslims overcame differences in 
the hope of establishing some kind of Arab autonomy. The 
movement to free the Syrian provinces from Ottoman rule was 
spread by cultural and social societies, literary journals 
and secret committees, as the first stirrings of Arab 
nationalism emerged. This movement was one result of the 
transformations in social organization, religious life, 
economic survival and relations with outside forces. The 
complexities that are embodied in Arab and Jewish 
nationalism reflect the unsolved issues raised by changes in 
all of these areas. Their unfolding is the subject of 
Chapter Three. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EFFECTS OF NATIONALISM AS A SOCIAL/POLITICAL SOLUTION 
ON ARAB/JEW RELATIONS, 1880 THROUGH 
THE BRITISH MANDATE IN PALESTINE (1917-1948) 
Preceding chapters have shown that the life of Jew and 
Arab in the Middle Eastern lands was shaped by a shared folk 
culture, including for example, reciprocity in economic 
arrangements and shared religious practices, as much as by 
official political institutions, religious movements and 
economic policies. 
Furthermore, as stated in Chapter III, in reviewing how 
Jew and Arab viewed one another in the process of the far 
reaching changes in social, economic and religious life 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, political 
affiliations and class status were more significant than 
religious differences in determining alliances and 
tensions. 
Economic and political developments shaped by European 
imperial policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
interacted with restructuring by the Ottoman state of 
economic, social and religious life. The Tanzimat Reforms 
and Capitulation Agreements represented policies designed to 
assist in meeting the demands of an expanding world market 
shaped by the Industrial Revolution.(See Chapter III) 
Middle Eastern society and economy, characterized by small 
scale agricultural production and local craft industry was 
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transformed in the nineteenth century. Large scale 
agricultural production for export and replacement of 
indigenous crafts by imports precipitated changes in social 
organization that threatened customary practices in regard 
to land use, modes of production and social alliances. We 
have seen how the widening gap between the peasant and elite 
classes and between urban and rural concerns exacerbated 
religious and ethnic differences. Competition for access to 
power and wealth was stimulated by the European powers who 
hoped to solidify their hold in the Middle Eastern lands 
through a network of intermediaries- whether Christian Arab, 
Jew or Muslim Arab. Chapter Two details how disruption of 
traditional forms of social economic and religious practices 
characterized by widening class disparities created inter¬ 
ethnic and intra-ethnic conflict. At the same time we have 
seen how Jew and Arab, as they responded to nineteenth 
century transformations, protected and preserved many of the 
traditional customs and forms of economic and social 
relations that had evolved for centuries. 
Along with European penetration and the effects of the 
Ottoman Reforms, nationalism was a third critical force 
affecting restructuring of social, economic and religious 
life in the Middle Eastern lands connected to the above 
developments. The development of a legal secular concept of 
state in the nineteenth century challenged the traditional 
inclusion of all ethnic/religious groups in the Dar-al- 
Islam.(House of Islam) Allegiance to Islam and inclusion of 
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all minorities in a system of social organization dictated 
by the Sharia had persisted as the Arab Caliphate gave way 
to successive rulers, culminating in Turkish rule in 1517. 
Nationalism as a means of organizing peoples and of 
redefining their allegiances was stimulated by four 
interrelated forces in the Ottoman lands in the nineteenth 
century. Political developments evolving out of 
dissatisfaction with the Ottoman Reforms culminated in the 
Young Turk Revolution which attempted to redefine 
Ottomanism. Secondly, nationalism as a specifically 
European ideology penetrated the Ottoman lands through 
missionary schools, colonial intervention (as in Egypt) and 
an emerging generation of western educated intellectuals. 
Third, in the final stages of European penetration in the 
post World War I period, nationalism becomes the primary 
vehicle for resistance to the west. Finally, in the case of 
the Jews and of the Palestinian Arabs, nationalism in the 
twentieth century carries the weight of ethnic survival. 
Chapter Three will explore two nationalisms, Zionism 
and Arab nationalism, particularly focusing on Palestinian 
Arab nationalism. Against the background of developments 
discussed in Chapter Three, what were the motivating forces 
behind both movements? What was the impact of rising 
nationalism on Judeo-Arabic civilization in the Middle 
Eastern lands? What do the evolutions of Zionism and Arab 
nationalism as political movements tell us about Jewish and 
Arab survival in the twentieth century? What were the 
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forces within the Zionist movement and within the Arab 
nationalist movement that were supportive to Jewish/Arab co¬ 
existence; and what were the forces that created dissension? 
What was the significance of these political movements for 
daily interaction between Jew and Arab? 
Neither Zionism nor Arab nationalism represents a 
monolithic movement. Yet, ultimately developments 
solidifying ideological positions defining both movements 
led to a bifurcation of Judeo-Arabic culture, historically 
and otherwise. In other words, as early as 1917, and 
certainly by 1948, a language sharply dividing Arab and Jew 
from one another in terms of cultural and historical 
description, dominates official diplomacy and to a growing 
extent popular consciousness. A dramatic indication of this 
phenomenon is the disappearance of the Palestinian Arab Jew 
from discussion of events in Palestine. 
The development of nationalism in the Middle Eastern 
lands culminates in a restructuring and redefining of 
society, of social relations and of peoples in relation to 
one another. Marshal Hodgson aptly delineates the 
predicament of this reordering in the Middle Eastern lands. 
’Egyptians, Ottomans, Indians? Men must identify themselves 
in some such workable units, to be sure, but what ones? Was 
not an Egyptian also an Ottoman? Could a Christian be an 
Ottoman? Or could a Muslim be anything but a Muslim; were 
not the Copts the only true Egyptians? What was India, what 
did it mean to be an Indian?- an entity imposed rather by a 
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conquering British government than by anything in nature. 
For the first time we are dealing not just with ethnic 
groups but with nations, not with ethnic feeling but with 
national feeling;and first the nations themselves had to be 
defined or invented. A nation, to serve as carrier for the 
modern institutions, might in principle be based on almost 
any common circumstances central enough to people's lives to 
make plausibly for a common fate; a common dynasty (the 
Ottoman?), a common faith (the Shir'a?), a common language 
(the Arabic dialects?) or even a common conqueror (the 
British?)."(Hodgson,Vol.Ill, 1974:246) This chapter will 
examine historical developments that shaped the choices made 
by Jews and Arabs as national identifications took form. 
Further, as European ideologies take hold, so do European 
definitions of Jew and of Arab. The 'civilizing mission' of 
the European, informed as it is with racist distortions of 
history and cultural realities in the Middle East, results 
in a European type of segregation of Jew and Arab in the 
Middle Eastern lands, distinct from the kinds of 
separateness and segregation that were a customary part of 
Middle Eastern societies. We will examine the participation 
of Jew and of Arab in this process and ascertain the 
benefits and the costs. 
Arab Nationalisms: 1800-1914 
Movements within as well as outside of Islam provide 
how Arab nationalism evolved. The 
several perspectives on 
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Wahabi movement of the eighteenth century was an attempt of 
Muslim reformers to 'remove the accretions and innovations 
beclouding the pure vision of Islam'. The Wahabi movement 
falls within the tradition of indigenous movements 
challenging uses and interpretations and political 
developments within the Islamic world that had sprung up 
since the days of Muhammad. 
The late 1800's were a period in which the 
interrelation of movements within and outside of Islam are 
utilized in the attempt to resolve tensions that had evolved 
in the era of Ottoman Reform. The 1876 constitution 
promising representative government through parliamentary 
rule was welcomed by Muslim, Christian and Jew alike. Their 
enthusiasm represented a general willingness to support the 
concept of Ottomanism as a way of unifying the diverse 
peoples of the State. However, national rebellions in the 
Balkans and continual threats by Russia were used as 
justifications for the despotic rule of Abdulhamid II (1876- 
1909) , who suspended the constitution and dissolved the 
Parliament. Abdulhamid II utilized the concept of Pan- 
Islamism to justify massacres of Armenians, who were 
suspected of having formed allegiances with Russia, and 
political suppression of Arab reformers. 
Westernization was one critical force determining the 
way in which nationalisms evolved in the Islamic lands. The 
Young Ottomans in the 1860's demanded 'liberal' reforms 
along occidental constitutional lines.(Hodgson, 1974:273) 
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The Koran and Hadith were interpreted as supportive of 
modern reform. One hadith for example is cited to 
corroborate that 'love of one's native place is a part of 
faith'. The Young Ottomans were suppressed by Abdulhamid 
who elicited the support of a conservative Muslim 
perspective, promoting a universal Muslim political 
solidarity. When military officers successfully restored 
the constitution in the Young Turk Rebellion of 1908, and 
had to confront the question of what kind of nation the 
constitution would represent, they chose the most compelling 
force of the times, modernization in the western sense, to 
shape their response.(Hodgson, 1974) They chose to 
subordinate religious and ethnic differences, shifting from 
the Islamic civilization of the past and accomodating to the 
dictates of the Europeanized elements of Ottoman 
society. (Hodgson, 1974) Some Jews and Arabs held high hopes 
for the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). However, as 
it became increasingly clear that the CUP defined Ottoman to 
mean Turkish, instituting Turkish as the official language 
and ensuring Turikish domination in Parliament, Arabs began 
to utilize earlier reform movements to resist. 
In the traditional Islamic world relations between Jew 
and Arab are defined by Koran and hadith, teachings of the 
prophet and interpretations of those teachings. In the 
twentieth century relations between Jew and Arab were 
restructured by a new world order shaped in part by 
westernization. Westernization implied nationalism. Two 
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consequences unfolded in that process. First, we have 
observed how intra-communally and inter-communally widening 
class disparities created hostilities. In response to the 
ensuing chaos, Jew, Christian and Muslim embraced 
nationalisms as a way of protecting themselves. This 
happened in one of several ways. Some became nationals of 
European countries. For Jews and Arabs who did not have the 
choice of becoming European nationals, Ottomanism held 
promise of egalitarianism. As historical developments 
evolved, Pan -Turanism (or Turkish dominance) propogated by 
the CUP, proved disastrous to minority groups. The Young 
Turk government, under pressure of European imperialism and 
Balkan nationalism, assumed the character of a 
'dictatorship' suppressing all minority rights. The 
question of what kind of nationalism, if any, could be 
supported by Jew and Arab alike, to their mutual benefit 
depended upon the kinds of choices available to Jew and Arab 
for ethnic, religious and economic survival. In other 
words, could the Judeo-Arabic tradition and civilization 
survive the process of westernization and concomitantly 
nationalisms as peoples in the Middle Eastern lands tried to 
create solutions that had cultural integrity and historical 
validity for them? For the most part the challenge of 
nationalism precipitated a crisis of divided loyalties. For 
example, Jews and Arabs who became western educated were 
challenged to reframe their relationship to traditional 
Judeo-Arabic culture and history. Increasingly class 
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interests dictated allegiances. Jews and Arabs were 
challenged to create and give allegiance to those forms of 
nationalism most likely to protect their class interests. 
One critical consequence within communities was alienation 
of fhe lower classes for whom national identification was 
for a long time irrelevant. A related consequence was a 
growing separation of Arab and Jew from a common tradition 
as both experienced the effects of historical developments 
that were rendering that tradition increasingly invisible. 
Further those historical developments threatened the very 
basis of Judeo-Arabic civilization embedded in folk customs 
and an agrarian way of life. 
While many Arabs were not yet caught up in nationalism, 
others reacted to the threat of Pan-Turanism as instituted 
by the Young Turk government to Arab visibility and power. 
In 1908 Arabs in Constantinople founded the Ottoman Arab 
Brotherhood. The Ottoman Decentralization Party was formed 
in 1912 by Syrians in Cairo.(Goldschmidt, 1979) The goal of 
both groups was greater local autonomy, as a way of 
weakening the central control of the government. The threat 
of Pan-Turanism brought together Muslim and Christian Arab 
with a platform calling for local general councils with 
budgetary control, the right to legislate domestic affairs 
in the Arab provinces and the institutionalization of Arabic 
as the official language along with Turkish.(Mandel, 1976) 
A secret society of mainly young Muslim Arabs, calling 
itself al-Fatat,convened the first Arab Congress in Paris in 
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1913, demanding equal rights and cultural autonomy for 
Arabs. A third group, al-Ahd('covenant') was a secret 
society of Arab officers. Their aim was the creation of an 
Arab—Turkish European style monarchy . All groups were 
supported by educated Arabs in Ottoman cities and abroad. 
(Goldschmidt, 1979) 
As noted above, along with political events that shaped 
the emerging Arab movement, sectarianism promoted by foreign 
intervention stimulated a different form of nationalism, a 
return to Islam. French ecclesiastical missions formed 
alliances with Maronite and Melchite clergy and promoted an 
education designed to foster allegiance to France. The 
Russians similarly supported the Greek Orthodox Arab 
population while Great Britain supported the Druze. 
American influence led to the creation of the Syrian 
Presbyterian Church.(Antonious, 1946) The strategy of 
gaining and maintaining political power in this way, of 
creating divided loyalties, was useful to the great powers 
in curtailing the ability of Arab nationalists to increase 
its membership. In the post World War One period however, 
political aspirations were to prevail over the forces of 
religious sectarianism. The disappointments of unkept 
promises by the Europeans and a continuing threat of 
colonial rule were the ultimate degradation to Arab 
Christian and Arab Muslim alike. Similarly, for many Jews 
the motivation to support nationalist movements in the Arab 
lands was a rejection of colonial rule. Those whose 
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interests were protected by colonial rule, whether Jew or 
Arab, were to suffer the consequences of divided loyalties 
both as anti-nationalists and as peoples torn within their 
own communities between two paths that held at once the 
promise of and the threat to, cultural, economic and 
religious survival. 
Jewish Nationalisms: 1800-1914 
Movements within as well as outside of the Jewish world 
affected how Jewish nationalism or Zionism evolved. 
Similarly to movements of 'purification' or 'return to 
sources' within Islam, Jewish sects have always existed 
promoting a kind of orthodoxy dependent upon return to 
geographic origins; to Zion, Jerusalem, the home of the 
first Temple. The necessity for return to the 'homeland' is 
based on a conceptualization of history that defines the 
Jews primarily as a people in exile. While embedded in 
religious ideology, this ideology did not permeate social or 
political ideology in the European lands. It was not 
relevant to Jews in Palestine in any social or political 
sense. However, historical developments in the European 
lands precipitated the evolution of political Zionism, just 
as political developments both within the Middle Eastern 
lands and in the European lands stimulated the emergence of 
Arab nationalism. In many ways Zionism in the twentieth 
century, the religious ideology, joined to the 'realpolitik' 
of European imperialism in the Middle East, worked to the 
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detriment of those Palestinian Jews most intimately 
connected to the land and to their Arab roots and culture. 
Four general and connected forces outside of the Jewish 
world affected the way in which Jewish nationalism evolved. 
First a history of anti-Jewish activity stimulated by 
Christian religious ideology and acted out in political and 
non-political movements that cut Jews off from sources 
necessary to cultural, religious and economic survival as 
well as resulting in physical violence and death. Secondly 
nineteenth and twentieth century social movements for 
example, naturalism, social liberalism, the ideals of the 
Russian revolution, provided ideological fuel for some Jews 
who envisioned a new kind of society based on egalitarian 
principles ensuring economic, cultural, religious survival 
as an inherent privilege of all its members. A third 
critical force was the Zionism of non-Jews who, stimulated 
by the Protestant Reformation's renewal of the Old Testament 
believed that the second coming would happen when the Hebrew 
people returned to Zion and became Christians again. 
Finally, these words of the Earl of Shaftsbury written in 
1876, characterize the fourth critical force affecting the 
evolution of Zionism, European Imperialism:"It would be a 
blow to England if either of her rivals (France and Russia) 
should get hold of Syria. Her Empire reaching from Canada 
in the west to Calcutta and Australia in the south-east 
would be cut in two. England does not covet any such 
that they do not get in the 
territories, but she must see 
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hands of rival Powers. She must preserve Syria to herself: 
Does not policy then- if that were all- exhort England to 
foster the nationality of the Jews and aid them, as 
opportunity may offer, to return as a leavening power to 
their old country? England is the great trading and 
maritime power of the world. To England, then naturally 
belongs the role of favoring the settlement of the Jews in 
Palestine. The nationality of the Jews exists: the spirit 
is there and has been there for 3,000 years, but the 
external form, the crowing bond of union is still wanting. 
A nation must have a country. The old land, the old people. 
This is not an artificial experiment: it is nature, it is 
history."(Esco, 1947:5) 
In the 1880's political anti-semitism sprang up in 
Russia, Germany, Austria and France. The politicized 
Russian Jews driven west by the pogroms of 1881, were a 
source of embarrassment to the Europeanized French and 
German Jews who placed their hopes of leading a better life 
on becoming 'Frenchmen (or Germans) of the Mosaic faith'. 
To Theodore Herzl, founder of the official Zionist party, 
both phenomena had equally disastrous consequences for Jews; 
both were the result of anti-semitism and both threatened 
Jewish cultural and religious survival. In Herzl's ideology 
anti-semitism was the 'propelling force' which, like the 
'wave of the future' would bring Jews into the promised 
land.(Arendt, 1978:174) All historical experience was 
reduced to the fact of anti-semitism as an entrenched and 
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unchanging force which set all non-Jews against all 
Jews.(Arendt,1978) This notion of history, in which 
Particular historical circumstances of time and place are 
superfluous, shaped the kinds of choices Herzl made and 
became a tool for organizing support. Such reductionism was 
to be costly for Middle Eastern Jewry, who had to pay the 
price of historical invisibility and the cultural racism 
that accompanied that particular aspect of Herzl's ideology. 
Herzl's solution for the Jewish dilemma was the modern 
solution of self-rule. Protected by a nation state, Jews 
would be safe in Palestine where they would be unavailable 
as scapegoats for domestic difficulties. Leo Pinsker's 
Auto-Emancipation: An Admonition to His Brethren by a 
Russian Jew and Herzl's The Jewish State, both encouraged 
the notion that Jewish survival was dependent on the Jews 
alone; that anti-semitism was 'the natural reaction of all 
peoples to the very existence of Jews'.(Arendt, 1978:169) 
Pinsker was elected President of the Hovevei Zion (Lovers of 
Zion) movement in Russia that in 1884 began to raise funds 
for settlements in Palestine. 
Organization of Jewish settlement in Palestine then was 
stimulated by movements reacting to anti-semitism. Another 
facet of Zionism relied more on the stimulation of social 
movements of the nineteenth century. The fundamental 
principle of life according to Jewish law is social 
responsibility and just conduct, the creation of an 
egalitarian society. For many Jews Zionism and Socialism 
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had a common basis. Ber Borochov (1331-1917) attempted a 
synthesis of Marxism and Zionism which influenced the 
Russian Poale Zion (Workers of Zion) movement.Ber Borochov 
believed that the exclusion of Jews from "the most 
important, most influential and most stable branches of 
production" was at the root of their problem.(Esco, 1947:25) 
This problem was exacerbated by modern capitalism- large 
scale industrialization and monopoly setting Jewish 
capitalist against Jewish worker and the increasing 
competition between the 'native' worker and the 'alien' 
Jewish worker. He saw Zionism as a way of connecting Jews 
once again to the land and to basic modes of 
production.(Esco, 1947) 
Another facet of the Zionist movement was based on a 
similar notion that the central element of Jewish national 
life is Jewish ethics. Asher Ginsberg (Ahad Ha'am) wrote in 
1913 that the object of Zionism was the reconstruction of 
Jewish spiritual life through a national revival of Hebrew 
literature and thought in Palestine. At the Fifth Zionist 
Congress in 1901, Ahad Ha'am formed the 'Democratic Zionist 
Fraction' to call attention to the mandates of his cultural 
perspective.(Esco, 1947:45) In 1902, he had published 
'Altneuland' in which he detailed his vision of a society 
without race laws based on economic justice and eguality for 
women, where the Arab would be side by side with the 
Jew.(Ruppin, 1934; Patai, 1974) Spiritual Zionism and labor 
Zionism represented two of the ways that Zionism was 
146 
attempt to create a new society shaped by universal values 
of social justice. Our analysis demonstrates that the 
combined forces of non-Jewish Zionism,the pressures of 
Imperial rule and the militarism of Jabotinsky's Revisionist 
Zionism inhibited and finally made impossible the 
institutionalization of those ideals within the Zionist 
movement. 
Non-Jewish Zionism 
Non-Jewish Zionism " took shape during four centuries 
of European religious, social, intellectual and political 
history through the interweaving of many different strands 
of western culture."(Sharif, 1983:9) The Protestant 
Reformation popularized the belief that the restoration of 
the dispersed Hebrew people and of the Hebrew language was 
necessary to prepare for the second coming of Christ. The 
revival of the Old Testament familiarized the west with the 
history and traditions of the Hebrews during the 1,000 years 
they were centered in the land of Palestine. The religious 
education of the Reformation period encouraged the notion 
that nothing of importance had happened in Palestine other 
than what was recorded in the Old Testament and that no 
other peoples existed there other than the Jews. The 
restoration of the Jews as a nation (Israel) in Palestine 
and the subsequent second coming, was predicated on their 
conversion to Christianity. Anti-Islamism was a corollary 
of this theory since Islam was held responsible for the 
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'ruin' of Palestine. Eighteenth century travel books 
described the indigenous Bedouin in terms consistent with 
European anti-semitic attitudes toward Jews as a 'very bad 
people', untrustworthy and destructive, parasites to the 
country.(Sharif, 1983:38) 
This collusion of anti-semitism and anti-Arabism proved 
useful as a rationalization for British imperialism in the 
nineteenth century. The British, fearful of possible French 
control of the Mediterranean sea were anxious to solidify 
control of their trade routes to the Far East. In 1799 
Napoleon had urged Jews of Africa and Asia to fight with him 
to re-establish control of Jerusalem. Moses Hess, in his 
Rome and Jerusalem (1862), quoted Ernest Laharanne, 
secretary to Napoleon III who asserted that the 'Middle 
East's decadent civilization could be saved only by an 
injection of European civilization and hence all of Europe 
must support the Jewish acquisition of Palestine from the 
Ottoman Empire.'(Sharif, 1983:53) Embedded in this 
philosophy and political strategizing was the imperative 
that Jewish survival be dependent upon the Europeanization 
of the Jew. That is, as a symbol of Europeanism, in spite 
of the inherent racism implied, Jews might take advantage of 
great power diplomacy to achieve their national goals. 
The strategic importance of Palestine for British 
trade was the background for British pressure on the Ottoman 
sultan to allow emigration of Jews to Palestine. Laurence 
Oliphant, a non-Jewish Zionist and member of Parliament 
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proposed in 1880 that Jews settle on the east of the Jordan 
River. The Bedouins were to be driven out and placed on 
reserves. Oliphant made contact with the Love of Zion 
movement, East European Jews escaping pogroms after Tsar 
Alexander's assassination in 1881. Lord Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, seventh Earl of Shaftsbury (1301-1885), another 
vocal non Jewish Zionist, rejected civil or political 
emancipation for Jews in England on the basis of preserving 
religious integrity in Parliament. For him and for other 
non Jewish Zionists restitution of the Jews in Palestine was 
the only way that Jews would not always remain aliens. 
Furthermore, during the late 1800's and early 1900's 
unwanted immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe was met 
with an anti-semitic immigration and civil rights policy. 
Lord Arthur James Balfour, head of the government (1903) 
promulgated the 1905 Aliens Act to save England from 'the 
undoubted evils that had fallen upon the country from an 
immigration which was largely Jewish."(Sharif, 1983:75) 
Cooper was the first to formulate the slogan to describe 
Palestine: 'A country without a nation for a nation without 
a country' that became popularized by Herzl as 'A Land 
without a people for a people without a Land'.(Sharif, 
1983:42) While Zionism remained a dormant movement 
throughout the nineteenth century among Jews, non-Jewish 
Zionists popularized and supported Zionism as a branch of 
British imperialism. For those Jews who emigrated to 
Palestine in the first Aliyah, Zionism was relevant as an 
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indigenous Jewish attempt to build a safe society based on 
principles of social justice culled from Jewish traditions 
and revolutionary movements of the times. However, when the 
first Zionist Congress met in Basle in August, 1897, a 
primary force endorsing the historical necessity for 
reconstituting a Jewish state in Palestine was the tradition 
of non-Jewish Zionism in the 1800's. 
Zionist Goals 
Contrary methodological perspectives presented 
themselves at meetings of the Zionist Congress . Herzl 
argued that the aim of Zionists ought to be to obtain a 
'legally secured home for the Jewish people in Palestine'. 
The Revisionists, led by Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880-1940) 
wanted a more forceful approach demanding "a Jewish state 
within its historic boundaries", obtained through a mass 
evacuation of Jews from Europe and the use of military 
force. The cultural Zionists supported a cultural 
renascence in Palestine. The 'practical' Zionists argued 
that Jews ought to begin the work of reconstituting the 
Jewish nation in Palestine without waiting for diplomatic 
approval. (Halpern, 1969) After Herzl's death in 1904, 
under the leadership of Chaim Weizmann, practical 
achievements in Palestine became the focus for achieving 
political success.(Arendt, 1978) 
Along with divergent views on the meaning of Jewish 
nationalism, Zionists held divergent views toward the Arabs 
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commensurate with their politics. The Social-Democratic 
Poalei Zion party along with other 'labor' Zionists 
identified their interests with those of the local 
Palestinian population;Arab and Jewish. The cultural 
Zionists led by Ahad Ha'am had similar views, rejecting 
conflict and animosity as a basis for a Jewish national 
revival. Embedded in the notion that the essential message 
of Judaism was that of the Prophets- peace and good will , 
these Zionists stressed the common Semitic origins and 
cultural similarities of Jew and Arab. They created an 
ambiance and a tradition that provided the background for 
the Bi-nationalists in the 1940s whose platform and 
influence will be discussed later. These Jews understood the 
necessity to maintain the common heritage, traditions and 
language of Palestinian Arab and Palestinian Jew .(Ro'i, 
1982:51) 
The 'practical' Zionists worked for good relations with 
the Arabs to make their task of Jewish colonization easier. 
Herzl and after him Weizmann subordinated the Arab 
'question' to the 'higher goal' of achieving diplomatic 
leverage with the Europeans. Yet Herzl was aware of the 
necessity of reassuring the Arabs. In 1899 he wrote to Arab 
leaders stating that the Zionists did not intend to 
expropriate Palestine. He asserted an oft repeated argument 
that Jewish resources brought into Palestine would benefit 
the non- Jews. Yet, during the early stages of the Zionist 
movement, the Arab problem was not considered important. In 
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the wake of a series of articles published in the Jewish 
nationalist periodical, Hashiloah. on the subject of the 
possible danger to Zionism of the Arab Nationalist movement, 
the subject was raised by Max Nordau at the seventh Zionist 
Congress at Basle,in July 1905. The Actions Committee was 
instructed to organize a political commission to decide the 
official attitude of the Congress toward Arab nationalism. 
The subject was not raised again until after the Young Turk 
Revolution, July 1908.(Ro'i, 1982:16) 
However when in the winter of 1912-1913, two new 
nationalist groups were formed, the Decentralization Party 
and the Beirut Reform Committee,the scope of the Arab 
national movement became increasingly apparent to the 
Zionists. Increased activity was documented through the 
Palestine Office in Jaffa, set up by the Eighth Zionist 
Congress in 1908 and headed by Dr. Arthur Ruppin. One of 
the functions of the Palestine Office was to report on the 
Arab press and to translate into Hebrew articles on Jews and 
Zionism . In 1913, Radler-Feldmann, for whom a fusion of 
the two national groups was a necessary Zionist objective 
wrote: "In Palestine we can hear two contradictory 
opinions: the one underrating the Arab question , the other 
perhaps exaggerating it...The fact is that approximately 
thirty years ago our leading thinkers felt themselves 
attracted (in the first instance platonically) by the Arabs 
as a related race and by Islam as a religion close to 
Judaism. In practice, however, the Jews who came here 
152 
within the last thirty years (those who came earlier adopted 
a different attitude) were unable - for reasons I cannot 
explain here- to establish friendly relations with the 
Arabs. At the moment their hatred against us is being 
fanned by the press and animosity is becoming more frequent. 
Altogether, it must be accepted that two nations such as the 
Jews and the Arabs can only live side by side either in 
friendship or in enmity. A third relationship, one of 
indifference, does not exist.u(Ro'i, 1982:52) In April 1911 
surveys of the Arab Press documented a range of attitudes 
toward Zionism in Christian and Muslim newspapers. Sephardi 
Jews some of whom were editors of Haherut, which attempted 
to make Zionists aware of what Arabs thought and wrote about 
them, warned that European Jews were not aware enough of 
conditions in Palestine. Ruppin hoped to encourage friendly 
relations with the Arab population by starting an Arabic 
newspaper in Jerusalem and suggesting that land be settled 
by Jews who knew Arabic and Arab customs.(Ro'i, 1982) 
In conclusion, Jewish nationalisms and Arab 
nationalisms evolved out of conditions and circumstances 
both within and outside of Judaism and the Jewish world and 
within and outside of Islam and the Islamic world. 
Sectarian movements in both religions, calling for a return 
to a pure Islam or a pure Judaism, stimulated Islamic 
revival and the notion of return to Zion. Religious 
sectarianism joined with political power was a stimulant to 
both nationalisms. 
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Dependence on diplomacy with the great pov/ers as a 
modus vivendi had ambiguous results for the early stages of 
both the Arab Nationalist and Jewish Nationalist movements. 
The European governments utilized Arab nationalism to obtain 
their goal of breaking the alliance of Turkey with Germany 
in 1914. Britain was not, however, prepared to award the 
Arabs their independence as had been promised. The 
identification of Zionism with imperial interests, 
significantly hurt them in their relations with the Arabs 
and allowed more militaristic elements to prevail. 
Finally, the absorption and/or use of European 
ethnocentrism and racism by European educated Jews and the 
absorption and/or use of Christian anti-semitism by 
westernized Arabs,(Lewis, 1984:171) creates tensions between 
both groups and inhibits communication at a time when 
historical developments require of Jew and Arab a 
particularly acute sense of common history and tradition, 
common problems and common goals. 
Ottoman Policy and the attitude of Arab Nationalists toward 
Jewish immigration, land settlement and Zionism,—pre World 
War I 
The Ottoman policy toward Jewish immigration in the 
1880's was influenced by internal and external threats to 
hegemony: loss of territories in the Balkans as a result of 
national uprisings, the issue of great power control of 
Jerusalem raised by the Crimean War and the intrusion of the 
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European Empires into the Ottoman lands though the 
Capitulations.(Mandel, 1976) Fearing Jewish immigration 
meant more foreign control the Ottoman government mandated 
foreign Jews become Ottoman subjects and not live in 
concentrated groups or receive any special privileges. To 
local craftspeople and merchants the increasing visibility 
of Jews from Europe whose population in Jerusalem between 
1881 and 1891 rose from 13,920 to 25,322, represented an 
economic threat. In June of 1891 a telegram was sent by a 
group of Arab notables to the Grand Vezir reguesting 
prohibition of settlement by Russian Jews. In March of 1884 
Palestine was closed to Jewish business people on the 
grounds that the Capitulations did not apply to Jerusalem 
which was not an area 'appropriate for trade'. Jewish 
pilgrims were allowed to enter, but only for thirty days. In 
November of 1882 the Mutasarif of Jerusalem had been ordered 
to stop the sale of miri (state)land to Jews, even if they 
were Ottoman subjects. In both cases pressure by the 
European states persuaded the Porte (heads of state) to 
grant concessions: administrative regulations were lax or 
were lifted and Jews continued both to conduct business and 
to purchase land. By the time of the first Zionist Congress 
in 1897, there were 50,000 Jews in Palestine and eighteen 
new settlements.(Mandel, 1976:20) 
Who among the Arab population supported Jewish 
immigration and who resisted? In 1901 the Jewish 
Colonization Association (founded by Baron Maurice de 
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Hirsch, 1891) was permitted to buy land in the Vilayet of 
Beirut. The Ottoman land code of 1867 allowed purchase of 
land but prohibited settlement. Although the transaction 
was not carried out Arab peasants were aware of the 
proceedings. Furthermore, the Bank , Anglo-Palestine 
Company, by lending to the Mutasarrif1ik of Palestine, was 
able to carry out land purchases without difficulty. In 
March of 1908 resistance to settlement erupted in violence 
resulting in the deaths of thirteen Jews and one Muslim. By 
1908 approximately 10,000 Jewish settlers lived in Jewish 
colonies.(Mandel, 1976:26,28) 
Tensions between rural Arabs and Jews erupting as early 
as 1886 had two immediate sources. Grazing rights, rights of 
access and the acquired right to a winter crop when a piece 
of land had been sown during the summer, were some of the 
customary practices regarding land use often violated by the 
settlers. In addition, land bought by settlers had often 
been lost by default to Arab moneylenders. Disputes arose 
because often moneylenders sold more than was their right to 
sell. Ironically local traditions, described as 'Arab' had 
evolved out of relations between Jews and Arabs for 
centuries. Shared agricultural practices were part of a 
folk heritage that sustained Jew and Arab, neighbors on the 
land, and produced mutually beneficial relations. 
One issue contributing to this problem was the European 
definition of Jew and Arab. Europeans misunderstood Arab- 
Jewish customary practices or ignored them. European 
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definitions of land use, property rights and ownership 
prevailed and were resisted, at the expense of the 
indigenous Arab Jew and Judeo-Arabic heritage. However, 
that relations between European Jews and Arabs improved is 
testimony to the continuing possibility that ancient 
traditions can become relevant in a new context. 
Government officials, members of the Administrative 
Council and law courts were among those who opposed Ottoman 
laxity toward Jews. Their antagonism was supported by 
Christian Arabs and those among the Catholics and Greek 
Orthodox who resented Jewish progress and were economic 
competitors. Their resistance was fed by anti-semitism 
propagated by foreign missionaries and priests who 
instigated hatred of the Jews among Arabs. For example 
in 1897, Pe' re Henn Cammens, a Belgian who taught at the 
Jesuit University of Beirut published an anti-Jewish 
article, "Zionism and the Jewish colonists" in which he 
described the Jews of Jerusalem as 'recognizable...by their 
repulsive grubbiness and above all by that famous Semitic 
nose, which is not like the Greek nose, a pure 
myth."(Mandel, 1976:53) Members of foreign consulates and 
foreign banks passed on European prejudices to local Arabs 
and to the Ottoman authorities. Referring to the Templars, 
Protestants from Germany who settled in Palestine, it was 
written that: "Jerusalem already possess its German anti- 
Anti-Jewish pressure by these groups on the Semitic club." 
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Mutasarif of Jerusalem encouraged misgivings. 
(Mandel,1976:54) 
Two related trends regarding Jewish/Arab relations 
characterize the period immediately following the Young Turk 
Revolution of 1908. Motivated by attitudes similar to those 
of the Ottoman government, Dr. Nasim Bey of the Committee of 
Union and Progress (the organization created by "Turkish" 
nationalists who took control in 1908) wrote to Zionist 
official Max Nordau in 1908 that arrangements would be made 
for settlement of up to 100,000 Jews in the thirty-two 
provinces of the Empire. He emphasized as had the Ottomans, 
that foreign Jews must live in scattered groups, and were 
not to form another national entity in the Empire.(Mandel, 
1976:60) (Furthermore, the policy of scattering ethnic 
groups was consistent with Ottoman policy in general.) At 
the same time Arab Jews, Muslims and Christians heralded the 
revolution by founding a joint branch of the CUP and a 
literary political club, the Jerusalem Patriotic Society. 
Fellahin (peasants) joined by Jewish settlers, formed a 
society to promote their own interests.(Mandel,197 6:63) 
However, the impact of such joint activities among Arab 
and Jew was moderated by the activities of Zionists of the 
second Aliyah who put a damper on Arab-Jewish relations in 
this period. Parading the Zionist flag in Jaffa and 
insisting on the election of Zionist deputies to the Ottoman 
parliament to promote their claims to Palestine, they 
stimulated misgivings among Arabs and among the CUP founde 
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who could not afford to alienate the Arab deputies by 
deferring to the Zionists.(Mandel, 1976)(Esco, 1947) 
In addition, anti-Zionist activity was stimulated when 
Arabs, disillusioned with the return of the Committee of 
Union and Progress to the centralist (that is, reinforcing 
control by the central government rather than local control) 
policies of the Ottomans and subsequent repressive policies, 
suspected the CUP of supporting the Zionists for economic 
reasons. Furthermore, even Arab notables loyal to the CUP 
were among those who believed that Zionism was a danger to 
the State. 
In this period the emerging Arab press also criticized 
Zionist goals. Along with two small papers, al-Quds in 
Jaffa and Al-Asma1i in Jaffa, al-Karmil (Haifa) had a 
significant influence on leaders of the Arab movement, and 
Filastin (Jaffa), although hostile to Arab nationalism, 
strongly criticized Jewish immigration. (Mandel, 1976) 
(Porath, 1974) Of the Zionists, al-Asma'i noted: 'They harm 
the local population and wrong them, by relying on the 
special rights accorded to foreign powers in the Ottoman 
Empire and on the corruption and treachery of the local 
administration. Moreover, they are free from most of the 
taxes and heavy impositions on Ottoman subjects. Their 
labor competes with the local population and creates their 
own means of sustenance. The local population cannot stand 
up to their competition.'(Mandel,1976:81) They encouraged 
their readers to buy goods produced by Arabs, advocated that 
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wealthy Arabs promote local commerce and industry and that 
the Arab fellahin learn techniques used by Jews. The anti- 
Zionist position of Najib Nassar, a Muslim and editor of a1- 
Karmil was adopted by leaders of the Arab movement in Syria 
and others influenced by his publication of an anti-Zionist 
book. (Mandel, 1976) Nassar also joined the movements 
active in northern towns boycotting Jewish goods and 
refusing housing to Jews. Sheikh Sulayman al-Taji al 
Faruqi, a popular Muslim anti-Zionist in Jaffa organized the 
Patriotic Ottoman Party and in July, 1913 attempted to 
organize representatives of Palestinian towns to resist land 
purchase by Jews. (Porath, 1974:29) 
Ottoman Jews were also among those resisting Zionism. 
The strongest base of organized opposition against Zionism 
by Ottoman Jews was in Salonika where Jews and Donmes, 
members of a Judeo-Islamic snycretist sect, were a majority 
of the population. Other indigenous Jews against Zionism 
were graduates of the Alliance Israelite Universelle. The 
Alliance opposed Zionism as contradictory to its aims of 
improving Jewish life in the Diaspora. A third group 
opposing Zionism were members of the Club des Intimes, a 
Jewish society supporting Ottomanization.(Flapan, 1979) 
Anti-Zionist activity was promulgated by some British 
and French who asserted that Zionism was a front for German 
influence in the Empire. The threat to the Triple Entente 
(Great Britain, France, Russia) of the Triple Alliance 
(Germany, Austro-Hungary, Italy) dominated Great Power 
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politics in relation to the Arabs, as did tensions between 
Great Britain, France and Russia for control in the Middle 
Eastern lands. 
On the other hand, political tensions between rival 
European powers could benefit the Zionist cause. For 
example, financially bankrupt after the first Balkan war and 
denied financial aid from its usual sources, the CUP was 
willing to moderate their opposition to Zionism in the hope 
of finding other sources of aid. The need for capital was 
one factor motivating the proposal of a Musiim-Jewish 
alliance by members of the CUP's Central Committee in 1913. 
At the same time, some Arabs involved in movements calling 
for reform within the Empire, the Ottoman Arab brotherhood, 
Beirut Reform Society and Decentralization Party mentioned 
previously, suggested that an alliance between Arabs and 
Zionists was a necessity.(Mandel,1976:152) Some 
Decentralists were impressed by Jewish achievements in 
Palestine and believed that their capital and knowledge 
could contribute to the advancement of the Arab provinces 
and the party's goal of Arab self rule within the State. 
Because few members of the Decentralization Party were from 
Palestine, they were able to view the Zionist question in a 
Pan-Arab context: that is, able to benefit the Arab 
provinces as a whole without focusing on the unique issues 
and consequences for Palestine.(Mandel, 1976) 
The First Arab Congress met in June of 1913 in the hope 
of putting pressure on the Ottoman government and enlisting 
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support for Arab demands for reform within the Empire. 
Among delegates to the Congress were those who supported the 
Jews as well as those who were strongly anti-Zionist. In an 
effort to reconcile conflicting views, the Chairman of the 
Congress, Al-Zahrawi, subsequently made the following 
statement, published in July in Le Jeune-Turc;1 In the course 
of the Congress, I presented a new formula which had 
considerable success because it accorded perfectly with the 
mentality and the spirit of the delegates, namely: The Jews 
of the whole world are but Syrian emigres, like the Syrian 
Christian emigres in America, Paris and elsewhere. Like them 
(the Jews) are also nostalgic for the country of their 
birth. We are quite sure that our Jewish brethren in the 
whole world will lend us their support to bring about the 
triumph of our common cause for the material and moral 
rehabilitation of our common land.'(Mandel, 1976:162) 
The principal negotiator involved in mediating between 
Turks and Arabs and hoping to assist both groups in reaching 
an agreement with the Zionists was Sami Hochberg, editor of 
a Zionist sponsored newspaper, Le Jeune-Turc. After the 
First Arab Congress, the Zionists continued to influence the 
Ottoman government to relax restrictions on settlement and 
purchase of land and discouraged Hochberg from making an 
agreement with the Arab nationalists. Furthermore, once the 
Arab Congress had negotiated an agreement with the CUP, its 
efforts toward an agreement with Zionists 
waned.(Mandel,1976) 
162 
An alliance with the Ottoman government was important 
to Zionists because in order to assure financial support 
from European Jews they had to ensure the ability of those 
Jews to settle in Palestine. However, as the government 
relaxed restrictions, Arabs in the Empire, particularly in 
Palestine, became increasingly alarmed. Anti-Zionist 
activities increased and resulted in the killing of an Arab 
and a Jew in July of 1914. The following statement by 
Falastin after being closed down by the government, aptly 
characterizes the ideological basis of Arab resistance to 
Zionism during this period: 'It seems that in the opinion of 
the Central Government we have done a serious thing in 
drawing attention of the nation to the danger threatened by 
the advancing tide of Zionism, for in the course of last 
week the Local Authorities received a telegram from the 
Ministry of the Interior ordering the suppression of our 
paper Palestine and our committal for trial as having 
committed in our campaign against Zionism and our appeal to 
the national spirit an offense which they term "sowing 
discord between the elements of the Empire..This is 
mighty well; still better is the acknowledgement by the 
Government of the Zionist society as one of the elements of 
the Empire, in which she shows more devotion to their cause 
than the Zionists themselves....They cry in their meetings, 
declare in their conferences, and announce in the highways 
and byways of Palestine, nay from the very housetops that 
they are a political party whose aim is to restore Palestine 
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to their nation and concentrate them in it, and to keep it 
exclusively for them. Then comes the Government saying, "No, 
you are on the contrary one of the elements of our happy 
empire, and he who opposes you is in our sight a criminal 
bent on causing strife between those elements." (Mandel, 
1976:180) 
The editors of Falastin asserted that 'Zionist' was not 
synonymous with 'Jew' and that the wave of immigrants 
(second Aliyah 1904) sought national autonomy, lived 
separately and discouraged Jews from mixing with Muslims and 
Christians. Under the pressure of Muslim and Christian 
notables in Jaffa, Falastin was reopened.(Mandel, 1976) 
Nahum Sokolow of the Zionist Executive delegation in an 
evaluation of Arab-Jewish relations published in April 1913 
suggested that: "the Arabs should regard the Jews, not as 
foreigners, but as fellow-Semites 'returning home', equipped 
with European skills which could be of immense worth to the 
local population. If Jewish immigration was hindered, the 
land would remain desolate and of no value to anyone. If it 
went ahead, Arabs and Jews would prosper together. To that 
end Arabic would be taught in Jewish schools; a health 
campaign would be begun; social services, including hostels 
for the poor of all creeds would be launched’ and new 
branches of the Anglo-Palestine Company would be opened to 
offer the local population long-term credit at low rates of 
interest." Rafiq Bey al-Azm responded by pointing out that 
the Zionists separated themselves from the local population 
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and endangered it economically and politically by 
encouraging great power occupation of the country. He 
encouraged Zionists to integrate by becoming Ottoman 
subjects, to work with the local population by creating 
joint economic ventures and integrated schools. (Mandel, 
1976:189) 
The threat of Great Power occupation again influenced 
developments at this juncture. The CUP had hoped for an 
agreement between Arabs and Zionists, which would ensure 
Jewish financial aid to the Empire. By the summer of 1914, 
war was imminent in Europe and the Arab movement had 
escalated. At that point the CUP wanted Jewish capital for 
itself and hoped to block the Arabs from allying themselves 
with the Zionists. 
Arabs viewed an alliance with the Zionists in a variety 
of ways. Some Muslims encouraged an alliance on the basis 
that Christian Arabs wanted the Great Powers to occupy 
Palestine and that this was not in the interest of either 
Jew or Muslim. They encouraged Jews and Muslims to work 
together to defeat the Turks. Others encouraged an alliance 
of Christian, Muslim and Jew against the Ottoman government. 
In July Nahum Sokolow and Dr. Victor Jacobson, Zionist 
organization representative in Constantinople, forwarded the 
following proposals to the Decentralist Party in Cairo. 
1. The Arabs and Jews are from one stock (jins), and each 
people possess attributes complementary to the other. The 
Jews have knowledge, funds and influence; while the Arabs 
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have a vast land (bilad), awesome power, cultural treasures 
and inexhaustible material wealth. Therefore a 
reconciliation (tawfiq) between both (peoples) will be to 
the good of both and to the good of all the Orient. 
2. The Arabs will receive the Jews in Arab lands as their 
brethren, on condition that the Jews become Ottoman subjects 
and that Palestine will not be exclusively theirs. 
3. In exchange, the Jews pledge to put their cultural and 
material power at the service of the Arab cause; they will 
support the Arab groups (ahzab) and place at their disposal 
three million guineas. 
4. An Arab-Jewish conference will be held in Egypt when the 
Syrian and Iraqi deputies return from Constantinople to 
their lands (that is to say during the summer parliamentary 
recess).(Mandel, 1976:198) These proposals built upon 
existing openings in both movements for rapproachment, based 
on reciprocity in regard to respective needs and goals. 
jn response, the Decentralist Party insisted that the 
Zionists meet first with Arabs in Palestine and then with 
Arab nationalists from all groups, since the Zionist 
question concerned first of all the local population in 
Palestine and secondly the Arab question in general. In the 
meantime, Zionists in Palestine were negotiating for a 
meeting with Palestinians; a meeting that was delayed in the 
face of opposition by both Arab notables and Zionists in 
Palestine who felt that the meeting was unnecessary, and 
that both were acting in accord with orders from the Ottoman 
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government. The general view of Zionists who were wary of 
the outcome of the proposed meeting was to avoid 'a 
confrontation' with the Arabs at this time. The First world 
war erupted on Aug. 4, 1914, halting all further 
negotiations toward an Arab-Zionist alliance. 
In conclusion pre World War One relations between 
Zionists and Arabs were shaped by four related factors: 
resistance to settlement, the cultural gap between 
indigenous and European Jew, external and internal political 
pressures and conditions generated in the reform era. 
Settlement affected Palestinians most directly and was 
eventually a major reason why Palestinians began to see the 
"need to rely upon ourselves and to stop expecting 
everything from the government." (Mandel , 1976) While 
Zionists argued their financial resources would improve 
conditions in Palestine, benefits did not filter down to the 
peasantry. In fact, the Zionists did not make efforts to 
raise the promised capital for the State in general. 
Cultural differences between European and indigenous 
Jews as well as between settlers and Arabs strongly affected 
relations between Zionists and the indigenous population. 
European Jewish settlers were not familiar with customary 
practices. Some brought European racist attitudes toward 
Arabs and toward their co-religionists, the Palestinian Jew. 
In general Zionists brought an ideological framework 
appropriate in the historical context of their European 
experience, but not appropriate to prevalent conditions and 
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developments in Palestine. The attempt to impose a social 
structure based on an ideological framework external to the 
environment they were inhabiting was experienced as an 
intrusion. 
Furthermore the Zionist movement was affected by 
conditions evolving in the nineteenth century 'era of 
reform'. European states fostered sectarianism as a way of 
controling indigenous populations. Competition between the 
ayans, new class of urban notable representing the Ottoman 
government and rural sheikhs for power and control of land, 
hurt the peasantry. The pressures of land reforms had 
resulted in peasants giving title to absentee landlords. And 
unfair practices by Arab moneylenders fed into conflicts 
that arose between Zionists and rural Arabs over land 
ownership. Economic competition was stimulated by the 
Capitulations which created a new class of wealthy 
Christians, Jews and Muslims, connected to the European 
states. Christian Arabs perceived Zionists as a threat to 
economic security. 
External and internal pressure;national revolts and 
wars in which vast territories were lost, left the Ottoman 
Empire bankrupt and therefore vulnerable to Great Power 
pressure. Zionists were perceived by the CUP as a possible 
source of financial support, but at the same time were 
perceived by some Muslim Arabs as aiding European 
occupation. 
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As part of the Reform Era, a final internal political 
development was critical to the way in which Arab and Jewish 
relations evolved in this period. Ottomanism represented 
the solution of the Ottoman government to the pressure of 
rising nationalisms, that is, Ottomanism would guarantee 
civil liberties to its citizens; to all those inhabiting the 
Ottoman lands. The Young Turk Revolution overthrew the 
despotic Abdulhamid and restored the promised constitution. 
This event was welcomed by Arab-Christian,Musiim and Jew 
alike. The CUP however, instead of carrying out its stated 
goals, replaced Ottomanism with the concept of Turanism. 
Disappointment and frustration at lack of power within the 
new government and resistance to centralization of power 
within the Empire, were major stimulae to the young Arab 
Nationalist movement. The CUP courted the Arab Nationalists 
at the expense of the Zionists and courted the Zionists at 
the expense of the Arab Nationalists. Finally, the 
government was not able to satisfy the demands of Arab 
Nationalist or Zionist. The First World War presented a 
greater threat to the Ottoman government than either. 
Along with outer events working against rapprochment, 
the range of perspectives within the Arab National Movement 
and within the Zionist movement weakened the possibility for 
an entente between the two. Some Decentralists believed the 
Zionists could be useful to their cause. Their perspective 
was pan-Arabist, hence did not focus on the particular 
ramifications of Zionism for Palestinians. 
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Muslim and Christian Arab Nationalists represented in 
the increasingly vocal Arab press, warned of the dangers of 
Zionism and admonished Arab notables for their laxity in 
recognizing those dangers. By 1914, unease about the 
expanding Jewish community in Palestine had materialized in 
the form of strong anti-Zionist polemics. Those Palestinian 
Arabs who, in support of Ottomanism, perceived the Zionists 
as a threat to national unity, increasingly focused on 
' Palestinian'national identity. While in 1911 the Ottoman 
Patriotic Party was formed in reaction to Zionist groups in 
Palestine, in 1914, the newspaper Falastin summoned 
Palestinians to form a Palestinian Patriotic 
Company.(Mandel, 1976) As the Decentralist faction moved 
closer to entente many Palestinian Arabs moved further from 
a pan-Arab national perspective toward a specifically 
Palestinian national perspective. Finally, Arab 
nationalists, Ottoman Loyalists and Palestinian Arab 
Nationalists were united in their increasing fear that 
Zionists sought a Jewish state in Palestine; and that they 
were establishing independent institutions of self- 
government and self-defense. This was based on their 
observations that by 1914 few Zionists had become Ottoman 
subjects; they taught Hebrew and not Arabic in their 
schools, had financial resources and were representatives of 
Great Power influence in Palestine. 
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On the other hand,conditions in the first decade of the 
twentieth century were very favorable for Arab-Zionist 
rapprochement. Arabs sought independence from the Turks and 
needed Zionist financial aid. Jews needed Arab cooperation 
in acquisition of land and settlement. Given these factors, 
diplomatic decisions were crucial. Unfortunately, those 
Zionists and Arab Nationalists who did support each other's 
movements were not significant enough in numbers or power to 
influence political action by either. Developments by 1914 
made clear Arab resistance to Jewish immigration to 
Palestine and land purchase and Zionist determination to 
pursue both. 
Social. Religious, Economic Consequences of World War One 
and Aftermath for Arab-Jew Relations 
The Ottoman State entered the War of 1914 in alliance 
with the Germans hoping to reconquer Egypt from the 
British,and use German resources to hold together what was 
left of the State.(Goldschmidt, 1979) In response to the 
Turco-German invasion of Sinai in 1914 Britain made contact 
with Sharif Husayn the Emir of Mecca, Arab leader of the 
Hijaz (western Arabia).Sharif Husayn of the Hashemites, clan 
of the Prophet, had long struggled with the Ottoman sultan 
who had appointed a local governor in the Hijaz. The Sharif 
and his son opposed the centralizing policies of the CUP. 
Abdallah's close ties with Arab nationalist societies in 
Syria had prompted him to seek support from the British 
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consul-general Lord Kitchener in early 1914. Although 
initially unresponsive, a British/Arab alliance against the 
Ottoman Empire could prove useful to both.(Goldschmidt, 
1979) 
Formal relations between Britain and Sharif Husayn took 
the form of an exchange of letters between Husayn and Sir 
Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt. McMahon 
assured Husayn that in exchange for collaboration in 
defeating the Turks: "Great Britain is prepared to recognize 
and uphold the independence of the Sharif of 
Mecca".(Hourani,1946:41) Husayn was concerned about 
ambiguity concerning status of the Syrian coastlands, 
problematic for Britain because of the interest of France in 
maintaining control of Syria. Husayn hesitated to make a 
commitment to Great Britain until the fate of Syria and 
therefore Palestine, an administrative unit of Syria, was 
clear. But increasing repression by the Ottoman regime put 
pressure on Husayn to move. In the summer of 1916, Muslim 
and Christian Arab nationalists were executed for 
'treasonable participation in activities of which the aims 
were to separate Syria, Palestine and Iraq from the Ottoman 
Sultanate and to constitute them into an independent state.' 
(Antonious, 1946:189) 
Two developments in 1916 and 1917 further fed the 
hesitation of Husayn and other Arab leaders to trust the 
British. In May, 1916, in response to French cognizance of 
the negotiations between the British and Husayn, Sir Mark 
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Sykes representing the British, and M.Georges Picot, 
representing the French, concluded an agreement that 
protected the interests of France, Britain and Russia, in 
the Ottoman territories. The Sykes-Picot agreement divided 
the Fertile Crescent into zones. The interior of Syria and 
Vilayet of Mosul were to be recognized as independent, in 
the form of a single state or a confederation of states. 
Great Britain had privileges in the territory that became 
Transjordan along with a a strip of territory in the south 
of the Vilayet of Mosul. France maintained similar 
privileges in the remainder of the territory. France and 
Britain were to negotiate the status of coastal Syria and 
the Vilayets of Baghdad and Basra respectively. In what 
became Palestine, the Sharif of Mecca and others were to 
consult on the form of international administration; Great 
Britain was given jurisdiction over Haifa and 
Acre.(Antonious,1946, Esco,1947, Goldschmidt,1979) 
The second factor affecting negotiations between 
Britain and the Arabs was the publication of the Balfour 
Declaration in 1917. Imminent war precipitated the 
possibility of a new connection between the Zionist 
leadership and the British. In the last decades of the 
nineteenth century the British had increasingly viewed 
connection with the Zionists as a liability in their 
relations with the Arabs. The Zionist movement itself was 
divided; while the strategy of neutrality had been adopted 
in order to gain support of the international community, 
173 
Weizman believed in 1915 that with Turkey on the side of the 
Central Powers, the British would try to prevent any other 
power from occupying her trade routes. Hence his suggestion 
that the Zionists help secure Britain's position in return 
for permission to develop Palestine under a British 
protectorate. (Flapan,1979) Sykes was anxious to acguire 
Zionist assistance to free Britain from agreements made with 
the French in 1916 (Sykes-Picot). 
A British-Zionist alliance was resisted for several 
reasons. Some non-Zionist British Jews, including Claude G. 
Montefiore, President of the Anglo-Jewish Association, took 
the position of the assimilationists, that political Zionism 
threatened the rights of Jews as citizens and nationals of 
the countries where they resided. Some British non-Jews 
anticipated further problems between the British and the 
rest of the Arab world. Bernard Lazare was the proponent of 
a view in the late nineteenth century that was assumed by 
some leaders of the Zionists such as Dr. Nahum Goldman. 
Lazare believed that a national movement among Jews had to 
be a movement by the people, for the people, of the people 
(Arendt,1978) . He was forced to resign from the Zionist 
party in 1899 because of his strong opposition to the policy 
of dependence on Great Power diplomacy to secure national 
goals. Lazare felt that Weizmann's diplomatic maneuvers 
were a sign of Weizmann's condescending attitude toward the 
masses. Some Zionist leaders continued to stress the 
necessity for the Zionist movement to view itself as one 
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with the struggle of all minorities for cultural autonomy 
and civic equality. A Jewish national homeland, they 
insisted, must be based on human rights and democracy, a 
thesis opposed to the goals of imperial politics. 
However, Weizmann and British negotiators were steeped 
in the nineteenth mentality that supported imperialism: the 
belief in Europe's 'civilizing mission among the 'backward 
peoples' of the Middle East. Hence the view that Zionism 
would overcome the stagnation of the desert with efficiency, 
economic stability and education. British supporters of the 
Balfour Declaration hoped that Britain's strategic goals in 
the Middle East; to secure her position in Egypt and her 
overland link with the East would be furthered by support of 
Zionism.(Antonious, 1946) The British were concerned that 
negotiations between the Zionists and the CUP for a 'Turkish 
Balfour Declaration' would threaten their goals. They hoped 
to win over Jews in allied countries hostile toward Russia 
by giving them a reason to support the allied cause. With 
much discussion back and forth of wording, the Balfour 
Declaration was issued on November 2, 1917:'His Majesty's 
Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of 
a national home for the Jewish people and will use their 
best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this 
object,it being clearly understood that nothing shall be 
done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights 
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and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other 
country.'(Antonious,1946:266) 
The Balfour Declaration solidified anti-Zionist 
attitudes that had been germinating since the turn of the 
century. Three events were meant to allay Arab mistrust of 
Great Power motivations following disclosure of Sykes-Picot 
and the subsequent release of the Balfour Declaration. In 
response to protest and recapitulation of Arab demands for 
independence by seven Arab officials, the British 
Declaration to the Seven renewed Great Britain's commitment 
to Arab freedom from Turkish rule and subsequent 
independence. (Antonious,1946) Secondly, President Wilson's 
Mt. Vernon address, in July of 1918 stated that post-war 
settlement would be based upon 'the free acceptance of that 
settlement by the people immediately concerned'. 
(Hourani,1946) Finally in November 1918, an Anglo-French 
Declaration was circulated in Palestine, and other parts of 
Syria defining the goals of the allies in the East as 'the 
complete and final liberation of the peoples oppressed by 
the Turks and the establishment of national governments and 
administrations deriving authority from the free initiative 
and choice of the populations.'(Hourani, 1946) 
Based on these reassurances, and responding to 
repression of Arab nationalists by Jemal Pasha, Sharif 
Husayn and his sons joined the allies and led the Arab 
Revolt against the Turks. At the end of the war, with the 
population suffering from hunger, plagues and corruption, 
176 
and the Turkish troops out of the Hijaz, Britain and France 
set up provisional governments, leaving the cities of 
Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Damascus and Transjordan to Amir Faisal, 
son of King Husayn.(Antonious,1946, Hourani, 1946) 
The Arab nationalists had at this point to confront the 
determination of France to control the northern half of 
Syria and to ignore the promises of Great Britain to Sharif 
Husayn. Some Lebanese Christians supported France rather 
than give power to the ruling family of Hijaz. Some Arab 
nationalists preferred a separate Syrian state to a 
confederation with the Arabs of the Arabian peninsula. The 
American King-Crane Commission based on a tour of Syria, 
including Palestine, in the summer of 1919 recommended 
separate mandates for Iraq and Syria, to be treated as a 
single geographical unit, with Amir Faisal as King of Syria. 
Polls demonstrated preference for a U.S. mandate for Syria 
and Great Britain in Iraq. The report, reflecting 
indigenous opposition to the French and to the Zionists, was 
ignored until three years later .(Hourani,1946:52) 
In 1920, Syrian notables met in Damascus and proclaimed 
Faisal king of Syria and Palestine. The British and French, 
preparing to decide the fate of the Ottoman territories at 
the San Remo Conference, proposed French and British 
mandates and Britain reasserted its obligation to carry out 
the policy of the Balfour Declaration. Faisal was 'deposed' 
and a final settlement negotiated by the Allied powers 
determined the status of Syria. The northern part of Syria 
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(including Lebanon) was to give way to gradual self 
government. In southern Syria, Palestine- the mandate was 
given full administrative control with provision for the 
promise of the Balfour Declaration to help in the 
construction of a Jewish national home in the British area 
west of Jordan. The region east of Jordan referred to as 
'Transjordan' and administered by Faisal's government from 
1918-1920, was given to his brother Abdullah, subject to 
mandatory control.(Antonious,1946,Hourani,1946,Esco,1947) 
Geographic boundaries between Iraq, Palestine and 
Transjordan were designated by Anglo-French agreements in 
1920 and 1922 arbitrarily dividing Arab communities from one 
another. The new 'states', British mandated Palestine, 
French Lebanon and British controlled Iraq became alienated 
from one another, as different administrative systems, 
languages, currencies, economic systems, were 
institutionalized.(Antonious,194 6,Hourani , 194 6) 
Arab nationalists in French mandated Syria suffered the 
consequences of French hostility toward the Arab Nationalist 
movement. The French initiated a systematic attempt to 
encourage regional rather than national loyalties. Several 
strategies were applied to disrupt the unifying effect of 
the movement. Police surveyance and suppression of the 
press drove nationalists underground. Alliances between 
Christians, Jews, and Muslims were discouraged. Economic 
instability resulted from the use of the franc to create a 
new currency and from practices favoring the interests of 
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French investors. In the area of trade, division of the 
Ottoman lands into separate states disrupted the free flow 
of goods from one area to another and contributed to 
regionalism. In the areas of education, French culture, 
languages and history were promoted and Arab culture, 
language and history put in the background. Injustices 
often were perpetrated by magistrates who did not know 
Arabic.(Antonious,1946:374) 
In conclusion the division of the Fertile Crescent into 
artificial political units did not resolve the issues that 
had stimulated the development of a strong Arab nationalist 
movement. Britain supported the movement when it was 
politically efficacious to do so. The diplomatic aftermath 
of the war made clear that support of Britain for Arab 
independence was framed by British economic and political 
goals. Rivalry among European nation states for economic 
and political control of strategic geographic areas was 
resolved by the creation of a new term 'mandate' to justify 
and facilitate colonial intervention. Arab nationalists had 
in their own regions, to develop strategies relevant to the 
new constitutions. 
Developments within the Zionist movement were dependent 
upon the same set of forces. British support of Zionism 
represented one possible way of controlling Palestine. 
Zionism benefited from the mandate system in acquiring a 
legitimized foothold in Palestine through the Balfour 
Declaration. However, the decision to rely on British 
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political and economic support put the Zionist movement into 
an increasingly vulnerable and antagonistic position in 
relation to the Arab world. 
Sectarian tensions exacerbated by war and diplomatic 
maneuvers disrupted daily coexistence of Arab and Jew. On 
the other hand, in the face of these tensions, Jew and Arab 
from all levels of society continued to solidify ties. 
Various groups of Ottoman Jews resisted Zionist land 
settlement. The interests of many Ottoman Jews were the 
same as those of their Arab neighbors; to maintain 
traditional ties supported by an indigenous system of social 
organization.(Porath,1974) Some Sephardi notables resisted 
losing leadership roles in the Jerusalem Jewish community to 
new immigrants. For example in April 1920, Sephardim signed 
an anti-Zionist petition organized by Arabs and in 1923, the 
MCA (Muslim Christian Association) persuaded Sephardim to 
hold a meeting in a synagogue against Zionism and Ashkenazi 
rule. (Porath,1974:61) Orthodox Jews opposed to Zionism 
attempted to form alliances with anti-Zionist Palestinian 
groups. For these Jews dissolution of the fundamental 
communal organization was a threat to their positions of 
power within the Arab-Jewish world. The period of the 
British mandate in Palestine, 1920-1948, makes clear how 
that process was carried out. 
Arab-Jew Relations, 1920-1948-Transformations in social. 
economic and religious life- Palestine 
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Between 1918 and 1920 Palestine was officially run by a 
British military administration. In the spring of 1920 the 
British replaced the military administration with a civil 
administration run by a High Commissioner. Between 1918 and 
1920, tensions between Arab nationalists and the British, 
and Zionists and the British, escalated. Palestinians found 
themselves increasingly isolated as attempts by the Arab 
nationalist movement to include Palestine in its national 
objectives failed.(Porath, 1974, Flapan, 1979) 
Weizmann as official representative of the Zionist 
movement adhered to the British concept of Pan-Arabism, 
ignoring the Palestinian national movement.(Flapan, 1979:33) 
The Weizmann-Faisal negotiations of 1919 were a result of 
British pressure on the Syrian nationalists to accept 
Zionism. The British hoped for a common anti-French, pro- 
British stand from these meetings. Weizmann and Faisal 
assumed that an agreement between them would ensure that the 
British would support each of their objectives. The 
Weizmann-Faisal agreement contained the following 
provisions:1) Arab and Jewish representatives would be 
established in their respective territories 2) the Zionist 
Organization would provide the Arab State with economic 
experts and use its best efforts to assist in providing the 
means for developing natural resources 3) Jewish immigration 
to Palestine was to be encouraged on the basis of the 
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Balfour Declaration with religious rights and Moslem holy 
places guarded 4) the parties were to act in complete accord 
and harmony... before the Peace conference 5) Any matters of 
dispute..shall be referred to the British government. The 
British however were more interested in reaching a 
settlement with the French than either the Zionists or 
Hashemites. Furthermore lack of support by the Zionists 
disappointed the Syrian nationalists when the French army in 
Syria deposed Faisal in 1920.(Flapan, 1979:43) 
Two objectives preoccupied Palestinian Arab 
nationalists during this period. The first was to from 
associations to protest Zionist policy. Secondly, two 
organizations were formed to advocate that Palestine or 
'Southern Syria' be included in the fate of Greater Syria as 
promised by the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918. (Flapan, 
1979:32) Al muntada al-Adabi (the Literary Club, and al- 
Nadi-al-Arabi (the Arab Club) emerged in 1918, calling for 
Palestinian inclusion in an independent 'Greater Syria'. The 
first Arab nationalist newspaper published in Palestine, in 
Sept, 1919 was edited by a member of al-Nadi al Arabi. 
While al-Muntada al Adabi was financed by the French, al- 
Arabi was led by young members of al-Husayni, a prominent 
Jerusalem family.(Flapan,1979 : 35) The Husaynis held high 
positions in the local administration and were therefore 
dependent upon them. However, both organizations met in 
January of 1919 in Jerusalem,and presented petitions to the 
King-Crane Commission protesting Zionism. 
The Damascus 
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branch of al-Nadi al-Arabi led by Palestinians, was active 
at the first General Syrian Congress in July 1919, rejecting 
a settlement by Faisal with the French. Similarly al Fatah 
organized the al-Istiqlal party to organize public 
activities calling for independence. On the other end of 
the spectrum, a group of landowners and businessmen, calling 
themselves Al-Hizb-al Watani were not willing to pay the 
price of instability and war for independence, and were 
therefore willing to recognize the Jewish national home in 
Palestine. While a number of important associations 
representing a range of views were made up of notables, Jam 
•iyyat al-Ikha wa-al-'Afaf was a more militant arm of al- 
Muntada al-Adabi and included both religious leaders and 
ordinary citizens, particularly policemen.(Porath, 1974:78) 
The choice between possible self- government as part of 
an independent Greater Syria and Zionist rule in Palestine, 
stimulated organizing activities resulting in the First 
Congress of the Musiim-Christian Association in Jerusalem, 
January, 1919. This organization was formed to create a 
platform and send representatives to the Pans Peace 
Conference for the adopting of Pan-Syrian Resolutions The 
Muslim Christian Association composed of notable and 
religious leaders, represented a traditional elite. 
The Muslim Christian Association and other activities 
of Palestinians during this period were organized in 
response to possibilities within the larger diplomatic 
situation as well as in response to the necessity for 
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immediate and direct action within Palestine. Within 
Palestine the newly formed Muslim Christian Association 
presented a petition to the military governor of Jerusalem 
from various Arab associations protesting Zionist policy. 
The military governor of Jaffa wrote:"I suggest that a 
Palestine Arab Commission be formed for the purpose of 
keeping the balance of power between the races. What the 
Arabs fear is not the Jews in Palestine but the Jews who 
are coming to Palestine."(Porath, 1974:80) These protests 
were stimulated by the arrival of the Zionist Commission in 
April of 1918 in Jerusalem. Supported by the Balfour 
Declaration, the Zionist Commission was recognized by the 
military authorities. While the Arabs had no officially 
recognized representative body, Jews were able to use their 
influence in Palestine and London to acquire privileges, for 
example, concessionary rail travel and use of the telephone 
at a time when war limited use of both. 
The Zionist Commission immediately met with Arab 
notables in Jerusalem. Weizmann reassured them that the 
Zionists sympathized with the cause of Arab nationalism and 
were not planning to set up a Jewish government. But the 
Balfour Declaration promised Jews a share in administering 
the country. Zionist demands for control of immigration, 
institutionalizing the Hebrew language and control over land 
transfers, contradicted Weizmann's assurances. Britain's 
obligation to Zionism was one tactic of the British to 
retain control of Palestine. The British Military 
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Administration pressed for resolutions for 'home rule' in 
Palestine under British control. While the British assumed 
a majority of delegates at the Paris Peace Conference would 
support these resolutions, fear of Zionism stimulated unity 
between pro-French and pro-British elements of the Arab 
Nationalist Movement. Resolutions of a majority of Arab 
delegates called for unity of Palestine with Syria, complete 
withdrawal of the French and establishment of friendly 
relations with Britain. 
The most significant dissent from the latter point of 
view came from Jerusalem's elite who were afraid that total 
unity would diminish Jerusalem's administrative importance. 
An assembly of notables of the city and surrounding villages 
convened by the Jerusalem MCA issued the following 
restriction:"Owing to the fact that the Big Powers by the 
Anglo-French Declaration bestowed upon the liberated peoples 
the right of establishing governments which shall derive 
their authority from the free choice of the indigenous 
population, we therefore on behalf of the public in general, 
beg that a constitutional and internally independent 
government be, by the free choice of the indigenous 
population, established in Palestine. This government will 
enact its all necessary laws, according to the wishes of its 
inhabitants, and be politically associated with the 
completely independent Arab Syria."(Porath, 1974:90) 
The range of positions held by Arab nationalist 
associations and parties inside and outside of Palestine 
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represented class interests and political allegiances. For 
example, al-Muntada al Adabi advocating unity and complete 
dependence without foreign protection, tried to block the 
pro-British traditional elite of Jaffa. These rich 
merchants grew and marketed citrus and were motivated by 
their interest in keeping the trade with Britain in citrus 
fruit stable. The traditional Muslim elite of Damascus 
contained pro-French elements. Many Arab nationalists in 
Damascus were wary of this element, as well as of Faisal's 
pro-British leanings and ambiguous stance on Zionism. The 
British themselves took a hard line in their attempt to 
influence public opinion in favor of a British mandate in 
Palestine. They blocked Palestinian delegates from the 
conference, tried to influence heads of communities to 
demand foreign protection and threatened arrest of persons 
advocating 'extreme' views. In spite of British efforts to 
undermine unity within the Arab nationalist movement, and 
even in the face of a range of opinion about how 
independence was to be achieved, the movement was almost 
unanimously united in its official opposition to Zionism. 
The general tenor of the movement was expressed by the 
protest statement of the 'Supreme Committee of the 
Palestinian Associations' to the authorities. This 
organization was created in 1919 in an attempt to create a 
nation-wide network of all organizations. It was 
concentrated in Jerusalem, Nablus and Haifa and became the 
coordinator of Pan-Syrian unity associations, demanding 
complete independence without foreign protect ion.(Porath, 
1974:94) 
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Class interest and contrary political motivations 
sparked conflict and splits within the Zionist movement as 
well. 
As discussed previously, Weizmann's views, the most 
influential in determining the politic of the official 
Zionist movement, were based on his conviction, finally, 
that a Jewish state could only be had with British support 
and protection. This choice was framed by Weizmann's 
adherence to two colonialist ideologies. Weizmann's pan- 
Syrian perspective was based on the following 
rationalization that 'in the present state of affairs would 
tend towards the creation of an Arab Palestine if there were 
an Arab people in Palestine.'(Flapan, 1979:57) Ultimately 
this rationalization became the basis for many Zionist 
policies vis-a-vis the 'non-existent' Palestinian Arab 
population. Secondly, the words of Aaron Aaronsohn, advisor 
to Weizmann reflect the racist view that the Arabs could be 
bought off; that they were not an important enough force to 
take into account:"Had we permitted the squalid, 
superstitious ignorant fellahin...to live in close contact 
with the Jewish pioneers... the slender chance of their 
success...would have been impaired, since we had no power, 
under the cruel Turkish administration, to enforce 
progressive methods...or even to ensure respect for private 
property... so far as we knew the Arabs, the man among them 
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who will withstand a bribe is yet to be found."(Flapan, 
1979:55) One consequence of both related perspectives was 
that the Zionist movement sought to neutralize Arab 
influence on British policy rather than to deal directly 
with Arab fears and demands. 
A second consequence was that Zionists, like the 
British, exploited indigenous family rivalries, differences 
between community leaders, tensions between Bedouins and 
farmers, between rural and urban elements and between 
Muslims and Christians, to facilitate Zionist hegemony. For 
example, between 1921 and 1923 the head of the Arab 
Department of the Zionist executive in Jerusalem, A.M. 
Kalvarisky helped to organize pro-British National Muslim 
Associations. The Zionist organization paid leaders to 
cover expenses, arranged for agricultural credit at bank 
rates rather than the usual high interest rates and 
subsidized newspapers supporting the associations.(Flapan, 
1979:64) 
Dr. Nahum Goldmann and Judah Magnes were two vocal 
representative of those few Zionists who recognized the 
importance of the Palestinian national movement in the 
context of anti-colonialist liberation movements. Magnes 
became the leader of the Ihud Association or bi-nationalist 
movement whose important role beginning in the 1920 s will 
be discussed. The Ihud Association supported a Jewish 
homeland, but did not believe that a Jewish state- that is a 
Jewish majority ruling an Arab minority- was desirable or 
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possible. The following statement exemplifies Goldman's 
belief that a Jewish homeland must come about as part of 
Middle Eastern politics and not as part of Imperialist 
politics:"The Arab problem can only be solved non- 
diplomatically, by entering into direct contact with the 
population...as long as we do not initiate such a policy...a 
bold effort to talk directly to the Arabs, to discuss the 
principles of neighborly friendly relations and co¬ 
existence, to thresh out these problems directly, people to 
people, Jewish colony to Arab village, group to group, over 
the heads of Agents, Clubs, cliques,journalists, Emirs and 
emissaries- the Arab question will remain a dark spot in the 
Palestine problem and the problem will remain 
unsolved."(Flapan, 1979:124,125) 
At the other end of the spectrum, Vladimir Jabotinsky 
played the most critical role in disrupting Jewish-Arab 
relations in Palestine. Jabotinsky worked outside of the 
official Zionist leadership, negotiating with heads of 
governments to facilitate a mass exodus of Jews to 
Palestine. Jabotinsky elaborated a militaristic concept of a 
Zionist take over that was based on total abnegation of any 
rights of the Arab population. While the socialist-Zionist 
movement believed that Jewish and Arab workers must unite to 
overthrow the capitalists among the Zionists and the Arab 
nationalists, Jabotinsky believed that military might and 
complete subjugation of the Arab would bring about 
of society that Jews needed.(Esco, 1947, Halpern, 1969, 
Flapan, 1979) 
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In April of 1920, the Pan-Arab Association initiated a 
demonstration during the traditional Muslim celebration, al- 
Nabi Musa to show support of a united Syria under the rule 
of Emir Faisal. The British government arrested leaders and 
confirmed their mandate over Palestine. In July France and 
Britain overthrew Faisal and a civilian regime was put in 
place in Palestine representing the country's new 
status.(Porath, 1974:102) After the April outbreak, the 
Arab Nationalist movement continued to forcefully resist 
British rule. The traditional leadership of the MCA opposed 
them, supported by the al-Nashashibi family (al Nashashibi 
was appointed mayor since he had not taken part in the 
demonstrations), and other community notables, merchants and 
many of the Greek Orthodox community. The first stage of 
the Arab nationalist movement among the Palestinians, 
advocating inclusion of Palestine or southern Syria in a 
greater independent Syria, came to an end. From 1920-1948, 
Arab nationalism in Palestine and Zionism both evolved on a 
practical as well as ideological level within the context of 
the British mandate. Both movements within this context 
were forced to use the British administrative system and the 
European concept of nation-state to make themselves felt and 
heard. 
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The British Mandate 
The League of Nations sanctioned the imposition of a 
modern bureaucratic system in Palestine. It gave the 
British political authority with no connection to the 
society it ruled. All recommendations or requests from 
Palestinians regarding the new state system were processed 
in London. Decisions regarding these requests were based on 
their relative significance for the international and 
domestic goals of the British. 
Under the Ottoman state, Palestine was divided into 
three major districts or sanjaks, administered by a 
representative of the Ottoman government and a 
representative legislative council. Each sanjak was divided 
into districts headed by local sheikhs, whose power was 
maintained through traditional custom and enforced by 
military at their disposal. Ottoman administrative reforms 
in the second half of the nineteenth century were designed 
to weaken the power of sheikhs by removing the function of 
tax collection from them. Tax collection was put in the 
hands of a newly created class of urban notables, 
a'yans.(Miller, 1985: 141) Sheikhs were brought within the 
framework of the Ottoman administration and appointed as 
mukhtars of villages.(Porath, 1974:9) Minority communities 
had separate administrative systems connected to the central 
apparatus of the Ottoman state. 
The political apparatus created by the British 
administrative system was based on a decision to utilize 
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existing communal ties, customary traditions and religious 
affiliations to maintain control. The British had to decide 
whether to consider the Palestinian community as one 
national group or according to religious affiliation. The 
population could be addressed as Arabs and Arab Jews; 
Muslims, Christians and Jews, or Palestinians and Europeans. 
By preserving religious identifications as primary, the 
British exacerbated and institutionalized religious 
tensions.(Miller, 1985) By isolating religion or using 
religion as a primary basis of identification, the British 
ignored the fundamental communal organization of the Ottoman 
state in which the religious community was a multi-faceted 
organic organization whose functions included but were not 
limited to the religious element. Thus, one step in the 
transformations of communities into organizations that would 
serve the interests of the British was the establishment of 
separate administrative bodies for Muslims, Jews and 
Christians. This worked to the benefit of the Zionists. 
For example, Article 15 of the mandate stipulated that 
education be conducted in the language of each community. 
Zionists used this to teach in Hebrew. In conjunction with 
the Religious communities Ordinance of 1925 allowing 
communities to tax for educational purposes, the Zionist 
were able to establish their own school systems.(Lesch, 
1980:40) 
The new administrative system gave bureaucrats 
accountable to the High Commissioner total power over the 
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local population. Palestinians absorbed into the 
bureaucracy, gradually replaced the traditional custom of 
authority of urban notable. In rural areas local mukhtars 
became the focus of British attempts to control villages. 
The effect was to divide the Palestinian population in new 
ways. Mukhtars, villagers, Palestinian bureaucrats, were 
subject to conflicting claims as traditional modes of group 
identification no longer ensured social, economic and 
political benefits, or power. In this sense political power 
became a source of disunity. In the face of these 
developments, the Arab nationalist movement ideally 
represented one place where a sense of unity could be 
maintained.(Lesch, 1980, Miller, 1985) 
Because Zionism was the only recognized Jewish 
nationalist movement, Jews and Arabs were pushed by the 
above developments to choose opposing national 
identifications to protect their interests in the face of 
British hegemony. Because the fate of both nationalist 
movements was bound up with European power and perogatives, 
conflicting loyalties were a source of disunity within both 
movements. 
Control of the Arab population was maintained by 
creating a hierarchical system of personnel assigned to 
various districts and accountable to central offices. 
Initially these positions were held by a disportionate 
number of Arab Christians. In response to demands from 
Muslims to maintain control over their own religious 
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and for equal representation, in 1921 the British created 
the Supreme Muslim Council. The SMS was controlled by 
Muslim elites appointed by the British, and was another tool 
for maintaining sectarian and class divisions within 
Palestinian society.(Porath, 1974,Lesch, 1980, Miller, 1985) 
Debates in the process of creating systems to control 
the two central functions of tax collection and education 
reflected the racist and paternalistic bias of the British. 
The government played contradictory roles encouraging some 
level of self government and at the same time maintaining 
that the 'backward' Arab population was not ready for self 
government. This racist view allowed the British to ignore 
the fact that the population had been governing themselves 
satisfactorily for centuries. 
Within Arab society literacy was highly valued and was 
bound up with religious education. The British authorities 
subsumed existing Kuttabs (Muslim schools), which had been 
the vehicle for the transmission of Arab culture and 
language. Moreover schools did not provide access to skills 
required to meet the demands of the rapidly changing economy 
and political system. Literacy education was discouraged 
and the standard course for fellahin boys was only four 
years, discouraging acquisition of anything more than basic 
skills.(Miller, 1985:109) Although by 1926 a large segment 
of the Muslim population recognized the need for education 
of both sexes, by July of 1934, there were only 10 
government schools for women in the villages of Palestine. 
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The government's response to the request for women1s schools 
was the followingIf female education is to have any direct 
effect upon the future of the country, girls must be brought 
up to understand the value of a good home where cleanliness, 
sanitation and above all care of children are to be regarded 
as the aim of every woman...The excellent work already 
accomplished by various missionary and other bodies, local 
and foreign, cannot be overrated. They are the pioneers of 
female education in Palestine and for what they have done 
and are doing deserve every commendation. But the tendency 
in schools under their direction has been, if a word of 
criticism may be allowed, to cultivate too much the literary 
side of education and to neglect almost entirely what may be 
termed the domestic side.'(Miller, 1985:104) 
Education played a twofold role in providing a context 
for assimilation into a new social order and cultural values 
because it determined social mobility and because the values 
inherent in education as defined by the British negated 
traditional values of familial and religious authority. The 
mandate created a new class of educated urban elite who were 
trained to identify more closely with foreigners (Europeans 
or European educated) than to peasants who were their own 
people. Students caught between worlds, were politicized by 
the process of discovering what their choices were and what 
they were 
social and 
denied. Many began to realize that schools had 
political significance and that economic hardship 
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was connected to access to education.(Saigh, 1979, Miller, 
1985) 
Policies with regard to Arab education did not affect 
the Zionists who as stated were authorized under Article 25 
of the Mandate and the Religious Ordinance of 1925 to 
maintain separate schools. Control over education gave the 
Zionists an ideological base to mobilize young Jews. 
Education became a tool for creating the socioeconomic 
autonomous base the Zionist movement felt was critical for 
its survival. The central issues for the Zionist movement 
in creating the socio-economic base and institutions to 
maintain it were land and labor. Zionist land purchase 
exacerbated existing tensions between peasants and 
landholders, and created a class of landless workers who 
because of the Zionist boycott of Arab labor, were cut off 
from alternative sources of income.(Saigh, 1979) Neither 
the Zionists nor the British developed agricultural programs 
to support the needs of Arab peasants. Furthermore, Land 
Ordinances in 1920 and 1929, although instituted to ensure 
compensation to peasants who gave up rights to land they 
cultivated, were of no effect or not enforced. Settlement 
disrupted local economy when people moved who had 
traditionally traded with neighboring villages.(Flapan, 
1979, Lesch, 1980, Miller, 1985) 
The belief among Zionists that by establishing 
autonomous branches of industry and agriculture, Jewish life 
it impossible for Arab and Jew to 
would be 'normalized' made 
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act jointly in recognizing the effects of foreign occupation 
on indigenous society and customary relations. Policies of 
separation in regard to land and labor were a major source 
of estrangement between the two communities. Violence 
erupting in 1920, 1921, 1929 and the 1936-9 Arab Revolt, was 
symptomatic of the growing tendency to target one another in 
the process of trying to win concessions from the British 
administration. Riots in 1920 and 1921 in Jaffa, and in the 
Tul-Karm-Hadera region caused dissolution of partnerships 
and commercial relations between Jews and Arabs. As a 
result of the 1929 riots provoked by the controversy over 
Muslim vs. Jewish rights to the Wailing Wall, Jewish 
communities left Arab towns in which they had lived for 
centuries. This process was completed by the 1936 
disturbances when it became impossible to continue daily 
contacts in economic relations and physical proximity in 
mixed towns.(Flapan, 1979) 
The call for Jewish labor evolved out of impulses at 
variance with one another. Socialist-Zionists anticipated 
the danger of settlers exploiting native labor. Thus 
evolved the concept of a closed Jewish economy independent 
of Arab labor and food supplies. However, they saw this 
within the concept of nationalized land as the basis for 
colonization and a guarantee against land speculation 
exploitation. The class-conscious socialists of the Third 
Aliyah (1917-1923) thought that by forcing an autonomous 
Arab sector, class conflict would be focused intra- 
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communally rather than on Jewish-Arab national 
differences.(Flapan, 1979) The concept of 100 percent 
Jewish labor was solidified by the creation of Mapai 
(unification of the labor parties, Hapoal Hatzair and Ahdut 
Avoda in May of 1929. Control of Jewish labor was, however, 
in the hands of the more conservative Histradrut, Jewish 
Federation of Workers Union. In 1933 the Histradrut 
initiated a campaign to remove Arab workers from 
construction sites and other Jewish enterprises in the 
cities. They also organized a nation wide campaign to 
picket citrus groves employing Arab labor, using the 
argument that the mandatory government could assert that 
Arab labor in the Jewish sector could compensate for labor 
shortages, giving them an excuse to limit Jewish 
immigration. The policies of the Histradrut, inimical to 
the idea of solidarity between Arab and Jewish workers 
obviated the effects of spontaneous joint activities of Arab 
and Jewish workers, such as the strike of drivers in 
November 1931 demanding reduction of the costs of driving 
licenses, fuel and tire. Arab workers ultimately formed a 
separate Arab trade union movement (Palestine Arab Workers 
Society) controlled by Arab National parties.(Flapan, 1979) 
Women were prime movers in the Arab nationalist 
movement articulating important connections between their 
rights within Palestinian society and Palestinian rights 
within the larger context of world diplomacy. In October 
1929 the first Arab Women's Congress met, representing 
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Muslim and Christian communities. Their . ratied goal was to 
assist the Arab woman in her endeavors to improve her 
standing, to help the poor and distressed and to encourage 
and promote the Arab national enterprise. Many Arab Women's 
Associations had been performing similar functions s>nee 
1919. Arab women's organizations presented their demands 
before the mandatory power at every possible 
opportunity.(Mogannum, 1937) 
In reaction to Arab-Jewish fighting in May 1921, 
Winston Churchill issued the White Paper on Palestine, 
limiting Jewish immigration to the 'economic absorptive 
capacity of the country'. Herbert Samuel tried to assure 
the Arab movement that the British government 'does not 
contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted 
into a Jewish national home, but that such a Home shall be 
founded in Palestine.'(Esco, 1947:27) Successive 
restrictions on land purchase and immigration followed each 
serious outbreak of Arab/Jewish disturbances. However, the 
Parsfield White Paper of October 1930 recommending 
restriction of Jewish immigration and settlement because of 
shortage of land for Arab peasants, was annulled by the 
McDonald letter of February 1931. As the British mandate 
moved to restrict immigration in order not to further 
alienate the Arab movement, the Zionist movement built up 
its means of circumventing that policy. The discovery of 
arms at the Jaffa port in October of 1935 was one of the 
to the disturbances of 1936. 
events leading 
At the same 
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time disintegration of village society and urban 
unemployment created the basis for the emergence of an 
organized armed movement among Arabs also. In April of 
1935, members of Ikhwan al-Qassam held up cars on a highway, 
robbing the Arab travelors and killing two Jews. Members of 
the Jewish community retaliated killing Arabs and holding a 
mass funeral in Tel Aviv. Arab politicians in Nablus and 
Jaffa responded by calling for a general strike.(Esco, 1947, 
et. al. ) 
The 1936 strike was organized by the Arab Higher 
Committee created to coordinate the six political parties 
which in turn coordinated local committees. Two viewpoints 
emerged- one supporting the economic-political strike as an 
instrument instrument of moral pressure on the British 
government. The other viewed violence as a necessary 
corollary to civil disobedience. While the strike had a 
broad base of support, it caused enormous hardship and 
losses for citrus growers and merchants, Arab workers, and 
peasants who were dependent on the Jewish market. The 
strike had the opposite effect upon the Zionist economic 
structure, stimulating investments and completing the 
process o£ separating the Arab and Jewish labor markets. 
However,as a result of the Peel Commission created in the 
autumn of 1936 to reconsider British policy a final White 
paper was issued. The resulting White Paper of 1939 
prohibited land transfers to Jews in most of Palestine and 
restricted immigration beyond that point dependent on Arab 
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consent. Finally the Jewish Agency was now faced with the 
decision whether to continue the policy of economic 
separation or to return Arab workers to the Jewish sector, 
resume trade and normalize economic relations.(Flapan, 
1979,et al.) 
Support for taking the latter course existed both in 
the Arab movement and in the Zionist movement. Between 1922 
and 1941, close to 30 million pounds passed from the Jewish 
to the Arab sector through payments for land, agricultural 
produce, rent and wages.(Flapan, 1979:223) The growth of 
the Arab urban sector and the growth in Arab citriculture 
from 20,000 dunam in 1922 to 147,000 dunam in 1935, was 
stimulated by partnership between Arab businessmen and 
Jews.(Smilansky,1947:58) Arab merchants marketed industrial 
products manufactured by Jewish firms. Common efforts 
between Jews and Arabs who were citrus growers resulted in a 
tremendous rate of growth in citrus cultivation. Moderate 
Arab forces, beneficiaries of those developments, could have 
been reinforced in 1936 by fostering co-operation between 
capital and labor and integration of the Arab and Jewish 
sectors into one economic base.(Smilansky, 1947) 
Martin Buber and Judah Magnes were two influential 
members of the Bi-Nationalist party, who in the crucial year 
of 1936 led the effort to reach a modus vivendi with the 
Arabs in Palestine. As noted previously, the first Zionist 
thinker to promote the idea of bi-nationalism was Ahad Ha'am 
who recognized Palestine as the 'common possession of 
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different peoples, each endeavoring to establish here a 
national home'.(Buber, 1972:10) Among the Oriental Jews 
involved in the bi-nationalist movement, Dr. Nissim Malul 
advocated "the renaissance of a 'symbiosis' of Arabic and 
Hebrew in opposition to western culture." (Flapan, 1979:164) 
Co-operation with the Arab movement was the basis of the 
Brith shalom (Covenant of Peace) movement in the 20's and of 
the Ihud (Unity) Association in the 40's (founded by Judah 
Magnes). Martin Buber maintained that a bi-national state 
aimed at 'a social structure based on the reality of two 
peoples' living together. The foundations of this structure 
cannot be the traditional ones of majority and minority, but 
must be different...The road to be pursued is that of an 
agreement between the two nations- naturally also taking 
into account the productive participation of smaller 
national groups- an agreement which, in our opinion, would 
lead to Jewish-Arab cooperation in the revival of the Middle 
East with the Jewish partner concentrated in a strong 
settlement in Palestine. This cooperation though 
necessarily starting out from economic premises, will allow 
development in accordance with an all-embracing cultural 
perspective and on the basis of a feeling of at oneness, 
tending to result in a new form of society(Buber, 1972:8) 
Within this context a group of Jewish business and civil 
leaders known as 'The Five' worked with Musa Alami, crown 
counsel and an associate of the Mufti to create a p P 
including political parity (equality of representative 
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regardless of numbers in population), an immigration limit 
of 30,000 a year for ten years and restrictions on Jewish 
purchase of land.(Flapan, 1979:228) 
The Zionist leadership in spite of strong Arab 
opposition, decided in 1937 to mobilize all efforts to 
achieve a Jewish state through partition. When the general 
strike and economic boycott of Jewish goods was called off 
instead of opting for an agreement with the Arabs and a plan 
for economic cooperation, they viewed the occasion as a 
final opportunity to realize the goal of complete economic 
separation. 
The first constitution of Mapai, the labor party formed 
in 1930 by the merger of Ahdut Avoda and Hapoal Hatzair, 
adopted the proposal of the cantonal system as the best way 
to achieve the Zionist goal. The cantonal system 
recommended Jewish and Arab independent territorial units 
joined together in a legislative framework to deal with 
foreign affairs. In 1931 Weizmann persuaded Mapai to adopt 
the principle of parity, equality between Jewish and Arabs 
in government whatever their role in the population. 
However, when Ben Gurion became chairperson of the Jewish 
agency in Palestine (1938) he did not try to have parity 
adopted as its official position. By 1936 both Ben Gurion 
and Weizmann accepted partition - the creation of a Jewish 
state in Palestine as the only solution for Zionism. 
Arab opposition to the partition plan developed into 
open guerrilla warfare against the British and by the 
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British army against Arabs. The Haganah, military 
organization under control of the official Zionist movement, 
retaliated against Arabs. When a Jewish terrorist was 
hanged by the British, anti-British feeling began to 
escalate. Between 1936 and 1939, 2,850 Arabs were killed 
and 9,000 jailed; 1,200 Jews were killed as were 700 
British. (Flapan, 1979:236) Arab villages were terrorized 
by the British as they attempted to defeat the Arab 
guerrilla movement. Martial law was declared and the Arab 
Higher Committee dissolved. In response all Arab political 
parties united demanding an end to Jewish land purchases and 
immigration; an end to the British mandate, creation of a 
legislative council as promised by the British in 1931 and 
the recognition of an independent Arab state. During 1937 
Ben Gurion attempted to negotiate with pan-Arab leaders 
outside of Palestine for recognition of a Jewish state in 
Palestine in exchange for Zionist recognition of Arab 
states. Ben-Gurion was also engaged at this time in gaining 
the co-operation of Vladimir Jabotinsky and his dissident 
Revisionist movement to counter the proposal for a 
legislative council in Palestine unless Jewish 
representation was based on the population of world Jewry 
and Arab representation on the population of Arabs in 
Palestine. 
In May of 1936 a Royal Commission was appointed to 
evaluate the events in Palestine. Their conclusions were 
that the British mandate was no longer workable and their 
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recommendation was partition. The proposed partition plan 
necessitated the transfer of 296,000 Arabs from the area to 
be designated as the Jewish state. The transfer proposal 
was resisted by many Jews, Zionists and non-Zionists. 
Senator and Hextor, members of the Jewish Agency 
representing non-Zionist groups, stated- 'We can't say that 
we want to live with the Arabs and at the same time transfer 
them to Transjordan.'(Flapan, 1979:259) During 1937 bi¬ 
nationalists and 'maximalists' (advocates of an undivided 
Israel) and non-Zionists in the Jewish Agency who opposed 
the idea of a Jewish sovereign state met with a group of 
Palestinians headed by the Mufti, who opposed partition and 
unification with Transjordan on political grounds. Zionists 
maintained contact with Arab leaders in Cairo, Beirut and 
Damascus. Throughout this period Jews and Arabs continued 
to maintain cultural exchanges (the Egyptian soccer team 
visited Palestine and the Jewish Philharmonic gave concerts 
in Cairo). Jews vacationed in Lebanon where hotel and 
restaurants had Hebrew menus. Jewish manufactured goods 
were sold in Arab countries and Arab agricultural produce in 
Jewish markets.(Flapan, 1979) In July of 1937 a proposal 
was submitted to representatives of the Jewish Agency for an 
independent Palestinian state with complete autonomy for all 
communities thus providing for a Jewish National home but 
not a Jewish state.(Flapan, 1979:268) The Jewish Agency 
rejected the proposal having decided to push for 
The moderate National Defense Party run by the Nashashibis, 
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the one group that could have helped negotiate between Jews 
and Arabs, withdrew its support, in response to the transfer 
proposal. 
The escalating violence in the years just preceding 
World War II further divided the Arab population and the 
Jewish population. Political factions attacked one another; 
the landless attacked the privileged; those in official 
positions were terrorized. The New White Paper of 1939 
solidified the British position- abandonment of partition 
and of commitment to the Balfour Declaration. The White 
Paper posited constitutional changes to permit self 
government in Palestine within ten years. Up to 75,000 
Jewish immigrants would be permitted to enter Palestine for 
five years, when immigration would cease unless approved by 
the Arab community. Land transfer was limited to defined 
areas.(Miller, 1985) The activities of the Irgun, a liason 
of the Revisionist Party led by Jabotinsky, escalated. 
While in 1938 the Irgun had placed bombs in Arab markets in 
Haifa, Jerusalem and Jaffa, in 1940 their aim was to 
eliminate British rule in Palestine. 
This militaristic element in Palestine was aided by the 
events surrounding the emerging war. The Mufti's decision 
to ally with the Nazis in the hope that British rule would 
be defeated, neutralized the effect of resistance among Jews 
to the extremist revisionist approach. Although the Mufti's 
rejection of the 1939 White paper was attacked by the 
Defense Party, the Mufti remained the most powerful leader 
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of the Palestinian Arabs. His support came from a history 
of frustration with French and British movements to prevent 
Arab unity and independence. Hitler's rise to power 
intensified those feelings, as they began to speculate on a 
new Arab revolt against Britain. 
After the 1939 White Paper, Zionists began to shift 
hopes for political support to the United States government. 
In 1942 in New York City the Biltmore Program was adopted by 
Zionists demanding fulfillment of 'the original purpose' of 
the Balfour Declaration and rejecting the British White 
Paper. The conference called for full support of the war 
effort by Jews and demands of a post-war settlement assuring 
'Peace, Justice and Equality'.(Flapan, 1979:282) 
Groups of Jews and Arabs in Palestine in favor of a bi¬ 
national solution continued to search for a political 
settlement. Liberal parties such as Hashomer Hatzair, 
Poalei Zion, and aliya Hadasha, and the Ihud Association met 
with Arab villagers and students and organized lectures and 
debates. An agreement was signed by Arab and Jews calling 
for common action and the publication of an Arab magazine 
promoting Jewish-Arab cooperation. Arab states such as Iraq 
and Transjordan proposed various forms of federations in the 
Fertile Crescent with autonomy for Jews. In 1943 Arab 
notables proposed free immigration up to numerical parity 
and possible compromise after that point.(Flapan, 1979:285) 
In May 1945, the Zionist movement petitioned the United 
Nations and the British government to set up a Jewish state 
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in Palestine. In June, 1945, Zionists demanded entry of 
100,000 displaced persons to Palestine. 
Proponents of the Biltmore Program and militarist 
nationalist elements in Palestine represented by the 
Revisionists were aided in their cause by the violence 
perpetrated against Jewish survivors of the Nazi Holocaust. 
The Haganah continued to build up its resistance, as they 
attempted to illegally rescue survivors who came to 
Palestine to find safety. The British responded by 
arresting Jewish political and religious leaders, and 
closing down the Jewish agency. In July of 1946 the Irgun 
blew up the King David Hotel site.of the mandatory 
administration. Zionists continued to dispute proposed 
solutions, with the added factor of strong United States 
participation. The 22nd Zionist Congress in Basle, December 
1946 rejected negotiations with Great Britain and deposed 
Weizmann. The matter was taken to the United Nations which 
with Soviet and U. S. support recommended partition. While 
the Zionist movement accepted this plan, Palestinian Arabs 
began to organize to resist its implementation. 
Dr. Nahum Goldman's comments on the War ol 1948 ending 
in the military and political collapse of the Palestinians 
salientlv identifies its consequences: 
"The Zionist movement had conceived the creation 
Jewish state on the basis o£ amity and ^d^Snrincinle- the 
the Arabs..our ideas contained two points of principle, tne 
demand for a Jewish state in part of Palestine and the 
participation of that state in a confederation of Near 
SSt after SS vote^the and 
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the democratic bloc, East and West, voted for a Jewish state 
leaving the Arabs in desperate isolation- it may have been 
the time to reach some agreement with the Arabs, even if 
only a temporary one. At the time I had some hints from 
Egyptian diplomats that we should meet...not to get the 
Arabs to accept the idea of Partition or a Jewish 
state,which they wouldn't have done at the time, but at 
least to get them not to react by a war. President Truman 
who was also very much afraid of an Arab/Jewish war, offered 
us his private airplane. The only one to side with me was 
Moshe Sharett who was in New York at the time...we decided 
to send him over to convince Ben-Gurion-but the enthusiasm 
in Israel was so great and Ben-Gurion's determination to 
proclaim the State immediately so strong that our suggestion 
to postpone it for a month, to try to avoid a war if 
possible, was rejected..in a sense it was the original 
tragedy of Israel because, as the Talmud says, one sin leads 
to another- aveira qoreret aveira; that's what I was afraid 
of, that there will be another war and another.... The 
proclamation of the State and the ensuing invasion by the 
Arab armies naturally ruled out reconciliation..The basic 
and tragic fact is that no agreement was reached and that 
the State of Israel made its entrance into history with a 
war, albeit a defensive war, against the Arabs. How to 
overcome the consequences of this is the central problem of 
contemporary Israeli politics and will be for many years to 
come, for that first war and the Israeli victory produced 
inescapable consequences for both Israel and the Arabs. As 
far as the latter were concerned the breach with Israel has 
been widened enormously..The unexpected defeat was a shock 
and a terrible blow to Arab pride. Deeply injured, they 
turned all their endeavors to the healing of their 
psychological wound: to victory and revenge. On the 
other hand, success had a marked psychological effect on 
Israel. It seemed to show the advantage of direct action 
over diplomacy. . .The victory offered such a of 
contrast to the centuries of persecution and humiliation 
adaptation and compromise, that is seemed to indicate the 
oniv direction that could possible to taken from then on. 
To brook nothing,tolerate no attack, but cut through Gordian 
knots and to sh^pe history by creating facts seemed so 
simp?;, SO compelling, so satisfying that it became Israel's 
policy in its conflict with the Arab world....This was the 
basisYof a whole wrong development of Israel because, fir 
n? all I have always thought of Israel as a neutral state 
between the ?wo blocs in the world. We are the classic^ 
people who have to be neutral, as a P®0Ph® communist world, 
because millions of our PeoP must have a State that 
millions in the Western world, and we must nave * 
any Jew living under any regime ^ depend on 
^rredg;;Tos?;yTrom°tgherwnest; so —more 
Israel-not oV^Helat^onship with the Arab world- was 
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determined by it.The second consequence was that, being 
threatened by the Arab world, being a small minority, we 
were absolutely committed to mass immigration and naturally 
had to depend on numbers of people- not only for the army, 
but for the economic development of the country. So we 
organized a great mass immigration which had to weaken all 
the ideals of kibbutzim and (of) creating a new society in 
Israel...To sum up, Israel was forced, from its beginning, 
into a situation where it can only become a State like all 
other States and I don't believe such an Israel will 
survive."(Flapan, 1979:295) 
The 1948 war had devastating consequences, causing the 
collapse of the Arab public sector and precipitating the 
flight of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian merchants, 
landowners and community leaders. The massacre of 
Palestinian men, women and children at Deir Yassin in April 
1948 exemplified the consequences of a victory for a 
nationalist-militaristic ideology. In panic, thousands fled 
becoming homeless refugees. 
With the creation of the Arab League in March of 1945, 
the Arab states had committed themselves to struggle for the 
independence of Palestine as an Arab State, which meant that 
the fate of Palestine now depended on what the heads of Arab 
states wanted. A delegate of the Arab Higher Committee was 
nominated to represent the Palestinian people in the 
League's Council. In November 1945 the Arab League had 
demanded an end to the British mandate and recognition of a 
democratically elected government with a legislative council 
based on proportional representation of Jews and Arabs. On 
the other hand Abdullah, supported by the Hashemite rulers 
of Iraq and encouraged by the British, continued to pursue a 
•Greater Syria' with the partition of Palestine and 
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arrangement of the Jewish state as the first phase. 
Distrust and disunity within the Arab movement were a major 
factor in a Zionist military victory. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examines the historical developments that 
as Andre Chouraqui puts it 'institutionalized' a Judeo-Arab 
conflict.(Chouraqui, 1972) The conflict is 
institutionalized by the same forces that invent it. The 
conflict emerges out of the definitions imposed on Jew and 
Arab in the modern era, the definitions that some Jews and 
Arabs pose for themselves. 
'Jew' in this period means European Jew. If Palestinian Jew 
were meant, the conflict could not be posed in the same way. 
The central question of this chapter is: how did 
nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth century affect 
social organization, religious life, economic survival, 
relations with outside forces, of Jew and Arab? How did 
transformations in these areas, connected to the emergence 
of Arab nationalism and of Zionism, contribute to peaceful 
co-existence and to dissension between Jew and Arab? 
Two observations are central in this period and inform 
responses to these questions. The first concerns the way in 
which nationalism taking shape in the Ottoman lands were 
affected by relations with outside forces. Second, 
transformations in social organization, religious life and 
economic survival in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, 
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described in Chapter II, had already set in motion the 
conflicts that became solidified in this period. Three of 
those conflicts need to be reiterated here. The first was 
crisis of identity for both Jew and Arab precipitated by 
increased relations with the west, whether through direct 
colonization, extraterritorial privileges and foreign 
national protection for agents of the European powers, or 
through the impact of European-style education in missionary 
schools or schools such as the Alliance Israelite 
Universelle. The second is changing patterns of land 
relations precipitated by the Ottoman Land Reforms and 
consequent changes in economic relations and widening class 
disparities. Third, in the area of religious life, the 
breakdown of traditional social organization with 
modernization of the Empire resulted in a focus on religious 
differences as critical in ways that were new to the Middle 
Eastern environment. Historically in the Islamic lands, 
differences were embedded in a system of social organization 
that provided a basis for common relations. Religion was not 
the important factor. 
Because nationalism was an inevitable part of 
westernization in the twentieth century, a central challenge 
for Jews and Arabs in this era was to define on what basis 
national identification would be pursued. For many 
Palestinian Jews and Arabs, Ottomanism was the logical 
choice. The Ottoman state had provided a relatively secure 
and in many cases comparatively privileged existence for 
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both Jew and Arab. Others joined emerging movements 
advocating a return of the Caliphate to its original 
creators, the Arabs and a revival of Arab culture and 
history. Arab nationalism was however in its early stages a 
movement for autonomy within the state- not a movement to 
overthrow the state. 
European intervention in the Ottoman lands affected the 
way in which Arab nationalism evolved. Anti-semitism in the 
European lands was a critical factor in the evolution of 
Jewish nationalism. Two factors were particularly important 
in the case of Arab nationalism. First, the decision of the 
Sharif Husayn ally with Britain to overthrow the Turks, and 
connected to the Arab Revolt, the McMahon-Husayn agreements 
and subsequent violation of those agreements. The second is 
the Balfour Declaration which promised British support for a 
national Jewish homeland in Palestine, as well as for 
protection of Arab rights. In the case of Jewish 
nationalism anti-semitism was the ideological frame for the 
official Zionist movement- that is, the notion that all 
Gentiles are enemies to the Jew. The critical consequence 
of that perspective held by Weizmann, Herzl and others,was 
that it framed all of history in those terms, ignoring and 
rendering invisible all other historical experiences- for 
instance, that of Palestinian Jews. Anti-semitism was 
critical to the evolution of Jewish nationalism in a second 
way. The violence perpetrated against Jews by Hitler during 
solidified the extremist element in the Zionist 
World War II 
movement and shaped the course of events immediately 
preceding the War of 1948. 
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The Arab nationalist movement was comprised of many 
movements. Similarly, Zionism must be understood as a 
plurality of movements with different perspective and 
different goals. For example, as discussed above, many 
Arabists believed that Zionism could support their cause. 
Likewise, some Zionists,for example, Ah'ad Ha1 am and the 
cultural Zionists conceived of a cultural renaissance for 
Jews in Palestine embedded in the Arab world- that is, 
inherently a Judeo-Arabic renaissance. 
The decision by the League of Nations to first of all 
create a distinct geographic area out of the administrative 
area designated as Palestine, and to mandate Palestine to 
Great Britain, politicized the Arab national movement and 
the Zionist movement. Elements within both movements who 
had opted to ally themselves with Britain in hopes of 
gaining British support to achieve their goals, gained 
power. Conflicts were exacerbated between those who 
benefited from British occupation and those who suffered. 
In the case of both Jews and Arabs, the peasantry suffered 
from political upheaval, social upheaval and religious 
hatred. For example, during the uprisings of the 1920's and 
the 1930's, the distinction between Jew and Zionist was lost 
and many Palestinian Jews were killed. 
The peasantry suffered also because of dislocation 
resulting from land purchase by the Zionist movement and a 
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changing economic structure precipitated by the British 
mandate, wars and Jewish industrial build- up and labor 
practices. As noted before, Ottoman land Reforms (1356,1858) 
left the peasant powerless " to convert customary land use 
into legal land tenure(Saigh, 1979:31) In the mandate 
period the creation of a new proletariat left many jobless, 
particularly where implementation of an autonomous Jewish 
sector was possible. This phenomenon in turn precipitated 
violence. A new class of radicalized Palestinian 
nationalists emerged particularly among the youth whose 
interests and experience differed from those of the elite 
and who did not have access to official channels to voice 
their complaints. 
Polarization within both national movements was fed by 
historical developments. Disenchantment with the British 
precipitated an alliance of the Mufti and Germany as world 
War II became imminent. Hitler's rule gave impetus to the 
militarist Revisionist movement at a time when bi- 
nationalists and Arabs were making progress in finding terms 
of agreement. 
The disruption of Arab-Jew alliances by outside force 
had a tradition. To give just a few examples, Hannah 
Arendt, a leading member of the bi-nationalist Ihud 
Association and one of the foremost interpreters of this 
historical period, notes:"It was in the interest of foreign 
powers that the so-called Weizmann-Faisal agreement was 
allowed to pass into oblivion until 1936. 
It also stands to 
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reason that British apprehension and compromise was behind 
the tacit abandonment.... When in 1922 new Arab-Jewish 
negotiations took place, the British Ambassador in Rome was 
kept fully informed, with the result that the British asked 
a postponement until the mandate has been conferred; the 
Jewish representative, Asher Saphir,held "little doubt that 
members of a certain political school took the view that it 
was not in the interest of the peaceful administration of 
Near and Middle Eastern territories that the two Semitic 
races... should cooperate again on the platform of the 
recognition of Jewish rights in Palestine." From then 
onward Arab hostility has grown year by year; and Jewish 
dependence on British protection has become so desperate a 
need that one may well call it a curious case of voluntary 
unconditional surrender."(Arendt, 1978:157) 
The territorial definition of the mandate in itself 
created the conditions for a particular kind of 
confrontation between Arab nationalists and Zionists. It 
made the common identity of Jew and Arab no longer viable. A 
politicized Palestinian Arab identity emerged in the face of 
a politicized Jewish identity tied to two distinct movements 
both of which finally claimed mutually exclusive rights. In 
the face of racism, anti-semitism and colonialism, Judaism 
had changed into Zionism and Islam into Arab nationalism. 
While British control over a clearly defined area 
created a common historical experience for Palestinian Jew 
and Arab, "policies designed to emphasize religious and 
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regional differences, ensured that understanding of that 
experience would not be uniform".(Saigh, 1979) Furthermore, 
the modern Jewish community of Palestine had two sources: 
indigenous Palestinian Jews and successive waves of Zionist 
immigrants beginning with the 'Lovers of Zion' movement in 
1882. The latter had a different historical experience and 
no understanding of the customary practices and traditions 
of Middle Eastern Jews and Arabs. For example, Muslim law 
favored partnership arrangements and:"large landowners 
frequently sacrificed economic advantage in exchange for 
community status in negotiations with peasants who worked 
their land."(Saigh, 1979:34) The goal of Zionism to build 
an autonomous Jewish infrastructure contradicted these 
traditions and consequently Zionism contributed to the 
disruption of Judeo-Arabic traditions. These traditions 
have been examined in Chapter I and their evolution traced 
in Chapter II. It is important to note that while 
developments in this historical era contribute to 
disruptions of those traditions, Jews and Arabs continued to 
form partnerships in every sphere. The importance of 
knowing this history is especially clear in a period when it 
is increasingly necessary to identify those traditions in 
whatever form and wherever they have survived. 
The ideology of the Revisionist movement led by 
Jabotinsky stands at the opposite extreme of a continuum of 
which the Judeo-Arabic tradition forms one kind of 
beginning. Jabotinsky implanted in the Jewish psyche an 
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image of the Arab as mortal enemy. He fostered the idea of 
the inevitability of conflict between Jew and Arab and the 
impossibility of solution, except by sheer force. 
(Flapan,1979, Arendt,1974) The consequences of this 
perspective were critical for developments in the 1940's. 
Many Jews were willing to tolerate a general mood of 
totalitarianism where 'every means was justified including 
terror and ruthless retaliation in the struggle for 
survival" (Arendt, 1974) The belief that one had to be 
either conqueror or conquered prevailed and justified even 
terrorist attacks on civilians, for example the attacks of 
the Irgun, which thirty years later were to be repeated by 
Al-Fatah. History has shown how militarism escalates. 
Terrorism, inherent in militarism, is condoned and 
rationalized as' war' but condemned as 'terrorism' when 
manifested by powerless groups who do not have access to 
huge war machines. 
The consequences unfold as actions of institutions that 
represent the new Israeli state reflect the ideology out of 
which the state emerged. Chapter IV describes the 
repercussions of the events of 1948-1949 for Arab-Jew 
relations. 
218 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abu-Ghazaleh, A. Arab Cultural Nationalism in 
Palestine during the British Mandate. Beirut: 
Institute for Palestinian Studies, 1973. 
Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim.(ed.) Transformation of Palestine. 
Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
1971. 
Anabtawi, Samir N. "The Palestinians as a Political Party." 
Journal of Palestine Studies (Volume LX, No.1,1970): 
47-58. 
Antonious, George. The Arab Awakening. New York: Putnam, 
1946. 
Arendt, Hannah. The Jew as Pariah. New York: Grove Press 
Inc, 1978. 
Aruri, Naseer H. Occupation: Israel Over Palestine.Belmont, 
MA. : Association of Arab-American University Graduates 
Inc, 1983. 
Brenner, Leni. Zionism in the Age of the Dictator. 
Westport, CT.-.Laurence Hill, 1983. 
Buber, Martin,Magnes, Judah, and Simon, E. Towards Union—in 
Palestine. Essays on Zionism and Jewish-Arab 
Cooperation. Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1972. 
Caplan, Neil. Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 
1917-1925. Great Britian: Frank Cass, 1978. 
Chouraqui,Andre. Letter to an Arab Friend. Amherst 
MA.:University of Massachusetts Press, 1972. 
Cohen, Amnon 
Millennium of 
Martin's 
and Gabriel Baer. Egypt and Palestine^ 
Association (868-1984). New York: St. 
Press, 1984. 
A 
Cohen, Hayyim 
New York: 
j. The Jews of the Middle East.1860-1972. 
John Wiley and Sons, 1973. 
Cohen, Michael J. Palestine: .. 
Making of British Policy. 
Retreat from the Mandate. The 
New York: Meier Publishers 
Inc,1978. 
Dawn C. Ernest. From Ottomanism to Arabism 
Origins of Arab Nationalism. Chicago: 
Illinois Press, 1973. 
f F.ssavs on 
University 
the 
of 
219 
El Kodsy, Ahmad. The Arab World and Israel. 
and Lobel, Eli. New York and London: Monthly Review 
Press, 1970. 
Esco. A Study of Jewish. Arab, and British Policies. 
Volumes I - II. New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 
1947 . 
Flapan, Simha. Zionism and the Palestinians. New York: 
Barnes and Noble Books, 1979. 
Gabrieli, Francesco. The Arab Revival. London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1961. 
Gershoni, Israel. The Emergence of Pan-Arabism in Egypt. 
Tel-Aviv: Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern-African 
Studies, 1981. 
Goldberg, Harvey E. The Book of Mordechai, A Study of 
Jews of Lvbia. Philadelphia: Institute for Study of 
Human Issue,1980. 
Goldschmidt, Arthur Jr. A Concise History of the Middle 
East. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press,1979. 
Goren, Arthur A. Dissenter in Zion, From the Writings of 
Judah L. Magnes. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard Unviersity 
Press, 1982. 
Hadawi, Sami. Bitter Harvest. Palestine between 1914-1967.. 
New York,: The New World Press, 1967. 
Haim, Sylvia G. Palestine and Israel in the 19th and 
'Kedourie, Elie. 20th Centuries. London: Frank Cass, 
1982 . 
Haim, Yehoyada. Zionist Attitudes Toward the Palestinian 
Arabs. 1936-1939. Georgetown University, 1975. 
Halpern, Ben. The Idea of the Jewish State. Cambridge, MA 
Harvard University Press, 1969. 
Hodgson, Marshall G.S. The Venture of Isl-f§; Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1974. 
Hourani, A.H. Syria and Lebanon. London New York and 
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1946. 
issawi, Charles. The Arab World's Legacy;. New Jersey: 
The Darwin Press Inc, 1981. 
Laquer, Walter, (ed.) The Tsrael-Arab Reader. New York: 
Bantam Books, 1976. 
220 
Lasker, Michael. The Alliance Israelite Universelle and the 
Jewish Communities of Morocco: 1862-1962. Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1983. 
Lesch, Ann Mosely. Arab Politics in Palestine 1917-1939. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1980. 
Lewis, Bernard. The Jews of Islam. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1984. 
Levensohn, Lotta. Outline of Zionist History. Scopus 
Publication Company, 1941. 
Litvinoff, Barnet. The Essential Chaim Weizmann. London: 
Holmes and Meier, 1982. 
Mandel, Neville J. The Arabs and Zionism before World War 
I. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA.: University of 
California Press 1976. 
Marks, John H. "The Problem of Palestine." The Muslim 
World (Volume LX, No.l, 1970):25-46. 
Miller, Ylana. Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 
1920-1948. Austin, TX.: University of Texas Press, 
1985. 
Mogannam, Matiel. The Arab Women and the Palestine Problem. 
Westport, Ct.: Hyperion Press,1937. 
Nuseibeh, Hazem Zaki. The Ideas of Arab Nationalism. 
Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1956. 
Patai, Raphael. Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel. 
New York: McGraw Hill, 1974. 
Porath, Y. The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National 
Movement 1918-1929. London: Frank Cass, 1974. 
Rabinowicz, Oscar R. Fifty Years of Zioni|m» 
London: Robert Anscombe and Co.Ltd,1950. 
Ruppin, Arthur. The Jews in the Modern World. 
London: MacMillian and Co., 1934. 
t?r> > i Yaacov "The Zionist Attitude to the Arabs. 
'rn —in the mh and ”n|- 
Edited by Haim,Sylvia, Kedoune, Elie, Lond . 
Cass, 1982: 15-59. 
Sayegh, Fayez A. Arab Unity. New York: The Devin-Adair 
Company, 1958. 
221 
Sayigh, Rosemary. Palestinians: From Peasants 
to Revolutionaries. London: Zed Books, 1979. 
Sharif, Regina S. Non-Jewish Zionism Its Roots in 
Western History. London: Zed Press, 1983. 
Simon, Leon. Ahad Ha-am. Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1959. 
Sokolow, Nahum. History of Zionism, 1600-1913. London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 
1919. 
Similansky, Moshe. "Citrus Growers have Learnt to 
Cooperate." In Towards Union in Palestine. 
Buber,Martin, Magnes,Judah. Westport, CT.: Greenwood, 
1947 . 
CHAPTER V 
ARAB AND JEW IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL, 1948-1980 
Chapter IV examined historical developments affecting 
the evolution of Jewish and Arab nationalism and their 
impact on Jewish-Arab co-existence. In Chapter III we saw 
that inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflict were stimulated 
by changes in social, economic and religious life during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. At the same time many 
of the traditional customs and forms of economic and social 
relations that characterized the Judeo-Arabic heritage 
continued to support Arab-Jewish co-existence. In the 
twentieth century nationalism supported by European 
intervention stimulated restructuring of social and economic 
relations. Developments within and outside of the Arab 
world supported those forces that were inimical to and that 
attempted to suppress Judeo-Arabic culture. Chapters III 
and IV demonstrate that in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries politics were used to emphasize religious and 
ethnic differences. In the early 1900’s the issue of 
dependence on Great Britain for economic and political 
survival fragmented the Jewish and Arab worlds. Most 
critically, as pointed out in Chapter IV, the League of 
Nations mandate to Great Britain of a distinct geographic 
area created out of the administrative area of Palestine, 
polticized and polarized the Arab national movement and the 
Zionist movement. Those who choose dependence on Great 
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Britain to realize their national goals, gained power. This 
event, bolstered by the Balfour Declaration of 1917, became 
the circumstance around which national identification 
asserted itself, a fact that had far reaching implications 
for the participation of Jew and Arab in the development of 
modern institutions in Palestine. 
This Chapter will examine the impact of the Jewish 
state on the Judeo-Arabic heritage. The focus will be on 
the consequences of the 1948-1949 war for Jew and Arab, and 
on economic survival, social organization, religious 
life,and political organization in Israel between 1948 and 
1980. 
As noted in Chapter Three the efforts of Jew and Arab 
to cooperate in making crucial decisions about the fate of 
Palestine continued as late as 1946. These efforts 
represented variations on three important ideological 
traditions, beginning with the bi-national vision of A'had 
Ha' am discussed in Chapter III. Hashomer Hatzair 
represented the second tradition with its vision of a 
socialist revolution led by a coalition of Jewish and Arab 
workers. Kedma Mizraha, calling for the advancement of 
Jewish-Arab relations, was created in 1936 by members of 
Brit Shalom (Covenant of Peace), the Sephardic community, 
new immigrants from Germany and people from the left. 
(Kolat,1983:26) The motivating ideology, voiced by 
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Kalvarisky and others, affirmed traditional relations and 
ties as Semitic peoples, of Jew and Arab. 
Following the 1939 Arab Revolt, Pinhas Rutenberg, Gad 
Frumkin, Moshe Smilansky, Moshe Novomesky and Judah Magnes,- 
known as 'the Five'- sought an agreement with Arab leaders 
based on the bi-national program supporting a ceiling on 
Jewish immigration in Palestine. The League for Jewish-Arab 
Rapprochment, organized in 1942, asserted that the 
realization of a national home for Jews could only come 
about as an outgrowth of agreement with the Arabs. The 
Bentov Plan, the work of a committee of the League, proposed 
international supervision, with the eventual establishment 
of a federalist binational government with representational 
parity for Jew and Arab. Jewish immigration would be based 
upon the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine and an 
agreed ratio of population. (Kolat,1983:25,29) 
The Zionist leadership rejected the proposals of the 
Five and of the League for Jew-Arab Rapprochement and 
continued to mobilize all efforts to achieve a Jewish state 
through partition. Opposition to the partition plan which 
necessitated the transfer of 296,000 Arabs from the area to 
be designated as the Jewish state , was strong among Arabs 
and among Jews. Clashes between armed Arabs and the Haganah 
as well as anti-British actions, escalated. The White Paper 
of 1939 mobilized Zionist forces, supported by the 
Revisionists, to eliminate British rule in Palestine. The 
split within the Zionist movement reached an apex in 1942 
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when Zionists meeting in New York City produced the Biltmore 
Program. The Biltmore Program made clear the priorities of 
the Zionist leadership for whom mass immigration and Jewish 
nationhood were more important than agreement with the Arabs 
or with the British.(Kolat,1983:29) 
Opportunities for dialogue between Zionists and Arabs 
declined sharply in the postwar period. The inhumane 
treatment of Jewish survivors of the Nazis gave impetus to 
proponents of the Biltmore Program and the militarist 
nationalist elements in Palestine. The Arabs of Palestine, 
reorganized under the influence of the Husseinis remained 
strong in their opposition to Zionism. In March 1945 
resistance to Zionism was taken up by the newly formed Arab 
League. The 22nd Zionist Congress in Basle, December, 1946 
rejected negotiations with Great Britain. Subsequently the 
United Nations Assembly proposed partition supported by the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Under the partition 
plan, Palestine was divided into six areas, three for a 
Jewish state and three for an Arab state, with Jerusalem as 
an international zone administered by the United Nations. 
The proposed Arab state would be 4, 476 square miles or 
42.88 per cent of Palestine, and the proposed Jewish state, 
5,893 square miles or 56.47 per cent of Palestine, with a 
higher percentage of better quality land. (Asadi,1976:79) 
In November of 1946 a final effort was made by Falastin al- 
Jadida, the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and leaders 
of the Palestinian Association headed by Fauzi al Husseini, 
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m support of a bi-national solution. Fauzi al-Husseini, 
who asserted thatImperialist policy is playing with both 
of us, Arabs and Jews alike and we have no choice but to 
unite and work hand in hand for the benefit of us both", was 
killed twelve days after the joint declaration appeared. 
(Gendzier,1975:31) Extremists among the Jews, led by 
Menachem Begin rejected the plan, as did Arabs who organized 
a resistance movement. Polarization of the Arab and Jewish 
communities intensified as British troops left Palestine in 
the spring of 1943. 
Yair Evron notes that the Egyptian decision to 
invade Palestine on 13 May 1948 came after King Faruq had 
been informed by Syria that King Abdallah of Jordan had 
decided to occupy the territories alloted to the Arabs by 
the 1947 United Nations partition plan. Abdallah hoped to 
occupy Jerusalem in addition, thereby restoring the power of 
his family and father, Sharif Hussein of Mecca. Zionists 
led by David Ben-Gurion were anxious to create an alliance 
with Abdallah against the other Arab states seeking dominion 
in Palestine.(Evron,1973:16,17) 
Several factors contributed to a Zionist victory 
in 1948. Inter-Arab conflicts as cited above contributed to 
a lack of preparation and coordination. The Palestinian 
nationalist movement had been weakened by the British and 
was subject to conflicting pressures from Arab leaders. The 
Zionist leadership on the other hand had organized 
politically, militarily and financially to ensure its 
227 
predominance. The success of the Zionists in creating 
institutions prepared to take on the administrative duties 
of a new state was attributable to British support in the 
hope that the Zionists would represent Imperial interests in 
the area. When the British deserted the Zionist cause in 
1939, the Zionist leadership shifted its allegiance to the 
United States. 
Their military success in the 1948-1949 war left the 
Jews with 20,850 square kilemeters or 77.4 per cent of the 
land and water surface of the former mandated territory. 
(Asadi,1976, Abdulfattah,1983, Zdyyad,1976) The Gaza Strip 
was placed under Egyptian military rule and East Jerusalem 
and the remainder of the West Bank area was annexed to the 
Hashemite monarchy in Transjordan. 
The 1948-1949 war represented a culmination of over 
fifty years of conflict regarding the fate of the Levant 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Britain and France wanted 
control of the Ottoman provinces for military-strategic and 
economic purposes. Beginning in the late 1800's an influx 
of European Jews added another dimension to the evolution of 
events that culminated in 1948. The creation by the British 
of Trans-Jordan, the League of Nations mandates, the efforts 
of the Zionists to win diplomatic approval from Britain, 
competition within the Arab world for positions of power, 
all contributed to the Palestinians' submersion in world- 
political developments. For thousands of years Arab Jews 
and Arabs in Palestine and all over the Middle Eastern lands 
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had experienced successive waves of conquering Empires 
stimulating a re-organization of power, social organization, 
ethnic relations. At this particular juncture in world 
historical developments re-organization of power involved 
internal conflict combined with presures from outside 
forces, threatening the basis of Arab/Jewish life; 
identification, mores, goals, possibilities. The 
Palestinian from 1948 on, whether Jew or Arab, witnessed a 
new level of military and moral destruction. In relation to 
outside forces the struggle for survival at this juncture 
took place on the basis of new definitions of who Jew and 
Arab were; definitions framed by European imperialist 
ideology. 
The Zionist enterprise became inextricably tied to 
imperialist ideology and policies with the issuance of the 
Balfour Declaration in 1917. The Zionist enterprise 
radically changed the import of Jewish emigration to 
Palestine. Jews had emigrated to Palestine for centuries 
for many reasons: the overriding motivation was safety. The 
Arab lands welcomed Jews who within the status of dhimmi 
were respected and for the most part encouraged to thrive. 
Emigration from Russia and Poland in the late 1800's took 
place within the context of far reaching changes on a world 
wide scale. Nationalist movements within and outside of the 
Middle Eastern lands were linked with economic, political 
and religious survival. 
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Another critical factor linked to cultural survival 
changed the import of Jewish emigration to Palestine. In the 
final years of World War II tensions between the British and 
Jews escalated as members of the Jewish underground 
organized illegal rescue atttempts to save thousands of 
survivors of the Nazi Holocaust. Quotas restricted Jewish 
emigration world-wide. The fact that no other country would 
welcome Jews intensified the struggle for Palestine. 
The aftermath of the Nazi Holocaust reinforced the 
power of those Zionists who asserted that all Gentiles were 
anti-semitic and that the only way to save Jews was by 
establishing a Jewish state. Ties of the Mufti of Jerusalem 
with Hitler in an effort to throw off British rule led to a 
generalized association of Arab with Nazi. The Holocaust 
experience became embedded in the psyche of the new state to 
unfold in a variety of scenarios. For many Jews the tragic 
experience justified any means that would secure Jewish 
national autonomy. 
Historical developments in the final years of the 
British Mandate reinforced three critical beliefs that were 
incorporated into the ideology propagated by the new Jewish 
state. The first noted above, was an a-historical view of 
anti-semitism. That is, Herzl popularized the notion that 
all gentiles were anti-semitic no matter what the situation, 
location, or time. Secondly, Herzl and Weizmann encouraged 
the belief that Palestine was an empty land. In the late 
1800's many Jews infused with a vision of a 'just society , 
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safe for Jews, emigrated to Palestine without any awareness 
that people lived there. Both these beliefs represented a 
western-ethnocentric view. They invalidated the historical- 
cultural experience of the Palestinian Jew and Arab and were 
P^°Pa<3ated in ignorance of and at the expense of the Judeo- 
Arabic heritage. 
A third belief incorporated into the ideology of the 
new state influenced the actions of many Jews in the 
critical period in which the state was formed. This was the 
belief that the fundamental goal of the Arab was to 
annihilate the Jew. Several factors seemed to support this 
belief. Disturbances in reaction to economic hardship and 
social and religious disorganization resulting from the 
British occupation resulted in attacks on Jews. Attacks on 
Jews in reaction to increasing Zionist settlement were 
another factor. For example, in 1929 in the town of Hebron, 
local Arabs killed sixty-seven Jews and wounded sixty 
others. Jews who had no knowledge of the history of 
Arab/Jew coexistence came to regard these developments as 
defining Jew/Arab relations. 
Nationalism was linked to another belief that shaped 
the way in which Jew/Arab relations evolved. Economic, 
political, religious survival were tied to the concept of 
territory as a way of defining peoples and ensuring their 
hegemony. The Judeo-Arabic heritage provided a context for 
national identification inclusive of Jew and Arab. Without 
the other had to prove their historic that context, one or 
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right to the land. Ties to Palestine were embedded in 
Judaic and Islamic religiosity and political and social 
history. Movements justifying control of Palestine by Arab 
or by Jew came to usurp the political arena. Within that 
context each came to regard the other as mortal enemy. 
The seemingly enormous contrast between this 
conclusion and traditional relations becomes understandable 
given the impact of historical developments described above. 
Traditional elements of tension became highlighted: issues 
of state power tied to economic survival, sectarianism tied 
to great power politics and most conclusively a form of 
national identification that was built on historical and 
current differences rather than shared history. 
The Israeli state was created within this context and 
as a result of the factors outlined above- preparedness; 
superior military support, confusion of goals among the Arab 
states. The central question of this chapter is- what were 
the consequences of the new political status of Palestine 
for the Judeo-Arabic heritage? Stated in another way- now 
that the Jews had come into power, how would that power be 
used in relation to Arabs? Would the Arabs now become 'the 
dhimmi'? 
Three views of the Israeli state frame sociological 
literature on the situation of Palestinian Arabs (now 
Israeli Arabs) in the Israeli state. The first and most 
popular, is coined'nation-building' and uses a model of 
'absorption-modernization' to describe the treatment of the 
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Israeli Arab by the state. in this context, the Arab is 
viewed as part of a 'traditional society' in the process of 
becoming modernized by Jewish society.(Landau,1969) The 
absorption-modernization model fosters an emphasis on the 
dual identity of Israeli citizen and Arab 'national' and 
studies the 'behavior' and 'reactions' of the Israeli Arab 
within that context. The emphasis thus is on the 
subordinate group and its cultural and psychological 
pecularities. In this context the Arab (subordinate group) 
is particularly vulnerable to the image of Arabs projected 
by the Jew, in control of mass media. Ethnic relations are 
removed from the context of economics and politics,i.e. 
history. Attitudes become an area of study, rather than the 
structural context that frames those attitudes. 
The second view describes Israel as a colonial-settler 
state and raises questions about how Zionism does or does 
not parallel typical colonial models. In this case, the 
Israeli Arab is viewed from an historical perspective as 
part of the Palestinian people,a people who are being 
nationally suppressed. Research based on this perspective 
examines reactions to economic, political and religious 
repression , not as problems of psychological marginality 
but rather as the result of objective conditions. Two 
influential works analyze the situation of Israeli Arabs 
from this general perspective. Elia T. Zureik (The 
Palestinians in Israel. A Study in Internal Colonialism)1979 
analyzes the effects of Zionist policies as a colonizing 
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movement. Ian Lustick (Arabs in the Jewish State- Israel's 
Control of A National Minoritynqbor examines ways in which 
relationships between the Jewish Zionist community and the 
Arab community are defined by the goals of the dominant 
group. Lustick raises questions about the historical 
circumstances and fundamental conditions of Jewish and Arab 
in Palestine and Israel that have been conducive to 
and/or reinforced the dependence of Arabs on Jews in Israel. 
A third related view of the Israeli state is developed 
by Sammy Smooha. Smooha (Israel: Pluralism and 
Conflict)1978 describes Israel as a plural society made up 
of three distinct segments arranged in an economic, 
social,cultural and political hierarchy. Western Jews are 
at the apex; Oriental Jews in the middle and Israeli Arabs 
on the bottom. Smooha characterizes the status of the Arab 
minority as a 'quasi-caste' whose relations to the Jewish 
majority are controlled by a system of exclusion, dependence 
and subordination. 
Our study is based on acknowledgement of the existence 
and importance of the Judeo-Arabic heritage and on an 
analysis of how that heritage fared, given the historical 
circumstances of life in the Middle Eastern lands. This 
model differs from others in that it establishes the 
importance of a continuous historical tradition that 
validates the age-old interrelationship of Jew and Arab. 
Our contention is that only by bringing the history of Jew- 
Arab interrationship into the foreground can we develop an 
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analysis of current relations that has integrity for Arab 
and for Jew. This analysis serves that history rather than 
the political investment of any particular group. 
We have demonstrated that in 1948, the main historical 
forces moving Israeli society to deal with the issue of 
^^^t>/Jew relations were twofold. On the one hand there was 
militarism associated with colonial intervention, European- 
ethnocentrism, i.e., racism, distortion and lack of 
information regarding the Middle East and national 
identification tied to the notion of the right to possession 
of land. On the other hand, there was a shared historical 
experience, language, folk culture, tradition, way of life. 
We have noted developments that gave power to the first set 
of forces, the most significant being World War II, the 
genocide of Eastern European Jewry and passive response of 
the world. And we have noted the ways in which responses of 
Jew and Arab to historical developments gave power to the 
second; the most significant being attempts to build on a 
shared historical experience in a variety of forms by 
affirming shared origins, historical experience and national 
identity. In analyzing uses of power by the Israeli state 
and whether or not Arabs had become the new dhimmi, it is 
necessary to keep in mind both sets of imperatives. We have 
noted that the kinds of choices opened to and created by Jew 
and Arab in the twentieth century were limited by the 
escalation of military power, chauvinism in the form of 
territorial 'rights', racism and mass murder. Under these 
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circumstances- the circumstances out of which a Jev/ish state 
emerged- who were the conservators of the Judeo-Arabic 
heritage? Who were the critics? 
Social organization, economic survival, religious and 
political life. 1948-1982 
We begin with a reiteration and clarification of 
Zionist goals and how those goals affected social 
organization, economic survival, religious and political 
life of Jew and Arab in the new state. This discussion will 
illustrate how the two sets of forces described above 
influenced implementation of those goals. 
Two fundamental goals affecting social organization, 
economic survival, religious and political life were 
acquisition of land and building an exclusively Jev/ish 
labour force. As detailed in Chapter III some Zionists 
believed Jewish land and labor were the key to establishing 
a Jewish state. Others believed that it was reasonable to 
limit settlement and that it was far more beneficial and in 
fact crucial to join Arab and Jev/ish labor in creating a 
common ecnomic base. The latter approach had precedent in 
ties between Arab and Jew for centuries in Palestine 
expressed through economic complementarity and connected to 
shared agricultural practices. 
The former belief- that Jewish land and labor were the 
key to establishing a Jewish state- was supported by the 
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concept of national identification tied to territorial 
rights, and maintained by military power. This concept was 
supported by other popular ideologies. Religious 
identification, the notion of God given right to the land 
will be examined in two opposing manifestations- one ruling 
out Jew—Arab coexistence and the other supporting it. 
European-ethnocentrism, racism, distortion and lack of 
information were belief systems that implicitly and 
explicitly supported policies of land confiscation by 
denying the existence and/or rights of non-Europeans. 
Controversy regarding the 'exodus' of Palestinian Arabs 
before, during and after the 1948-1949 war, illustrate this 
point. From the publication of the UN partition resolution, 
29 November 1947 until after the armistice in the summer of 
1948 600,000 to 700,000 Arabs fled or were expelled from 
their homes.(Flapan,1987:3) Territory won by the Zionists 
in excess of what had been proposed by the United Nations 
partition resolution for the Jewish state included Western 
Galilee, 123,000 Arabs, the Jaffa enclave- 114,000 Arabs, 
the Ramleh subdistricts and portions of sub-districts of 
Nazareth including wholly Arab towns and villages. Almost 
two-thirds of the 1948 refugees were from these areas. 
(Cattan,1969) The General Assembly of the United Nations 
meeting in June of 1949 estimated that 940,000 Arabs had 
become refugees; the League of Red Cross Societies reported 
one million.(Cattan,1969:72) 
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The popular view of the refugee situation and the one 
which was insisted upon by Israeli officials was that 
Palestinians had deserted the country by fleeing and 
therefore had no claim to it. Many Jews believed that the 
leaders of Arab states had told the Arabs to leave and that 
the Arab population did so of their own free will.Howard 
Sachar in The Course of Modern Jewish History, asserts that: 
"The chaos was compounded by the presence of 650,000 
Arab refugees from Israel. The plight of these pathetic, 
terrified creatures was the most heartbreaking tragedy of 
the Palestine War. It had been a needless tragedy. As the 
end of the Palestine mandate drew near, the Arab states 
bordering the Yishuv began to issue warnings to the Arabs of 
Palestine; they were told to clear out, to leave a clear 
field for Arab military operations, to seek temporary refuge 
in neighboring Arab lands. According to Arab League 
propaganda, there would be sufficient opportunity for all 
emigres to return, once the Jews had been driven into the 
sea. The propaganda was effective. As early as October 
1947, small groups of Arab villagers began to leave 
Palestine; in succeeding months the numbers of departing 
Arabs swelled rapidly. It was vitally important for Ben- 
Gurion and his colleagues to check this flight. For one 
thing, the Arabs played an important role in the economy of 
the Yishuv; their sudden departure would merely complicate 
the problems of survival for the Jews. In Haifa, for 
example, Arab stevedores were needed to unload the 
freightage, the arms and supplies, upon which the new state 
would depend for its security. And Arab agricultural 
produce was even more crucial for the Jewish city 
populations. But more serious than these economic 
considerations, was the problem of world opinion. Israel 
was on trial before the world; the United Nations still had 
the power to attenuate Israel's boundaries, perhaps even to 
intervene with force. Every effort had to be made to keep 
the Palestinian Arabs at home, to give them equal rights and 
opportunities, if only to retain international good 
win.in spite of the government's public and private 
assurances that they would not be harmed, the Arabs fled by 
the hundreds of thousands once the fighting broke out. They 
fled in answer to Arab League propaganda."(Sachar, 1977:485) 
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This assertion convinced many Jews of their both 
superior and deeper atttachment to Palestine. Louis 
Finklestein in The Jews their History, Culture and Religion, 
Vol IV. notes: 
"One conclusion appears incontravertible. The mass 
flight of the Arabs came as a surprise to the Jews. Early 
in April, 1948, before the massacre of Deir Yassin, Ben- 
Gurion was speculating on the reasons for the flight of 
Arabs. During the latter part of the month, when the Jews 
took Haifa, the Jews pleaded with the Arab leaders not to 
encourage flight, and the Haganah distributed leaflets 
assuring the Arabs egual treatment. As the initial shock 
passed, however, the Jews ceased to discourage the exodus 
and even welcomed it.(Finklestein, 1960:710) 
Supporting the view that the Jews ceased to discourage 
the exodus and even welcomed it, and the subsequent policy 
of not allowing refugees to return was the belief stated 
above that if the Arabs remained a majority Jews would not 
survive. Medad Yisrael, a West Bank settler expressed a 
commonly held perspective: 
" The Jews, he said, had proved that the land was 
theirs by the way they lived on it. They caressed it. They 
cultivated it. They planted in it. And the land, in turn, 
gave them its fruits. What had the Arabs done for the land? 
What kind of lovers were they? They neglected it. Their 
allegiance was to the village rather than to the land. And 
if they had finally developed a Palestinian nat 
ionalism, they had done so only after having been confronted 
by the nationalism of the Jews... Besides, Medad added, 
during the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli war, the Arabs ran away 
too easily, much as the Jews used to run away from towns in 
Poland and the Ukraine when hostilities would start in those 
regions; the Arabs ran because they weren't committed to the 
land, whereas the Jews in the Land of Israel, even during 
the war, would never leave it. 
..."And I genuinely believe that if we lived under Arab 
rule the situation for us would by much much worse than the 
situation is for Arabs under Israeli rule. It would be a 
questions of our very survival. We would be killed. It 
would be Hebron, 1929; it would be Kfar Etzion, 
1948."(Quoted in, 'A Stranger in My Home', 
RpirhrWalter.Atlantic Monthly, June, 1984:54) 
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On the other hand evidence has surfaced which makes 
clear that the military machine was utilized to a maximum in 
order to achieve the Zionist goal of 'Jewish land'. Simha 
Flapan in a carefully documented analysis 'The Palestinian 
Exodus of 1948'(Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XVI, No.4, 
Summer, 1987:3-26), notes that the Palestinian Arab 
leadership would not have appealed to the Arab population to 
leave since Arab armies coming from long distances needed 
the help of the local population for food, fuel, water, 
manpower and information."(Flapan, 1987:5) Declassified 
documents reveal the efforts of the Arab Higher Council and 
Arab states to restrain the flight. However, economic, 
psychological and physical warfare forced Arabs to leave. 
The military was the vehicle to realize Ben Gurion's goal of 
making Israel as homogeneous as possible, and to make use of 
the lands, properties and habitats of the Arabs to absorb 
the masses of Jewish immigrants.(Flapan,1987:7) The 
Haganah's Plan Dalet called for the destruction of villages, 
expulsion of the population, closing of transport and 
communication routes.(Flapan,1987:9) In addition to seizure 
of territories and expulsions, the military utilized 
terrorist tactics of looting, rape and murder to create a 
situation of mass panic. The murder of women, men and 
children in the village of Deir Yassin in April of 1948 
shocked many Israelis and expresses clearly how 
dehumanization dictates policies when run by the military. 
On 12, 13, July, 1948, 50,000 Arabs were driven out of their 
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homes in Lydda and Ramleh.(Flapan,1987:13) For Ben-Gurion a 
condition rather than a deterrent of Jewish-Arab peace was 
the removal by any means necessary, whether through the 
terrorism of war or by means of transfer, of the Arab 
population. He asserted that the Arabs should not amount to 
more than 15 percent of Israel's total population; therefore 
Arabs who had fled could not be allowed to 
return.(Flapan,1987;17) In order to prevent their return, 
villages were razed and a series of laws instituted that 
turned land over to the military government. In spite of 
this evidence Ben Gurion wrote on 4 May, 1948, that: 
"history has proved who is really attached to this country 
and for whom it is a luxury which can be given up. Until 
now not a single (Jewish) settlement, not even the most 
distant, weak, or isolated, has been abandoned, whereas 
after the first defeat the Arabs left whole towns like Haifa 
and Tiberias in spite of the fact that they did not face any 
danger of destruction or massacre."(Flapan,1987:23) 
There were voices of protest, externally and 
internally. On 25-27 May, 1948 the political committee of 
Mapam met to oppose official policy regarding the Arab 
refugees.(Flapan,1987:20) Outrage was voiced by Kibbutz 
members of the Haganah whose orders had been to promote non¬ 
aggression with their Arab neighbors. Yitzhak Avira, a 
founder of the Moaz Haim Kibbutz wrote: "Recently, a new 
mood has prevaded the public- 'the Arabs are nothing', 'all 
Arabs are murderers', 'we should kill them all', 'we should 
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burn all their villages',etc.,etc.. I don't intend to defend 
the Arab people, but the Jewish people have to be defended 
from deteriorating into far reaching 
extremism."(Flapan,1987:19) On the other hand, extremism 
was ignored by many, for example participants from Ahdut 
Haavodah in the meeting of Mapam, who asserted that :"war 
has its own meaning and its own rules, despite what might be 
morally indefensible in any other situation. Thus Avrahim 
Levite, one of the two party secretaries, acknowledged that 
the cutting off of Jaffa was "very inhumane from the point 
of view of absolute values." Still, he could "both justify 
and welcome as a matter of highest morality and political 
necessity every act of conquest - and the removal of every 
Arab settlement- dictated by the needs of war." Levite 
agreed that "every lawless act, all theft and looting, must 
be fought vigorously, up to and including the meting out of 
the death sentence." But, he felt, the immoral behavior of 
the soldiers was finally a "secondary 
question."(Flapan,1987:22) 
The 'problem of the inhabitants' was dealt with in two 
other ways: through the implementation of a series of laws 
to ensure government control of the land and through the 
establishment of a military administration. 
In December of 1948 military rule was imposed on Arab 
villages and towns based on Emergency Regulations enforced 
by the British in reaction to the Arab Rebellion, 1936-1939. 
Since a military ruler takes it upon himself to make 
242 
decisions that would normally be under the jurisdiction of 
the courts, it followed that the military administration 
established a set of laws based on military rule. This was 
done between 1948 and 1950 when legislation was enacted for 
formal seizure of property (lands, buildings). This 
legislation included the Abandoned Areas Ordinance (1948), 
the Cultivation of Waste Lands Regulation (1948), the 
Absentee Property Law (1950), the Development Authority 
(Transfer of Property Law (July, 
1950).(Cattan,1969,Jiryis,1976,Lustick,1980) These laws 
were a necessary adjunct to the first act of the Provisional 
State Council, May 14, 1948 that abolished all restrictions 
on Jewish immigration and land sales to Jews. Over 684,000 
new Jewish immigrants entered Israel between May 1948 and 
December, 1951. In two and a half years the Jewish 
population doubled. (Lustick,1980:44) Fifty percent of 
these immigrants came from Europe (including 100,000 Jews 
from displaced persons camps in Germany, Austria, Italy and 
Cyprus). The other half came from Iraq, Yemen, Turkey, 
Iran, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, under a variety of 
circumstances stimulated by reaction to the Zionist victory. 
Settlement became a critical issue and was resolved by 
different means depending upon whether immmigrants came from 
Europe or from Asian and African countries. The differences 
will be discussed in subsequent sections. 
Under the Abandoned Areas Ordinance the government had 
the power to declare any occupied area as 'abandoned', while 
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the cultivation of Waste Lands Regulation defined 'waste 
land' as any land which was not cultivated or "in the 
opinion of the Minister of Agriculture, was not 
'efficiently' cultivated."(Cattan,1969:66) This land could 
be seized by the Minister of Agriculture. Refugees who were 
not allowed to return to their lands to cultivate them 
therefore lost them. Similarly the Absentee Property 
Regulations entitled the Custodian of Absentee Property to 
seize all property- land, buildings, possessions, money- of 
any citizen or resident of the Arab states or Palestine who 
had left his/her place of residence in Palestine, even if to 
take refuge from the war. Between 1948 and 1953, 350 of 370 
new Jewish settlements were established on land classified 
as abandoned „-( Lustick,1980) This land had been owned by 
Arab residents of Israel who were assigned "absentee status" 
by the government under the Absentee Property Regulations. 
In 1954 more than one third of Israel's Jewish population 
lived on land classified as 'absentee property*. Close to 
one third of the new immigrants (250,000 people) lived in 
urban areas that had been abandoned.(Lustick,1980:58) 
Furthermore, the Development Authority (Transfer of 
Property) Law empowered the government to sell or lease 
acquired property only to the state, the Jewish National 
Fund, government institutions or local authorities of the 
State. 
Article 125 of the Military Regulations imposed by the 
Israeli government granted the Military governor " the power 
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to proclaim any area or place a forbidden (closed) 
area...which no one can enter or leave without.... a written 
permit from the military commander or his deputy.... failing 
which he is considered to have committed a crime." 
(Jiryis,1976:11) The majority of the Arab inhabitants of 
Israel lived in the Galilee (60%) in the north, the 
'Triangle' in the center of Israel (30%) and the Negev (10%) 
in the South. Arab villages and settlements in these areas 
were divided into 'closed areas': no Arab could leave or 
enter without a written permit from the military governor 
assigned to the area.(Jiryis,1976:89) Article 110 allowed 
the military governor to place any person under police 
supervision for at least a year subject to renewal. There 
are contradictions in how many historians view the 
consequences of land confiscation and the threat of the 
Arabs to Israeli security. Historian Oscar I. Janowsky in 
'The Rise of the State of Israel', expresses a commonly held 
view: 
"The Jewish National Home was built in the midst of an 
Arab majority which was inevitably affected by the far 
reaching changes. That the Arab population, or at least its 
leadership, was hostile has beennoted, but this hostility 
was not the result of harmful economic or social effects 
suffered by the Arabs. On the contrary, they profited, at 
least materially, from the coming of the Jews....The Jews 
bought all but an insignificant fraction of the land they 
acquired, and the exorbitant prices paid by them enriched 
the Arabs. Except for some 317 families, Arab cultivators 
did not become landless as a result of direct land sales to 
Jews. The Arab death rate and infant mortality declined, 
and the Arab population of Palestine grew more rapidly than 
in neiqhborhing countries. Jewish medical and heal 
facilities helped the Arabs, and banks and mortage companies 
were available to them. They were encouraged by the exampl 
of the Jew to improve farming methods, develop industry, 
or uie o ew -l t' ncnrv Their waqes were 
organize co-operatives, combat usu y. caoita 
higher, agricultural productivity greater, and per capita 
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national income larger than in neighboring Arab lands. 
Moreover, Jews made repeated attempts to promote 
understanding and co-operation with the Arabs. The 
Histradrut helped in the organization of Arab labor and in 
i °f better working conditions. In the middle 
thS "Brit shalom" group, in the early 1940's the 
Ihud group, and especially the League for Arab-Jewish 
Rapprochement, all worked for co-operation. These elements 
were not numerous, but they included prominent Zionist 
leaders who exerted considerable influence.... However, the 
<^1fferences between Arabs and Jews were too fundamental to 
be bridged by these efforts. Estrangement deepened and the 
two peoples constituted separate and self-contained 
communities. By the end of the Second World War, the Jews 
were a vigorous community with a dynamic economy and 
effective political leadership. The Arabs, too, were 
organized, determined, and militant. A quarter-century of 
conflict had reached a critical stage, and decisive events 
were in the making."(Janowsky,0. in Finkelstein,L., 
1960:699) 
However, evidence detailed above indicates that state 
ideology supported policies intended to keep Arabs from 
reclaiming land and intended to control the Arab population. 
Arabs were represented as a 'security threat' to the nation. 
On the basis of security related issues many acts of 
repression were justified by the military administration. 
The definition of 'Arab' was circumscribed by military 
objectives. In spite of a history of cooperative discussion 
of the possibilities for Arab/Jew coexistence in Palestine 
detailed in Chapter III, some of which is noted by Janowsky, 
Arabs came to represent a monolithic group with one purpose 
destructive to the Jewish state. 
One of the reasons that many Jews were convinced of 
their extreme vulnerability in relation to Arabs was the 
recent confirmation of a history of anti-Jewish sentiment 
erupting into violence. Those elements in the history of 
Arab-Jew relations supporting these fears, loomed large. 
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For recently arrived immigrants in particular the myth that 
Jews represented a monolithic group whose purpose was to 
destroy the world, was fresh in their minds, alive in their 
bodies. As noted above half of the Jews who were settled on 
confiscated land were near-victims of the Holocaust. While 
for many Jews settlement was a priority related to military 
security, for others settlement meant the end to 
homelessness; to possible genocide. In 1948 Palestine 
reverberated with the intensity of colonial politics mixed 
with the urgencies created by mass murder and by the 
struggles of indigenous peoples to preserve their cultural 
integrity, their historic experience, their livelihoods and 
homes. 
Many Jews and Arabs, recognizing the tragic confluence 
of events, understood the far reaching significance of the 
choices facing the Israeli government . Yaakov Hazan, a 
leader of Hashomer Hatzair and Mapam, insisted " that policy 
could not be based on what the Arabs "might have done" to 
the Israelis. Haganah participation in killing, plundering 
and raping Arab villages in the Galilee, he argued, could be 
ended by the shooting of one soldier. He rejected the 
notion that the Israeli army was bound to be like all other 
armies. "Poison is being injected into our lives and it 
won't stop with the end of the war." Hazan warned that the 
final result would be a kind of Jewish fascism and that if 
the country didn't build a united labor movement of Jews and 
Arabs, it would end up similar to South 
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Africa."(Flapan,1987:21,22) other Jews viewed the 
circumstances differently. They took events to be an 
indication that the Israeli government must seize this 
historic moment and use any means necessary to resolve the 
'Jewish issue' in modern terms. 
Opposition to the hardships imposed by military 
regulations specifically to the treatment of Arabs came from 
Arab groups and from coalitions of Jew and Arabs. in 1958 
with the May Day Demonstrations, the Arab Popular Front was 
formed, to be replaced by the politically active A1 Ard 
movement in 1959. In December of 1961, the Jewish-Arab 
Committee for the Abolition of the Military Government 
organized a mass demonstration against military rule. The 
dominant political party, Mapai, formed with the merger of 
Achdut and Hapael Hatzair in the early thirties, was forced 
to form a coalition with Mapam, which insisted on a 
government review of its policy toward the Arabs. The 
following statement was signed by representatives from 
twenty kibbutzim in the summer of 1958:'About 200,000 of the 
inhabitants of Israel, belonging to another religion and 
with a different nationality, do not enjoy equal rights and 
are the victims of discrimination and repression. The 
overwhelming majority of Arabs in Israel live under a system 
of military government which deprives them of their 
fundamental rights as citizens...' (Jiryis,1976:38) In 
February, 1965, 400 demonstrators from Tel Aviv went to the 
closed area near Carmiel to make known their disagreement 
248 
with government discrimination against • a section of the 
citizens of the country'. (Jiryis,1976:110) 
In spite of these efforts, and the abolition of the 
military regime in 1966, and contrary to Janowsky's 
assertions, violations of the civil rights and denial of the 
national rights of Arabs in Israel fostered socio-economic 
inequality and tensions. 
As noted above, the goal of establishing a strong 
economic base controlled by Jews was connected to the goal 
of Jewish land. in the early stages of Zionist settlement 
in the late 1800's Zionists had been helped in these efforts 
by changes in the socio-economic structure already underway 
in the Ottoman lands. These changes were precipitated by a 
new relationship to the European governments, both voluntary 
and involuntary. Absentee Arab landowners sold land in 
order to acquire cash to enter into capitalist agriculture. 
For example, by selling poorer lands they were able to 
accumulate capital to improve orange production on their 
better lands. (Davis,1977:14) In spite of this and other 
means to acquire land, by 1948 Jewish owned land amounted to 
only six percent of the total area of Palestine. In 
addition to land won in the aftermath of the 1948-1949 war, 
the new government rectified this through methods detailed 
above. 
Loss of land was a major factor in the changing 
occupational base of Arabs and in tensions that resulted 
from ensuing conditions, for example, inferior living 
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nditions and lack of economic power. Separation of Jewish 
and Arab labor was part of and was maintained by the 
institutionalization of a legal and extra-legal structure of 
segregation. For example, Israel's labor federation, the 
Histradrut, continued to provide benefits for Jewish 
workers, including fair wages and work conditions, 
productive positions, health benefits, social recreational 
facilities, and investment opportunities The Histradrut 
established controls in almost every area of the Israeli 
economy. It sponsored collective agricultural units, 
cooperative farms, and commercial cooperatives. Members of 
the Histradrut were entitled to shares in a unit Heurat 
Ovdim which representing the Histadrut in corporate form. 
The Histradrut controlled manufacturing and mining 
operations, construction companies, and service enterprises. 
Besides being Israel's national labour union and major 
employer, all members of the Labour Party holding a central 
position in determining national policy and ideology were 
also members of the Histadrut. (Zureik,1979:18) 
On the other hand, between 1949 and 1952 the majority 
of the Arab labor force was concentrated in farming for 
Jewish owned enterprises and construction, and received 
thirty-five to seventy percent of Jewish wages for similar 
work. Arabs were increasingly forced to leave their 
villages for employment in the Jewish sector. A major 
factor inhibiting development of the Arab sector, lack of 
government subsidies, prevented industrialization of many 
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Arab Villages. For example, in 1975 out of 105 villages, 
only 43 had electricity;less than half of Arab villages had 
no immediate or future plans to acquire electricity. 
(Zuriek,1979:133) 
Earlier in this chapter we raised the question of 
whether or not Arabs had become the 'dhimmmi' of Israeli 
society. Many within and outside Israeli society point to 
the Israeli Declaration of Independence (1948) promising 
full consitutional rights to all of its inhabitants. On the 
other hand, sociological literature notes that Arabs are 
treated on a separate legal basis as a linguistic, religious 
and cultural minority. For example, there is no basis in 
Israeli law for intermarriage between Jew and Arab. The Law 
of Return guarantees automatic citizenship to Jews, not 
Arabs. (Davis,1977,Jiryis,1976,Lustick,1980) Arabs are 
barred from military service and are thereby excluded from 
subsidized housing and other benefits afforded those who 
have served in the army. On the basis of the 1953 National 
Insurance Law created to encourage families to bear many 
children, Israelis received twenty Israeli pounds per child. 
When it was discovered that Arabs, who tended to have large 
families, were benefiting more than Jews, the law was 
changed to confer family allowances based on military 
service. Arabs were thus denied benefits. 
In some cases the civil rights of Arabs were infringed 
upon because of the Israeli government's refusal to 
recognize the Arabs as a people with their own national 
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goals. Political and civil liberties were upheld where 
Arabs were willing to identify themselves and their goals 
with that of the Ashkenazi ruling elite. 
Before he became Minister of Defense and leader of the 
Labor Party, Shimon Peres, in 1962 categorized Israel's Arab 
minority as :"the indifferent resigned; the actively 
hostile; the hostile resigned", asserting that it was up to 
the government to decide which of these groups would 
dominate the Arab community. (Lustick,1980:67) in 1976 a 
confidential memorandum by an Arabist in the Ministry of 
Interior, Israel Koenig, made recommendations for the 
creation of a new political force in the Arab sector to be 
controlled by the government. He advocated the adoption of: 
"tough measures at all levels against various agitators 
among college and university students" and economic 
discrimination against Arabs to deprive them of the "social 
and economic security that relieves the individual and the 
family of day to day pressures, (and) grants them, 
consciously and subconsciously, leisure for 'social- 
nationalist thought.' (Lustick,1980:255,Shipler,1987:442) 
Arab nationalist identification is suppressed by the 
Israeli government is encouragment of divisions in the Arab 
community between Muslim, Druse, and Christian and between 
antagonistic kinship groups. For example, the government 
refuses to identify the Druse as 'Arab' in spite of protests 
from the Druse community. The Druse receive more help in 
the form of government subsidies and local development 
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programs and are allowed a very modest role in the military 
which qualifies them for further benefits. 
Discrimination and suppression of national 
identification is also reflected in the educational system. 
Because of economic discrimination, many Arab children had 
to work instead of attending school. Classes were crowded 
due to lack of government assistance. On the university 
level Arab students were not allowed to enroll in areas such 
as electronics and aeronautics for 'security' reasons. 
Eighty four percent of Arab graduates in the humanities and 
social sciences became teachers. The role of the Arab 
teacher has been riddled with contradictions. To keep 
his/her job, he/she has had to conform in some measure to a 
curriculum that is denigrating to Arabs. While in Jewish 
schools the historic struggle of the Jewish nation is 
lauded, two percent of the total number of hours has been 
alloted to Arab history. Arab children learn about their 
own history through a negative perspective; their own 
cultural and literary achievements have been ignored. Arab 
students must learn Hebrew but Jewish children have not been 
required to study Arabic. Lack of adequate teaching 
materials on Arab history and culture makes the Jewish 
population vulnerable to the characterization and reduction 
of Arabs to a 'security risk' potentially subversive and a 
threat to the coninued existence of the state. Arab 
children have experienced alienation and lack of motivation. 
In 1975 the median number of years of schooling among Arabs 
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was six as against 9.6 among Jews. Gaps in attendance rate 
and literacy have reflected the neglect of the Arab sector 
in terms of resources, relevant curriculum and job 
opportunities. 
Israeli citizenship has not provided Arabs with 
positions of power within those institutions and 
organizations that control the state. Of the 1,360 
officials listed in Israeli ministries and independent 
agencies in 1976, only twenty six were Arabs. Arab citizens 
have had contact with the government through special 'Arab 
Deparments' that have functioned without established budgets 
or long-range programs.(Lustick,1980:93) Political power 
has been concentrated in central committees, secretariats, 
nomination committees of Zionist political parties. 
Political parties have attempted to gain Arab votes 
through cooptation of village notables and others who are 
rewarded with tax privileges, jobs and other benefits. For 
example, the director of the Arab branch of the Labor Party 
in the western Galilee argued that:"To block the trend to 
Rakah (Communist Party) and the formation of other 
nationalist groups we must take care of young Arabs. We 
must give them party membership and (what might be called) 
"directed democracy". First of all we must identify those 
who criticise us and then join them to us. Then we must 
open more clubs in Arab villages and hire young Arabs to 
staff them. Through such clubs we can provide additional 
funds for musical performances, folklore groups, films, 
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lectures, trips or other activities which they want- make 
them feel a little 'Israeli'. After they get these things, 
they 11 forget about their nationalism... of course we have 
been doing these things but just look at how many of our 
clubs are closed down and dusty- we need more funds and 
workers to do what is necessary.1' (Personal interview with 
Eliyahu Ronen, Acre, April 1, 1974) (Lustick,1980) 
The Ministry of Religious Affairs has been the prime 
authority in religious matters and its functions are 
connected to control of land. In 1948 the government seized 
Islamic Waqf property(property endowed for religious 
purposes) and set up courts of Islamic law. Islam's 
religious judges, Qadis were appointed by the Minister of 
Religions. Islam's court authorities, Shari'a qadis, were 
appointed by a committee of nine, four of whom could be non- 
Muslims. The government rejected a proposal to reinstate a 
higher Muslim Council, maintaining the request represented a 
"political rather than a religious aspiration". 
(Jiryis,1976:198) 
The intermixture of religion and politics is 
reminiscent of issues related to the dhimmi under Islamic 
law. However, many in Israeli society point to the ways 
that devout Muslims and Orthodox Jews respect each other's 
religiosity, and that Jews and Arabs continue to participate 
in each other's religious rituals as they have for 
For example, the Israelis have set up an Islamic centuries. 
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museum in West Jerusalem to display art and handicrafts of 
Islamic societies.(Shipler,1987:374) 
Along similar lines many assert that Arabs and Jews 
continue to complement each other culturally and that 
Israeli society has simply provided a new and more stable 
context for interaction. To support this view some point to 
the improved standard of living of Arabs through access to 
modern conveniences. Many Israeli Arabs function in 
important bureaucratic roles that confer status and 
privilege. Others also assert that failures in the system 
can be attributed to resistance among traditional elements 
to change, i.e., modernization. For example, they assert 
that ancient antagonisms among sectarian groups, kinship 
groups and villages, contribute to lack of leadership and 
organizational skills required to meet the needs of life in 
a modern society. However, in spite of improved living 
conditions for some Arabs, segregation of Jew and Arab based 
on the ideological position of the state as described above 
has continued to result in an overall lower standard of 
living and lack of access to resources available to Jews. 
And in spite of divisiveness among sectarian groups, etc., 
Arabs from a range of political perspectives have developed 
an organizational base from which to advocate for 
improvements. 
For example, after the '48 war, anti-Zionist Jewish 
communists joined with Arabs to form the Israel Communist 
Party (Maqi) . In 1965 the predominantly Arab Rakah or New 
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Communist List split from Maqi. Rakah organized the Arab 
general strike, March 1976 known as Land Day to protest 
expulsions and expropriations of land. Rakah's activities 
were based on the belief that Arab and Jewish workers as 
citizens of the same state have common interests and mutual 
goals and that discrimination on the basis of nationality, 
whether by the government, the Histradrut or other national 
institutions must be abolished. Until 1984 it was the only 
place where Arab voters could express their dissatisfaction 
with government policy. While Rakah has supported Israel's 
right to exist it has opposed the Zionist character of the 
state. (Lustick,1980,Schnall,1980) Haolam Hazeh formed in 
1969, called for a regional Semitic Confederacy ensuring 
repatriation of Arab refugees. The Israeli Socialist 
Organization, Matzpen, composed of native Israelis from 
mixed backgrounds, Christian Arabs and more recent European 
immigrants, advocated the elimination of discrimination 
against Palestinian Arabs and Oriental Jews through the 
elimination of Zionism. Its platform included replacing the 
Histadrut with a trade organization run by workers 
committees; separation of religion and state; and 
elimination of the Law of Return.(Schnall,1980:92) 
The First Arab Students Committee was formed in 1958 
and joined with groups of Jewish students to protest 
discriminatory practices against Arabs.(Lustick,1980 : 26) 
Attempts by the Israeli government to break up these 
organizations have escalated in recent years, including 
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arrests, deportations and excluding student members from the 
job market. All of these groups represent support for 
Jewish-Arab coexistence and in this sense are the 
conservators of the Judeo—Arabic heritage. 
Along with political parties and student organizations, 
a third element produced a movement that most poignantly 
represents the Judeo-Arabic tradition. The Black Panthers 
were an organization representing the interests of Jews from 
Middle Eastern countries outside of Palestine and North 
Africa. Between 1943 and 1956 thousands of Jews from the 
Middle East and North Africa were forced to leave their 
countries because of political tensions created by the 
emergence of the Jewish state. Zionists had already 
established organizations in these countries beginning in 
the late 1800's to encourage emigration to Palestine/Israel. 
However when these Jews arrived in Israel they found 
themselves in an environment shaped by the cultural mores of 
its European pioneer ruling elite. The term 'Oriental' 
became a reference point for discrimination based on the 
mythology that Jews from Middle Eastern and North African 
countries were, like the Arabs, backward, primitive, in need 
of European education and values. 
Conditions for the 'Oriental' Jew were much worse than 
for the European Jew. Alex Bein notes that: 'The Ashkenazi 
(East European) Jews of the old yishuv had already settled 
in the towns and would probably not be suitable for other 
than urban occupations; but the Oriental Jews, particularly 
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those belonging to the Yemenite and Persian communities, 
could enter agriculture. As their needs were few, they 
could compete against the Arabs. Already Yemenite Jews were 
being employed for seasonal work at several Jewish 
settlements. if they could be transferred permanently to 
the settlements, there would be employment for them, while 
their women folk could work as domestic servants in the 
settlers' homes instead of Arab women."(Davis,1979:35) 
Oriental Jews served two related purposes in the Jewish 
State: of providing an underclass of labourers to help build 
the state, and acting as a competitive sector with the Arab 
sector.(Davis,1977,Schnall,1980,Smooha,1978) 
The image of the Arab Jew as primitive, backward and 
without culture was used to justify the conditions these 
Jews were forced to endure when arriving in Israel. Most 
were crowded into transit camps and offered only manual 
jobs. In fact, as Uri Davis points out, many of the Jews 
from Asis and Africa were part of the cultural elite of 
their countries. Davis quotes B. Nadel, Yediot Aharonot, 
23/7/1976: "Moroccan Jews tended to be the capitalists in 
that largely agrarian state. They were big, medium and 
small merchants, but also craftsmen such as gold, copper and 
silversmiths and carpenters. They made money by trading in 
the local Muslim produce and mediated between the French 
regime and the population at large, as well as between the 
local rulers and their subjects. They had a long and proud 
cultural tradition- Jews had resided in Morocco already in 
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the days of Bar Kachva ( 132-135 A.D.) Jews emigrated 
from Morocco m the pre-state illegal immigrant ships and 
were detained by the British Mandate's authorities in camps 
in Cyprus. in 1943, several thousand Moroccan Jewish youth 
rushed to Israel and fought the Egyptian army, participating 
in the hardest battles in the south of the country, 
especially on those fronts where our soldiers had failed so 
far (f.i. against the Egyptian Hulaygat fortifications). 
Many of those youths were killed and many more were injured, 
yet after the war their achievements were forgotten. They 
had come without their families and had no relatives in the 
country, so they demonstrated in the streets for some sort 
of state assistance. They were nicknamed 'knifing 
Moroccan". Most of them went back to Morocco and returned 
only years later with the mass wave of immigration from 
Morocco."(Davis,1979:43) Discrimination and poor conditions 
in education, housing, jobs, continued. In 1968, the 
average family income of western Jews in Israel was 1116 
Israeli pounds while that of 'Oriental' Jews was 470 pounds. 
(Schnall,1980:160) Only about half of Oriental Jewish 
families live with less than two people per room. In 
1969/70 there were twice as many Ashkenzim in high status 
white collar occupations and 1.7 more Orientals in low 
status jobs. The history and culture of Oriental Jews has 
been grossly underrepresented in school textbooks. 
The Black Panthers was started by teenagers from slums 
of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem who began organizing for better 
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housing, jobs and education. They believe that the 
treatment of "Oriental' Jews reflected the government's 
obsession with breaking all ties to Arab culture. Some 
members of the Black Panthers defined their goals as linked 
with those of the Palestinian Arab: "We favor the creation 
of a Palestinian state next to Israel and oppose the 
secularization of Israel. The large portion of Oriental 
Jews support the right wing, not out of a sympathy with 
their views so much as out of sheer protest and a desire for 
an organized opposition. We believe that the Oriental 
community can be a force of peace and understanding with the 
Arab world. We have much in common. When Oriental Jews get 
together with Arabs there is an immediate 
affinity."(Smooha,1980:166) Sammy Smooha believes an 
alliance between Oriental Jew and Arab is discouraged by the 
'religious-national quasi-caste line': ..."the emphasis on 
the sectarian Jewish character of the state solidifies two 
quasi-castes, stressing Oriental membership in the superior 
Jewish quasi-caste and consequently downplaying the 
v. 
Oriental-Ashkenazi division." (Smooha,1980:102) More than 
in any other case the situation of Oriental Jews represents 
the consequences of a European ethnocentric racist view that 
pits Jew against Jew. Further those who opt for 
assimilation of the Arab Jew to western mores as a solution 
to unequal conditions are critics of the Judeo-Arabic 
heritage. 
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Another group whose political reference point is the 
Judeo Arabic heritage comes from a religious perspective. 
As noted earlier, religious identification with the land was 
a major element supporting the Zionist goal of Jewish land. 
But Nature1 Karta is a religious anti-Zionist organization 
led until 1974 by Rabbi Amram Blau, a Palestinian Jew from 
one of Jerusalem's oldest families. This group has asserted 
that any attempt at Jewish independence without 'divine 
intervention' is heretical and that Zionist aspirations are 
in addition the main factor disrupting Arab-Jewish 
cooperation in the Middle East. Rabbi Blau's relations with 
Arabs prior to Zionism were close; he maintained 
communications with Moslem leaders in Jordan and East 
Jerusalem until his death. Naturei Karta opposed 
participation in the Va'ad Leumi (Jewish National Council) 
and voting in municipal elect ions.(Schall,1980:8) 
The above represent viewpoints of individuals, 
organizations and movements that from a variety of 
perspectives have acted as conservators of the Judeo-Arabic 
heritage. Their criticisms have emerged from the ways in 
which the Israeli government has encouraged separation of 
Arab and Jew. The Israel Defense Force and Gush Emunim 
represent the opposite perspective. Critics of the Judeo- 
Arabic heritage, both organizations are based on ideologies 
that ensure the polarization of Jew and Arab on both a 
theoretical and day to day practical level. 
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Military service in the Israel Defence Force is 
compulsory for men and women; 35 months for men and 24 for 
women at age 18, with annual reserve duty for thirty years. 
Ihe I. D. F. grew out of the Haganah, the military arm of 
the Jewish Agency in pre-forty-eight Palestine. Schnall 
quotes the following characteriztion of the effect of the I. 
D. F. on Israeli culture:” A certain cockiness, as well as a 
well developed sense of independence, has also been noted 
and may be correlated to the role of the military in Israeli 
life. Suffice it to say that every veteran can find 
satisfaction and status in his reminisciences of military 
life and many look forward to reserve duty as a change of 
pace from the mundane world they know. There can be little 
doubt a major cultural contribution can be attributed to 
Zahal in its influence on popular culture."(Schnall,1980:48) 
The I. D. F. is considered a training ground for political 
leadership: the Ministry of Defense is the most powerful 
cabinet post. The power of the Ministry of Defense to 
overide courts has been cited above. Militarization of 
Israeli society is reflected in the privileges afforded 
those who have served in the army. The Israeli military 
represents the national commitment of the society as a 
whole, so that exclusion of Arabs from the Army makes them 
particularly vulnerable to feeling they are 'outsiders'. 
Worthiness is measured by serving in the army: explicit 
privileges granted to those who have performed military 
service is testimony to that fact. Security is the reason 
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most often given for justifying limitations on equal rights 
for Arabs. 
Although often at odds with the government in terms of 
tactics, Gush Emunim (the Block of the Faithful) also 
believes that the primary goal of the Arab states is to 
destroy the Jewish state. Gush Emunim has launched a 
massive settlement movement, justified by a religious 
interpretation of history that inhabiting the land of Israel 
is equivalent to fulfilling all other religious 
requirements. in this sense they are implicitly linked with 
the I. D. F.: war has a holy purpose and is the expression 
°f full devotion to an ideal. Gush Emunim ideology places 
history within a religious context: that is, the only 
significant events are those that happen 'outside of time' 
through religious revelation. Whether or not they are 
members of Gush Emunim, Jews who hold this belief consider 
the Arabs to be 'strangers in their house', a sentiment 
often voiced by Palestinian Arabs (and Palestinian Jews) 
toward the European Jew. 
The 1967 War and Consequences of the Occupation for 
Jewish/Arab Relations 
Post 1948 competition for power between Egypt and 
Jordan and between Israel and Egypt dominated inter-Arab 
politics and attempts of the Israeli government to establish 
allies from among the Arab States. Israel's commitment to 
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share power with Jordan inhibited the government's ability 
to negotiate with Egypt, or with the Palestinians. The 
Baghdad Pact, February 1955 between Britain, Turkey, Iraq 
and Iran created a defense organization and triggered 
defensive reactions from Egypt and from Israel.(Evron, p 
33)1973 Within the Israeli government, the Lavon Affair, 
1954 stimulated internal divisions, and the return of Ben 
Gurion to power in 1955. A group of Israeli agents were 
accused of setting off bombs in American establishments in 
Egypt attempt to disrupt the newly emerging 
U. S./Egyptian alliance. Minister of Defense Pinhas Lavon 
was forced to resign and two Jewish agents in Egypt were 
hanged.(Evron,1973:36) Ben Gurion supported the 1955 attack 
on Gaza in reaction to the threat that Egypt posed to 
Israel. Shortly after, Egypt launched Fedayeen attacks 
against Israel. During 1955, 234 Arabs and 55 Israelis were 
killed,for the most part along the Israeli-Egyptian border. 
When Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956 tensions 
escalated.(Evron,1973:38) On the eve of the ]956 British, 
French and Israeli attack on Egypt, curfews were imposed by 
Israeli security forces on Arab villages.(Davis,1977:147) 
According to official court records instructions were to 
kill anyone who broke the curfew, whether aware of it or 
not..." a dead man (or according to other evidence 'a few 
dead men') is better than the complications of detention." 
Forty nine Arabs, including seven children and nine women 
returning from work to the village of Kufr Qasim after the 
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curfew with no knowledge of it, were "taken off bicycles, 
carts and lorries, lined up and shot at close 
range."(Davis,1977:147) The 1956 war in which Israeli 
British and French armies overran Gaza, the Sinai and Suez 
Canal area not only resulted in extensive suffering for Jews 
and for Arabs in Israel and in Egypt, but also acted as a 
stimulus to Palestinian student activists in Cairo who 
formed a commando battalion to help the Egyptian war effort. 
Between 1948 and 1967 Palestinians joined a range of 
nationalist organizations: the Muslim Brotherhood, Syrian 
Social Nationalist Party, Arab Ba'th socialist party, the 
Arab Nationalist Movement.(Quandt,1973) Some were attracted 
to Egypt's president Gamal Abdul Nasser's nationalism, 
others became influential politicians within the Hashemite 
regime in Jordan.(Quandt,1973) Those who rejected Jordanian 
authority and Nasserism (Arab unity under Egyptian 
leadership) or Syrian nationalism began to build on a vision 
of Palestinian nationalism that had been emerging since the 
early 1900's. The most important of these organizations, 
al-Fatah, was formed by a group of Palestinians living in 
the Gaza Strip, in the mid-50's, whose spokesperson was 
Yasar Arafat. In the late 40's and 50's students at 
American University of Beirut formed a political 
organization led by a Palestinian of Greek Orthodox 
background, Dr. George Habash. Other Palestinian groups 
with tenuous connections to the Arab National Movement 
surfaced between 1965 and 1966. One was the Palestine 
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Liberation Front, led by Palestinian Ahmad Jibril, to which 
several branches of the Arab National Movement 
belonged.(Quandt,1973,Cobban,1984) 
The resurgence of the Palestinian movement with the 
establishment of al-Fatah in the years between the Suez War 
in 1956, the failure of union between Egypt and Syria (1958- 
1961) and the June War (1967) were characterized by an 
impatience with Arab regimes and political parties in the 
area. (Quandt,1973) Al-Fatah asserted that pan-Arabism 
would not solve the Palestinian problem. Al-Fatah attempted 
to disentangle itself from intra-Arab rivalries and 
competing ideologies within the Arab nationalist movement by 
focusing on building a military, financial and social 
support system for Palestinians. George Habash's movement, 
on the other hand, asserted that a socialist revolution that 
would affect the entire Arab world was a necessary corollary 
of the Palestinian movement. 
In the mid-60's several Palestinian groups initiated 
military raids against Israel in an attempt to escalate 
tensions between Israel and the Arab states. This was one 
factor that motivated the Arab League, and especially Nasser 
to create the Palestine Liberation Organization as an 
umbrella for all organizations serving the cause of the 
Palestinian Arabs.. 
All four elements; intra-Arab tensions, Israeli-Arab 
conflicts, domestic differences within Israel and rivalries 
between Arab states contributed to developments culminating 
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m the 1967 War* Following the failure of unity talks with 
Syria and Iraq, in 1964 Nasser announced that the Arabs 
would not take military action to prevent Israel's diversion 
of Jordan River Waters to the Negev.(Evron,1973) Nasser's 
stand disillusioned moderates in the Arab Nationalist 
Movement and spurred others to develop a more radical 
ideology. 
At the same time many within Israel were taking a 
radical stance in response to policies of Arab countries. 
Goldschmidt notes that:"It is true, though, that Arab 
hostility made Israel's life harder. All road and rail 
connections between Israel and its neighbors were cut. 
Planes flying to and from Israel could not fly over Arab 
countries, let alone land in their airports. The Arab 
countries refued to trade with Israel and imposed a boycott 
against the products of any foreign firm that did business 
there.... Ships carrying goods to Israel could not pass 
through the Suez Canal or even enter certain Arab ports. 
Egypt blockaded the Straits of Tiran between the Red Sea and 
the Gulf of Aqaba, hampering the development of Israel's 
port at Eilat. Arab diplomats abroad publicly shunned their 
Israeli counterparts. Arabic books, newspapers, and radio 
broadcasts were often viruleent in their hostility to Israel 
and is supporters." (Goldschmidt,1983:260) Egypt's refusal 
to allow Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran, 
guerrilla attacks around the Israeli borders, and an 
economic recession were the circumstances under which Israel 
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attacked Egypt, Syria and Jordan in 1967. As a result of 
this war and of the 1973 October War in which Egypt and 
Syria planned a co-ordinated attack in an attempt to 
retrieve territory, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, the West 
Bank of Jordan, the Sinai Desert and Golan Heights of Syria 
and the Gaza Strip. Refugees from the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip as a result of the Israeli Arab War of June 1967 were 
estimated by the government of Jordan in May of 1968 at 
410,248. (Cattan,1969) 
Since 1967 the occupied territories have been a focus 
for the realization of Zionist policy, a source of 
controversy that has attracted world-wide attention and a 
crisis area for Jew/Arab relations. For many occupation of 
the west Bank of the Jordan River has come to symbolize 
fulfillment of the Zionist mission. The poignancy of the 
claims that have supported the Israeli government are 
embedded in its soil: historical necessity, theological 
rights tied to national identification, military necessity. 
For some Jews the West Bank is 'Judea' and 'Samaria', 
ancient site of Jewish kings and prophets. In the words of 
one West Bank settler: "This is where David ran from Saul. 
On that hill Judah Maccabee sprang a trap on an occupying 
Syrian army many times the size of his and won Jewish 
independence. North of here, in Shechem, which the Arabs 
call Nablus, Arbraham made his first stop in Canaan, and 
Joshua his farewell address. On the other side of those 
hills is Shiloh, where we've just built a Jewish settlement, 
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where I live with my wife and children, and where, 3,000 
years ago, we made our first capital and became a people. 
This is a place from which we were repeatedly expelled and 
to which we repeatedly returned. And now we've returned 
once again. We're back to stay. This is Israel. This is 
my home."(Reich,1984:54-90) This settler is one of 30,000 
who by 1980 relocated on the West Bank. Some went with 
similar convictions; others to fulfill the goal of military 
security; others to take advantage of government subsidies 
that made it possible for them to work in Tel Aviv or 
Jerusalem and live cheaply in West Bank housing. 
For many Arabs, refugees of the 1967 war and those who 
have remained on the West Bank, the occupation has the 
opposite significance. It represents the culmination of 
centuries of occupation- first by the Ottoman Turks, then by 
the British and the Jordanians. Their ancestral ties to the 
land have sharpened into nationalist fervor, a determination 
to put an end to the economic hardships, and political 
repression that have characterized Jordanian occupation and 
that continue under Israeli occupation. Examination of the 
effects of Israeli economic and settlement policies in the 
West Bank ('Judea' and 'Samaria'), and its effects on 
indigenous life, will illustrate why. 
Since 1967 the major economic byproduct of the Israeli 
occupation has been the export of labor services to Israel 
itself. Many Palestinian small farmers, artisans, and 
shopkeepers could not compete with wages paid by Israeli 
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capitalists or the Palestinian bourqeoisie, and have 
themselves been forced into wage labor. The number of 
Palestinian wage earners from the West Bank and Gaza working 
in Israel increased from 9,000 in 1969 to 70,000 in 
1974.(Hilal,1977:169) 
During the eighteen years of Jordanian rule there was 
a high rate of unemployment and no significant industrial or 
agricultural investment in the West Bank region of the 
River. After 1967, the Israeli government imposed a 
range of programs that resulted in dependent specialization 
in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel acquired a large trade 
surplus with the territories: by 1973 the territories were 
their second largest export market. Small factories, 
workshops and other enterprises became dependent on the 
Israeli market or world capitalist market. For example, 
Israel encouraged exports of agricultural products to Europe 
and the Arab States (through a policy of ’open bridges’ to 
Jordan) and encouraged agricultural production to meet the 
particular needs of Israel's internal and external 
markets.(Hilal,1977) 
Palestinian wage laborers have borne the brunt of the 
economic changes brought about by occupation. Workers from 
the West Bank in Israel have been in large part confined to 
manual labor; without benefits and receiving lower wages 
than Israelis. Conditions of life as itinerant workers have 
been dangerous and exhausting. Workers sleep in shanties, 
and commute three to six hours a day on sheds, garages 
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buses. Women have been forced into full time 'outside' 
work, along with full time responsibility for family 
domestic labor. 
Workers remaining in the West Bank and Gazahave been 
faced with unemployment and worse wages. Many families have 
been without electricity: 81 percent in the West Bank and 92 
percent in Gaza were without running water; 84 percent on 
the West Bank and 87 percent in Gaza were without 
bathrooms.(Hilal,1977:170) 
Political and security considerations have dominated 
economic policy and social organization in the occupied 
territories. The Israeli government has avoided large-scale 
public investment to avoid a decision on the political 
future of the territories. West Bankers have been required 
to submit to Israeli security requrements as holders of 
Israeli I.D.'s as well as to Jordanian security provisions 
as holders of Jordanian passports.(Avkadie,1977,Dakkah,1983) 
All signs of Palestinian nationalist sentiment have been 
consistently censored and repressed. Strict measures were 
taken against active members of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization; political assembly was outlawed and 
organizations suppressed to hinder the development of West 
Bank nationalist leadership and a cohesive political 
community. 
The basic principles of West Bank policy have been are 
the same as those that governing pre-1948 strategy: 
settlement, economic hegemony, military security. The 
272 
Israel Defense Force has been charged with maintaining the 
territories as 'defensive outposts', a means to 'alter the 
hostile intentions of our Arab neighbors'.(Maloz,1984:62) 
With these aims in mind, in October of 1978, after the Camp 
David accords, the government produced a comprehensive five 
year plan for settlement of 'Judea' and 'Samaria', Their 
objective was to create Jewish enclaves among the 
"population areas of the minorities- that is the 800,000 
Palestinian inhabitants."(Nakleh,1983) The settlement 
strategy was to surround major Palestinian towns to prevent 
their expansion and cut off Arab towns from each other. The 
massive loss of land by West Bank Palestinians and their 
replacement by tens of thousands of Israeli Jews attracted 
by subsidized housing and supported by the pioneer zealots 
of Gush Emunim has clarified the grounds of Arab/Jewish 
hostilities. 
Disposession of the indigenous population has been 
encouraged by means other than land confiscation. Potential 
leaders were encouraged to emigrate; for example, during 
1981/82 the military closed down Bir Zeit Univeristy on the 
West Bank, for 'security reasons' on three separate 
occasions. This and other similiar tactics aimed at 
limiting higher education in the occupied territories has 
forced many intellectuals to leave the area and to teach at 
foreign universities. Emigration has been encouraged by not 
allowing Palestinians passage into Jordan unless they sign a 
commitment not to return for three to five years. Because 
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opportunities for employment have been scarce, as noted 
above, many Palestinians have been forced to leave in search 
of work.(Tsemel,1983) 
Palestinians living in the 61 refugee camps throughout 
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon have 
been living in squalid conditions subject to constant 
surveillance and often terrorism. They have 
suffered from an uncertain future, loss of status due to 
loss of land and separation from family and friends. 
Village life is sometimes recreated in the camps, so that 
children if asked where they come from will often give the 
name of their village in Palestine. Refugees are reluctant 
to accept any conditions other than return to their homes: 
politicization in the camps is high as the spirit of the 
'right to return' is kept alive. Anger at Zionists for loss 
of their homes, livelihoods, and communities, often turns 
into hostility toward Jews in general, particularly among 
the children whose only contact with Jews is often the butt 
of a rifle. For this reason the refugee camps have been 
ripe receptors for a range of Arab propoganda about Israel 
and Israelis. Children grow up with a distorted and 
oversimplified view of a highly complex situation. 
Desperation for a life of stability with integrity makes 
them vulnerable to extreme positions denying Israel's right 
to exist and denial of any historic connection of Jews to 
the land. From this perspective the situation in the West 
Bank has heightened the contradictions that Jews and Arabs 
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face in attempting to resolve nationalist goals. Power 
accrues to those elements that act on the belief that Jew 
and Arab are inherently enemies the more repression is 
used as a tool to control those elements. 
Detention and imprisonment has been a common form of 
repression : "Israeli police receive from (secret) security 
services, Shin-Beth, lists of persons to be arrested. Shin- 
Beth collects its information from informers or rumors in 
current circulation. In addition to lists of persons 
suspected of having been present in certain places, or of 
having participated in certain events, there is a fixed list 
of young 'instigators' who are to be harassed by arrests as 
opften as possible. Even if innocent, they are accused of 
intending to do something or of being indirectly involved. 
In addition, arbitrary and indiscriminate arrests are 
carried out during every wave of protest and resistance and 
sometimes even when quiet, sometimes for the purpose of 
exploiting pressure on parents with the intention of 
recruiting the latter as collaborators." (Journal Palestine 
Studies, Vol.VI, No.2,Winter,1977,Issue 22,:206) 
Resistance to the occupation has surfaced in a variety 
of forms, of which organizing by the Palestine Liberation 
Organization is one. For a time fragmentation of the 
political elite through ties with the Hashmeite regime and 
cooptation by the Israeli government weakened the 
nationalist movement. But the 1972 municipal elections in 
the West Bank strenghtened the position of its town mayors 
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as political leaders.(Heller,1980) However increased 
opportunities to reach an agreement with Arab mayors 
concerning a Jordanian solution or other non-PLO settlement 
were rejected by Israel who feared that moderate leaders 
would eventually be influenced by the more radical politics 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The October 1973 
Yom Kippur, Ramadan War between Egypt, Syria and Israel and 
the official recognition of the PLO as legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people did contribute to a 
process of radicalization in the West Bank. Harsh reactions 
of the Israeli military to protests by Israeli Arabs against 
land appropriations in the Galilee,and demonstrations in the 
West Bank against Gush Emunim settlement, further alienated 
West Bank mayors.(Ma'oz,1984) 
With the April 1976 free elections for municipal 
government, local leadership emerged as a major voice of 
Palestinian nationalism in the West Bank. The Committee of 
National Guidance, 1978, an organization representing most 
public organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip- women, 
students, professionals, labourers, cultural and welfare 
associations, established close ties with Israeli Arabs and 
conformed increasingly to PLO directives.(Ma'oz,1984) 
Studies indicate that the 1967 War strongly affected 
the attitudes of Jewish youth toward Arabs. According to 
Amos Elon, The Israelis: Founders and Sons,(New York; Holt, 
Reinhart and Winston,1971) many Israeli soldiers were 
surprised and some were deeply disturbed to discover among 
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the refugees a form of 'Arab Zionism': the living memory of 
a lost homeland, to which they were passionately attached as 
the Jews had remained attached to Zion in the lands of their 
dispersion. The education of these young soldiers- some 
were born after the establishment of the state- little 
prepared them for a discovery such as this. Upon entering a 
refugee camp one young soldier discovered that the inmates 
were still organized into and dwelled according to the 
village, town and even street- they had lived in prior to 
the dispersion in 1948, villages and towns that were now 
thoroughly Israeli: Beershebas, Zarnuga, Ramleh, Lod, Jaffa, 
Rehovoth..." (Elon, 1971:266) High School students notified 
the Israeli government of their frustration with the 
government's refusal, in 1970 to discuss peace proposals 
when Nasser asked Nahum Goldman to visit Cairo for that 
purpose. Their concerns affected their motivation to fight: 
"Up to now we have believed that we go to fight and serve 
(in the army) for three years because there is no 
alternative. After this incident, it became clear that even 
if there were to be another alternative, however slim, it is 
ignored."(Zureik,1975:59) In spite of the overall 
conservative trend among Jewish university students in 
Israel, in 1970 the world union of Jewish students adopted a 
resolution asking the Israeli government to recognize the 
rights of Palestinians while affirming Israel's right to 
exist. In a December 1973 Tel Aviv Survey, high school 
students noted that from a historical perspective mistakes 
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had been made in how Zionist leaders related to the Arab 
Nationalist movement: that a political agreement should have 
been reached with Arabs before buying land and establishing 
the state: " I wanted to ask Mr. Dayan who declared that we 
will not return Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, West Bank and 
Sinai- what then is he prepared to return? Does he think 
that with humiliating conditions such as these the Arabs 
will sit down with us at the negotiating table?" Another 
student felt that tensions between Arabs and Jews were the 
outcome of a failing rooted in old ideas and bad, bad 
education. Even at home I was taught from an early age to 
hate the Arabs. Although they did not tell me this in 
detail, it is a fact that up to the age of seven I hated the 
Arabs and feared them." (Zureik,1975:57,74) 
Sociologists note that Israelis from a variety of 
political perspectives share an image of the Arab as the 
'enemy', bent on total destruction of the state. The trend 
has been to reduce a highly complex set of cirumstances 
based on historical developments of which many Israelis are 
unaware, to psychological attitudes and inherent character 
traits. For example studies show that the Israeli elite view 
conflict between Arab and Jew as a result of 'an irrational 
and emotional attitude on the part of the Arabs.' 'National 
character analysis'is based on representing diverse groups 
of Arabs with varying situations and historical backgrounds 
as one monolithic group. National characteristics are 
created to fulfill polticial goals. As Fouad Moughrabi 
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notes the image of Arab as enemy of the state, "leads to 
wide acceptance by the population of the pre-eminence of the 
armed forces establishment in the making of foreign 
policy.(Moughrabi,1984:166) 
Studies have indicated that the social-political 
organization in which Israeli Arabs experience a high degree 
of powerlessness strongly affects how they view Jews. 
According to Arabs and Jews working in Arab communities, 
common stereotypes of Jews included violence, sexual 
permisiveness, greed, sneakiness, technological superiority 
and a lack of personal warmth.(Lustick,1980) In the eyes 
of Arabs who have become the manual laborers of Israel, the 
Jew is the "owner, boss, man of power who exploits his 
workers. Or he is seen as uneducated and arrogant, one of 
the 'chosen people' who is unwilling to stoop to menial work 
and so leaves the jobs of garbage collector, janitor, 
dishwasher, construction worker, fruit picker, citrus packer 
to the underclass whom he despises, the Arab." 
(Shipler,1986:266) 
Stereotypes that Arabs have of Jews are the result of 
cultural differences with the Ashkenazi, differences in life 
styles, ways of dressing, ways of expressing themselves. 
They also emerge from the socio-political conditions of 
daily existence. In this sense, class differences and 
political repression foster stereotypes of Arabs among Jews. 
Many Jews in Israeli society view the Arab as 'dirty, lazy, 
thieving, incompetent and at the same time uppity, wealthy 
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and brash' (Shipler,1986:266) Because free political 
expression among Israeli Artabs is repressed, Jews are 
vulnerable to viewing Arabs as sneaky and potentially 
dangerous, hiding their true feelings which may at any 
moment erupt. 
Ashkenzi predominance in Israeli society has added a 
challenging element to Arab-Jew relations. It has brought 
about the meeting of peoples with not only widely differing 
historical experiences, but also of peoples who have been 
taught to view one another from an ethnocentric perspective. 
Nonetheless Jewish/Arab traditions have remained 
strong. The challenges of historical developments have 
shaped the Judeo-Arabic culture but have not destroyed it. 
Arabs and Jews have working relationships on every level of 
Israeli society. For example, Arabs and Jews worked 
together to support the work of political clubs established 
in Arab towns and villages to improve education, building 
facilities, improve the status of women, build roads, bring 
in public services.(El-Asmar,1978) Joint businesses reflect 
a centuries old tradition of economic omplimentarity between 
Jew and Arab. Arab and Jewish university students have 
worked together to demand equality for Arab and Jewish 
university students regarding admission criteria, student 
housing, availability of suitable work for Arab students and 
the right to organize on campuses. Arabs and Jews continue 
to share traditional foods, to participate in each others' 
religious ritual. Arab Jew and Arab are in many cases 
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indistinguishable in appearance and continue to speak the 
same language. The influence of the Judeo-Arabic heritage 
on Israeli society continues to underlie the many 
contradictions that have become the foreground of the 
struggle for survival of both peoples. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the following related 
guestions: How did the new political status of the Jewish 
community affect the Judeo-Arabic heritage? Now that the 
Jews have come into power, how would that power be used in 
relation to Arabs? Under the new circumstances of the 
state, who were the conservators of the Judeo-Arabic 
heritage and who were the critics? 
Nationalism and militarism in the twentieth century 
introduced a new element into Arab/Jew relations. Fawzi 
Turki notes that: "when Theodore Herzl, the European from 
Vienna, spoke of creating "a rampart of Europe, an outpost 
of civilization" against "Asian barbarism" in Palestine, no 
one came forth to oppose the concept and its execution. The 
event was appaluded."(Turki,1972:12) Jewish nationalism 
emerging out of the European historical experience and 
ideology, known as Zionism, became the movement of a 
Europeanized elite: as their policies unfolded two implicit 
concepts informing Zionist ideology became clear. One is 
the a-historical and immutable nature of anti-semitism. The 
second related concept was that Jews could be served best by 
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using anti-semites to help them achieve their national 
goals. The logical consequence of the second was adherence 
to Westernization- western values, mores, politics, as 
fundamental to the building of a Jewish state. Among 
Zionists and among Arab Nationalists a range of responses to 
world political developments created intra-communal 
cleavages that have become absorbed into the social- 
political fabric of Israeli society. Whether an Arab or a 
Jew is defined as a 'moderate' or a 'radical' has become 
dependent upon where they stand on nationalism. Nationalism 
has become the overriding issue of Arab-Jew relations: from 
a concept intended to bond peoples with an identity based on 
a shared experience it became a concept representing all of 
the elements that separate Jew and Arab. Furthermore and 
most critically, the consequences of militarization as 
accepted by both Arab and Jew are dehumanization of each by 
the other and a license to terrorism on both sides. 
The significance of Zionist ideology for daily 
interaction in the newly formed state has been detailed. 
Jews and Arabs are highly segregated, occupying opposite 
strata socially, economically, politically. Contradictions 
invalidate the declared commitment of the Israeli 
Declaration of Independence to uphold the civil rights of 
all of its citizens within the context of a secular 
democratic state. On the contrary, religious activities 
including religious schools and Rabbinic courts are publicly 
financed. Nationalism and faith are intertwined. The Law 
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of Return allows any Jew to automatically become an Israeli 
citizen and the Orthodox constituency has the power to 
decide who fits that definition. Israeli citizenship for 
Jews automatically implies privileges not available to 
Muslims or Christians. The state, backed by nationalist 
religious elements, poses barriers in every sphere to 
intermingling of Jew and Arab. 
Another important aspect of Zionist ideology is the 
notion of the historical necessity of creating a Jewish 
majority in Palestine in order to ensure the continued 
dominance of Jews in Israel. To back this up Zionist 
organizations were created on the basis of the concepts of 
'Jewish land' and 'Jewish labor'. Arab land disposession 
was a devastating factor in bringing about loss of social 
status, poverty, changes in occupational patterns, patterns 
of school drop out and despair. In 1975 half of Israeli 
Arab workers and all of approximately 64,000 Palestinian 
migratory laborers held the lowest paying jobs in 
agriculture, construction and menial services for Jewish 
employers. All but five percent of Jewish employees are 
unionized and over three fifths belonged to the giant 
Histadrut which therefore has primary control over the labor 
force negotiating wages and work conditions on a nation-wide 
basis. Regional development, housing, education, political 
positions, the police force, are controlled nationally. The 
Jewish Agency and Ministry of Immigrant Absorption 
establishes immigration policies. Jews run Arab education 
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and mass media, manage the special Arab Deparments and 
intervene in Arab local government. While in 1917, Arabs 
were 91 percent of the total population, in 1947 they were 
68 percent, in 1949, 14 percent, and in 1937, 17 
percent.(Smooha,1978:75) The fact that Arabs have separate 
Departments further supports their segregation. The over¬ 
all inferior position of the Arab in Israeli society ensures 
that Arab-Jew relations will be fraught with tensions. A 
system of cooptation, forced dependence, pacification, and 
compliance structures daily life between Arab and Jew and 
distorts their images of one another The struggle for 
national and civic rights occupies much of the energy of the 
Arab community (sometimes as we have seen, with rigorous 
support of Jews). The energies of the Zionist establishment 
have been absorbed in instituting a system of social 
controls designed to ensure the pacification of all 
elements- Jew and Arab- who pose a threat to Zionist 
hegemony. 
As a result, segregation of Arab from Jew and of Arab 
Jew from European Jew has contributed to erasing history and 
fostering the notion that Jew and Arab are eternal enemies. 
The complex struggle between nationalisms is exacerbated by 
the struggle between classes. In this sense Arabs are the 
unannounced 'dhimmi' though not officially subordinate, m 
actuality, the underclass. 
Segregation (and racist policies in general) 
■Oriental' Jews in Israeli society profoundly works against 
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the preservation of the Judeo-Arabic tradition. Uri Davis 
faces the matter after quoting Kokhavi Shemesh, a leading 
member of the Israeli Black Panther organization who was 
taught that there was a :"big difference between me and the 
Arabs, that is, they have tried to instill into me that Jews 
are better than Arabs and that we, the Jews are a chosen 
people."(Davis,1977:36) Davis asserts:"The term Oriental 
Jew was coined in Israel to categorize and identify the 
post-1948 massive Jewish immigration from Asia and Africa. 
It is an ideologically motivated term of reference, coined 
in an attempt to hide away a critical contradiction 
underpining the social and political reality of the newly 
established state. The majority of Israel's post 1948 
Jewish population, (approximately 60 percent) is culturally 
Arab, and yet divorced from its Arab heritage and 
affiliation through being situated in Israel as second class 
citizens of a western extension, a settler colonial polity, 
based on the distinction between Jew and Arab and on the 
exclusion and dispossession of the latter in the process of 
transforming Palestine into Israel. The specific terms of 
their determination have far reaching implications on the 
eventual destiny of the Jewish state of 
Israel."(Davis,1977:34) 
The specific terms of their determination also have far 
reaching implications for the eventual destiny of the Judeo- 
Arabic heritage. Palestinian Arab Jews and Arab Jews from 
other Middle Eastern lands helped to settle the land, 
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support the economy, build roads, increase the armed forces, 
but never had a say in and did not participate in rulinq 
the country. These Jews, like the Arab in Israeli society, 
have become the 'outsiders', displaced by a force as 
familiar and as strange as they might ever confront: the 
European Zionist Jew. Along with the creation of the term 
'Oriental' to distance himself from a critical part of his 
own heritage, the western Jew utilized the term 
'modernization' to rationalize the neglect of that crucial 
aspect of his own heritage. In the face of 'modernization' 
with its necessary corollary of militarization and 
nationalism based on the monopoly of one ethnic group over 
another, we must continue to look with a finely tuned ear 
and eye for the survival of the Judeo-Arabic heritage, which 
as much as any other aspect of Jewish history represents the 
source and the richness - the very basis of all of Jewish 
life. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The history of relations between Jew and Arab begins in 
the lands of their common origins. Through sharing language 
and cultural values; through philosophical, literary and 
religious exchange; through complimentary social and 
economic strategies for dealing with the challenges of daily 
survival, Arab and Jew produced a heritage that has had an 
impact world-wide. 
Two facts, then, draw our attention: first the extent 
to which this tradition has receded and is unrecognized. 
Second, in popular media Jew and Arab are most often 
represented as enemies and in fact, have become deeply 
divided in the course of historical developments in the 
lands that are their ancient homes. The preceding chapters 
have detailed the forces that contributed to the destruction 
of the Judeo-Arabic heritage and as well that contributed to 
its continuing survival. We have examined four basic models 
of Arab-Jewish coexistence: intermingling of Jew and Arab in 
pre-Islamic times, the dhimmi model during the centuries of 
the Arab Caliphate and Ottoman rule; Arab-Jew interrelations 
in the colonial era, and finally, the relation of Arab and 
Jew in Israeli society from 1948 to 1980. This methodology 
has brought to light a number of important conclusions as 
well as enduring questions that can guide future work in the 
area of Arab-Jew relations. 
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Judging from research on Arab/Jew relations in the 
areas of the Middle Eastern lands that we have examined, Jew 
and Arab are not, as popular media too often asserts, 
eternal enemies. On the contrary, given variations over 
time and place, the predominant conclusion is that Jew and 
Arab supported each other's survival. Most importantly this 
evidence points to a time when racism did not rule relations 
between Jews and Arabs. As K.L. Brown points out in 
describing relations beteen North African Arabs and Jews, 
Jews and Muslims had:" stereotypes and folklore about one 
another that did not stand in the way of dyadic-personal, 
face to face relationships between members of two religious 
communities based on mutual interests, affinities and 
respect for qualities of individuals."(Brown,1981:275) 
Secondly, our study of relations between Jew and Arab 
from the eighteenth century to the present indicates that 
dissension between Jew and Arab has been deliberately 
fostered in the course of colonial intervention and 
concommitant changes in this period. Jew and Arab have 
participated in, encouraged, dissented to and rejected those 
forces. For example, in the face of economic changes 
fostered by colonial intervention, Jews and Arabs chose to 
participate in developments exacerbating tensions between 
them, because of the benefits they received. Others 
participated out of necessity; there was no other way to 
survive. Some Jews and some Arabs lived in areas remote 
! enough to be untouched by those changes. And still others 
rejected them and continued to participate in traditional 
forms of economic complimentarity. 
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K.L. Brown graphically illustrates this point in 
discussing the effects of French colonial rule in Morocco in 
1912.(Brown,1981) The code of religious and moral behavior 
shared by Jews and Muslims in the pre-colonial period began 
to diminish in importance and many Jews lost touch with the 
shared Moroccan Arabic dialect. Commerical relations 
between Jews and Muslims changed as Jewish craftsmen and 
traders moved into other more viable occupations after the 
beginning of the protectorate. Brown notes that economic 
and social relations becamelooser and more differentiated, 
less tightly-knit and personal"(Brown,1981:270); and that 
economic complimentarity was reduced as competition between 
the two groups became widespread. While Jews and Muslims 
suffered from the instability of political conditions, so 
did relations between them. As the economic life of the 
community came to depend on ties with Europeans, political 
interests and cultural values shifted and produced 
antagonisms where once there had been a 'community of 
interests'.(Brown,1981) Widening class disparities in any 
historical period but particularly in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries as a result of government policies 
internally and from the outside have been a major source of 
disruption to Jew-Arab relations. 
A fruitful approach then, to the question of what can 
the future of Arab-Jew relations has to do 
we expect for 
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with willingness on both sides to clarify the grounds of 
dissension and to ask whether or not and for what reasons 
those in power are making choices that foster dissension 
rather than coexistence. It is clear as we continue to 
examine the grounds of dissension that this cannot be done 
in a vacuum. The forces of dissension only become clear in 
the context of world historical developments; so that this 
process (and experiment and task) must be supported by the 
world at large. 
For example, racism is a force that has helped to 
disrupt the Judeo-Arabic heritage in a number of ways. We 
noted the effects of Christian anti-semitism in the Middle 
Eastern lands, fostered by colonial intervention, missionary 
schools and imported political propaganda. Anti-Arabism and 
Jew hatred were built into the notion of the 'civilizing 
mission' of the 'west'. Racism was not an indigenous 
phenomenon: that is, no ideology of hatred of Jew by Arab or 
Arab by Jew operated within the context of Middle Eastern 
societies. Furthermore, because of racism, the Judeo-Arabic 
heritage has been ignored, diminished in importance and 
distorted. 
Religious fanaticism is another factor that has 
produced violent eruptions in relations between Jew and 
Arab. In periods such as the Spanish Reconquista and 
Crusades of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when 
tensions were high between the Christian world and Muslims, 
minority groups suffered. Rulers who advocated return to a 
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'pure Islam' often imposed or reimposed restrictions on the 
'dhimmi' that had otherwise been ignored. Similarly some 
groups of Orthodox Jews in Israeli society today contribute 
to the worsening of conditions for Arabs, and to 
institutional racism enforced by many Israeli Jews. 
During the period of changes in power from Muslim Arab 
to Muslim Turk Jews suffered from 'resettlement' policies of 
the Ottoman government. Similarly the concept of 
transfering Arabs in the twentieth century to make way for 
Jewish settlement, has caused enormous hardship and 
bitterness toward the Israeli government. On the other 
hand, the Ottoman government compensated Jews by enforcing 
economic policies that benefited their communities. The 
Israeli government has not acted similarly. 
Education has played a major role in the history of 
Arab-Jew relations and will play a major role in these 
relations. The guestion must be asked: what is the role of 
education and whose interests does it serve? Beginning in 
the nineteenth century tensions were fostered between 
minority groups as education became closely tied to economic 
advancement. Bernard Lewis accentuates another critical 
aspect of the role of education in 'The Decolonization of 
History:Islam in History(Lewis,1973:51-56) His point is 
that since the advent of European rule, the purpose of 
writing history has been to facilitate colonial domination. 
This is done by defining pre-colonial times as backward and 
by presenting the colonial regime as "an instrument of 
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enlightenment and progress. This kind of history, taught to 
both rulers and ruled, served the double purpose of 
demoralizing the latter and nerving the former for sometimes 
disagreeable duties they had to perform. A further aim is 
to divide the subject peoples by inventing fictitious 
national entities."(Lewis,1973:51) Lewis uses as an example 
the case of the French creating a mythical version of North 
African history in order to foster antagonism between Arabs 
and Berbers.(Lewis,1973) But the analogy holds true for 
Jews and Arabs. Colonial historians have portrayed the Arab 
as destructive rulers and asserted that the Jews were 
rescued by the coming of the Europeans. Similarly Jews are 
portrayed as destructive rulers from whom the Arabs must be 
rescued. Both views are based on mythical views of the 
history, serve the interests of those who perpetrate them, 
and serve to divide Arab from Jew in order to rule over 
both. 
What was the situation of Jews under Arab-Muslim rule 
and did that situation foster or discourage the Judeo-Arabic 
heritage? How does the situation of Arabs ruled by a Jewish 
majority, compare? Under what kind of government are Arab 
Jew relations most likely to thrive? 
With the rise of Islam in the seventh century, Jews 
ceased to be an outcast community persecuted by the ruling 
Christian church and became one of a number of minority 
groups with a special status. Jews and Christians were 
considered to be 'People of the Book'; following religions 
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that represent an earlier and incomplete form of Islam. As 
such they were termed 'dhimmi' and were protected in 
exchange for recognition of the supremacy of Islam signified 
by payment of the jizya, a poll tax. With the 'Covenant of 
Umar' discrimination became institutionalized. Dhimmi were 
subject to a series of restrictions and treated as second- 
class citizens. 
What did it mean to be a 'second-class citizen' in 
Islamic society? The Jews were not subject to any major 
territorial or occupational restrictions. They had far 
greater social mobility than in Christian Europe and at 
various times held important and influential government 
positions. The Arab Caliphate and Turkish Muslim state kept 
intact the indigenous community organization of minorities. 
Jews had their own courts and their ov/n religious and 
secular leaders. A great number of the dhimmi had access to 
the economic activities of the state and several reached 
positions of great power and influence. For a number of 
reasons noted in Chapter I related to the evolution of Islam 
and confluence of historical developments, Jews experienced 
a degree of tolerance that was supportive to the 
continuation of Jewish-Arab symbiosis- sharing of language, 
cultural values, economic and political goals. There was 
little sign of deep-rooted hostility and ideologically 
motivated negative attitudes between Arab and Jew. On the 
other hand, as dhimmi, their situations were always insecure 
Intolerance and suffering were the 
and subject to change. 
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result of factors analyzed in Chapter I, and noted above. 
And as Bernard Lewis notes, in the eighteenth century this 
system was subject to severe strain as the dhimmi "tried to 
combine incompatible objectives of equal citizenship, 
foreign protection and national independence." 
(Lewis,1984:170) 
There is an implicit analogy between the historic 
dhimmi relationship and the situation of Arabs in 
contemporary Israeli society. While discrimination against 
Arabs is not built into Judaism, in fact Arabs are treated 
as second-class citizens. Like the historic dhimmi they 
cannot bear arms- that is they do not participate in the 
Israeli military. However,unlike the historic dhimmi, Arabs 
do not have access to the economic power of the state. Nor 
are they considered to be a group with a distinct national 
identity. They are not allowed to develop independent 
political organizations. Intermingling of Jew and Arab is 
not only discouraged, but is blatantly feared. Racism has 
become a factor inhibiting relations on both sides. Israeli 
racism has the additional power of the state to back it up. 
The fabric of the society has absorbed the colonialist 
ideology: each considers the other to be 1 inferior , 
'dangerous', 'deceitful', 'all-powerful', 'evil'. The 
Israeli government has created the conditions to carry out a 
dhimmi program that is even more successful than the 
original. 
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Our study brings into the foreground historical 
developments that are the precondition for the present state 
of affairs. As militarism tied to industrial development 
colonial intervention, and racism, have come to dominate 
world politics, they have produced incalcuable suffering for 
Jew and for Arab. 
What are the forces that may come in to change that ? 
Are there forces at work undermining the political 
presupposition of the new dhimmi relationship? What are the 
chances for the forces that brought Jew and Arab together, 
to be revived? 
To address these questions it is useful to turn to 
those elements that have supported the Judeo-Arabic heritage 
since they represent factual evidence that coexistence is 
possible. 
Throughout history economic complementarity is a theme 
demonstrating shared strategies for survival. There are 
rare examples in Israeli society today of joint businesses 
between Arab and Jew built on that tradition. 
When religion was not connected to state power, more 
flexibility in rituals and customs accounted for a shared 
folk religion. Jews and Arabs made pilgrimages together to 
visit shrines of saints and visited one another's healers. 
These customs continue to be relevant for many Arabs and 
Jews. 
Respect for land is an ancient and commonly held belief 
structuring life between Arab and Jew centuries ago. Shared 
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agricultural practices brought prosperity to both. Land was 
cultivated for tne benefit of all members or both 
communities within any given larger grouping. 
In the 1980's Israeli society is witnessing a proliferation 
of organizations whose work revolves around Arab-Jew 
relations: for example, The Committee for Israeli- 
Palestinian Dialogue founded by Oriental Israelis; Hamizrach 
El Hashalom (East for Peace), the Israeli Council for 
Israeli-Palestinian Peace, Institute for Education for 
Coexistence Betwen Jews and Arabs, and many more 
educational, cultural, and community groups. History shows 
us that the struggle of all peoples against injustices: 
economic and civic inequality, religious and political 
warfare, racism in all its manifestations, over and over 
again resurfaces in the face of enourmous odds. These 
groups represent the resurfacing of those elements that have 
kept alive the Judeo-Arabic heritage ; and in this sense 
have the support of a long historical tradition. Many of 
them address directly the issues examined in this work: 
world-wide historical developments in terms of economic 
policies, imperialism , religious fanaticism tied to state 
power, and militarism: are all factors that have contributed 
to the disappearance of the Judeo-Arabic heritage. Because 
there are Arabs and Jews who benefit from these developments 
as well as Arabs and Jews who suffer, the future will be 
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decided by those within both groups who have the courage to 
examine the consequences of these developments for future 
relations. 
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CHAPTER VII 
TEACHING CURRICULUM 
This curriculum is designed for secondary and higher 
education, as well as for use in community settings. The 
analytical approach is important for students in their final 
year of secondary education. At this point they will 
benefit from learning how to think about complex historical 
issues that require probing beneath the layers of popular 
misconceptions that infect their daily lives. 
In a college setting, this course is designed to give 
students the opportunity to rethink the meaning of history 
as it affects current events. It is designed to give 
students tools to form judgments about issues that are 
determining the future. An essential aspect of their 
educational process is learning how to live in a world where 
conflicting interests dictate social and political process. 
They must learn how to think critically about difference. 
They must learn to think critically about the forces that 
are controlling the evolution of world historical 
developments and how those developments shape their daily 
lives. It is hoped that special programs currently 
implemented in some universities specifically for teaching 
about socially relevant issues (such as racism, sexism, 
anti-semitism) will expand to include courses with a 
specifically historical orientation. It is only through 
such courses that the import of social issues educational 
306 
work can significantly affect the quality of life in society 
at large and in the university setting. 
The following materials are designed to assist in 
teaching about the history of Arab-Jew relations: 
1. Goals of chapter 
2. Outline of chapter 
3. Important themes of chapter 
4. Suggested activities for chapter 
5. Suggestions for evaluating content with students 
6. Materials, Other Resources 
7. Glossary 
The curriculum can be taught in a traditional fourteen week 
semester. With a total of forty-two classes (three classes 
per week), ten classes can be devoted to each chapter, 
allowing one class for each of the eight themes presented 
(for each chapter), and two classes for evaluation. Media 
presentations are suggested, to be utilized as introductions 
to each chapter. The historical material can be taught 
through a combination of lecture, dialogue with students as 
analytic themes are explored, related outside readings for 
students, and group activities. Teachers are encouraged to 
begin the course with a discussion of how students' 
backgrounds will affect their relationship to the materials 
presented; and to address how interaction between students 
might be affected. 
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Chapter II 
Goals 
A. To familiarize students with the social, political, 
economic and religious life of Arabs and Jews in pre-Islamic 
times. 
B. To familiarize students with the social, political, 
economic and religious life of Arabs and Jews under Islam. 
C. To explore the implications of dhimmi status as a 
model for minorities living under foreign rule. 
Outline 
Introduction 
I. Relations Between Jew and Arab, Pre-Islam 
A. Origins of both peoples 
B. Historical Setting 
C. Social organization, economic livelihood 
1. Cultural and religious life 
2. Women 
D. Impact of Outside Forces 
E. Summary 
II. The Emergence of Islam 
A. Description of Muslim State 
B. Circumstances of Muhammad's rise to power 
C. Muhammad and the Jews 
D. The Consolidation of Islam 
E. The Period of the Caliphates 
F. Islam and Dhimmi Status 
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G. Jews Under Islam 
1* Jews under Abbassid Rule 
2. Tenth- Thirteenth Centuries The Fatamids and 
Ayyubids 
a. Partnerships 
b. Legal Matters 
c. Leadership 
d. Jewish Vulnerability 
e. Government Interference 
f. Jewish-Arab Intermingling 
H. Thirteenth - Sixteenth Centuries- The End of the 
Caliphate 
I. The Ottoman Empire 
A. Economic Life 
B. Iberian Jews 
C. Summary 
J. Conclusion 
Important Themes- Correcting Misconceptions 
A. Many students will not be aware of the origins of Jew and 
Arab in the Middle Eastern lands. Some scholars consider 
both Jews and Arabs to be part of the Semitic peoples who 
moved in waves across the Arabian peninsula. In any case, 
Jew and Arab share a common heritage associated with their 
emergence as peoples in shared geographic locations in the 
Middle East. 
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B. In the West, a false equation between Arab and Muslim is 
common. in Chapter One students learn that Christians and 
Jews in the Middle East also consider themselves Arabs. 
Christian Arab, Muslim Arab, Jewish Arab, share a common 
linguistic, cultural and historic heritage. 
C. A common misconception links 'Arab' with'nomad'. Jews 
also may be categorized as unilaterally nomadic (the 
wandering Jew). Chapter I demonstrates that groups of Arabs 
and Jews were agricultural, citied, or nomadic. 
D. Stereotypes falsely depict the Arab as 'backward', and 
the Jew as'modern'. Both terms have been invented to 
justify colonial intervention in and usurpation of, other 
cultures. This theme is developed beginning with Chapter 
One, where students learn that Arabs and Jews together 
evolved systems of irrigation, crafts, commerce,literature. 
E. Our educational system rarely teaches about the 
historical suppression of women, and is fraught with 
misinformation and misconceptions about women, breeding 
stereotypes that falsify women's experience. Students must 
become aware first that women were primary participants in 
every phase of life in the Middle Eastern lands- economic 
(agriculture and crafts), religious (pilgrimages, healing), 
political (advisors and warriors), literary (poets). 
Secondly, Arab women are often characterized in relation to 
Jewish women, as less'advanced'. In Chapter I students 
learn that Arab and Jewish women shared a customary way of 
life with similar values, goals, visions and struggles. Even 
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as Judaism and Islam evolve as distinct religio-ethnic 
cultures many of the similarities between them survive. 
F. A common misconception corrected in Chapter I is that 
Muhammad depicted the Jews as evil and corrupt. In this 
Chapter students learn about the strong influence of Judaism 
on Islam and the events leading to Muhammad's alienation 
from the Jews. 
G. In regard to the rise of Islam, western students are 
taught that Muslims were 'fanatical warriors' who subjected 
their conquered populations to inhumane treatment (the Koran 
or the sword). A central area for discussion is the system 
of social-religious organization that became the Muslim 
state. There are several important features of this topic, 
beginning with a careful examination of the treatment of 
conquered populations by Muslims. 
Students will note a major difference under Islam where 
the interpenetration of faith and power, religion and 
authority shaped political and social organization. State 
policies evolved out of varying interpretations of the 
Shari'a, holy law. According to the Shari'a, the Caliph or 
ruler was elected by God. 
Secondly, a comparative analysis of the status of 
minorities under Islam and in North American society 
deserves attention. The popular misconception is that Jews 
were highly discriminated against under Islam. Dhimmi 
status afforded the Christian and Jewish minorities 
privileges and protections as described in Chapter I. 
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Within that basic system, Chapter I reveals a wide variety 
of experiences of Jews (and Christian Arabs) in the Middle 
Eastern lands. The following discussion is pertinent. 
While in North American society 'minority' populations are 
ostensibly given full equality, in actuality they suffer 
from discrimination in every area of daily life. On the 
other hand, while discrimination was institutionalized under 
Islam, minorities were for the most part able to overcome 
those limitations and lead full productive lives as stable 
elements of the Islamic world. 
Furthermore, Jews contributed to the consolidation of 
Islam and continued a traditional way of life with their 
Arab neighbors (Christian and Muslim). Chapter I develops 
many examples of the fruitful interchange of Arab and Jew 
under Islam and in the Ottoman Empire, a continuation of the 
Islamic state under Turkish rule. 
H. Students learn in Chapter I about the importance of the 
Ottoman state, often neglected in standard histories, and of 
the important contributions of Jews to Ottoman society. This 
theme will be continued in Chapter II, where the important 
evolution of events in the Ottoman Empire strongly 
influences the development of Arab-Jew relations. 
Suggested Activities 
A. Have students evaluate newspaper, television and radio 
reporting on Arabs and Jews. Ask students to collect 
examples to present . After a discussion analyzing content 
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Of their data, compare these findings with what they have 
learned about Jews and Arabs in Chapter I. 
B. Ask students to compare the situation of the dhimmi in 
the Islamic state with the situation of minority groups in 
North American society. Divide students into groups. On 
the basis of their findings, ask each group to propose a 
system of social-political organization and describe its 
benefits and liabilities. in presenting their proposals to 
the larger group, are there shared goals in terms of what 
form of social-political organization students feel most 
comfortable with? 
C. Ask students to interview a Jew and a Muslim focusing on 
religious beliefs, cultural traditions, political beliefs, 
relation to history, level of comfort in the communities 
they live in, relations with one another. Compare and 
evaluate findings in the class. 
D. Invite speakers to address the following themes: 
I. Muslims in North America 
II. Jews in North America 
III. Comparison of Judaism and Islam 
IV. Misconceptions about the Middle East 
V. Jewish and Arab women 
Suggestions for Evaluating Content with Students 
A. Design a group discussion in which groups of students 
debate the issue of how Jews fared under Islam. 
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B. Design a group discussion in which groups of students 
defend or refute the proposition that Jew and Arab are 
'eternal enemies'. 
Chapter III 
Goals 
A. To analyze the effects of European imperialism on Arab 
and Jewish social, political and economic survival. 
B. To explore the effects of European imperialism on 
relations between Jews and Arabs in selected Middle Eastern 
countries. 
C. To examine the role of Jew and Arab in social, economic, 
political and religious transformations of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. 
Outline 
Introduction 
I. The Ottoman Reforms 
A. Background 
B. Tanzimat Reforms 
C. Reforms and the Millet 
D. The Capitulations 
E. Land Reforms 
F. Transportation, Demographic Changes 
G. Class Conflict 
II. North Africa- Seventeenth- Twentieth Centuries 
A. Economic Livelihood 
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B. Education 
C. Demographic Changes 
D. Social, political, economic, religious 
complementarity 
III. Conclusion 
Important Themes 
Chapter II examines the politics of transformations in 
social organization affecting economic livelihood and 
religious life during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. These transformations introduce new elements 
into Arab-Jew relations and are critical for understanding 
Arab-Jew relations in the twentieth century. The following 
are central themes for discussion; areas that are often 
overlooked and/or misrepresented in educational texts. 
A. The introduction to Chapter II emphasizes the importance 
of the Ottoman Empire to world historical developments. 
This discussion helps to break down the false separation 
between 'East' and'West' that informs much of western 
education. Often the Ottoman Empire is misrepresented as 
'the sick man of Europe', a western version that ignores the 
significant interrelation between European developments and 
developments in the Middle Eastern lands. 
B. The introduction to Chapter II also raises fruitful 
questions for discussion about the transformation of values 
that accompanied the Industrial Revolution. It is important 
here to discuss the meaning of the term 'underdeveloped', as 
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another example of how an indigenous culture can be 
misrepresented and its values and traditions concealed by 
the use of a term invented by the colonizer. Both 
discussions can help students to clarify their values and 
assumptions by examining the interconnection between those 
values and assumptions and world historical developments. 
C. A central theme emphasized in Chapter II is the range of 
interpretation of any historical period, depending upon 
differences in class status. This theme was introduced in 
Chapter I where students learn that historical 
interpretations that the experience of the Sephardi, exiled 
from Spain and Portugal in the period of Ottoman rule 
differed from that of indigenous Jew. In Chapter II, 
widening class disparities result in a range of experiences 
affecting relations between Jew and Arab. This discussion 
can encourage students to develop a more complex view of 
history and can discourage students from seeing Jews and 
Arabs as monolithic groups with one antagonistic historical 
experience between them. 
D. A critical theme in Chapter II is colonial intervention. 
Attempts of European governments to colonize the Middle 
Eastern lands through economic and political intervention 
had costs and benefits for Arab-Jew relations. This theme 
continues to be a focus for discussion in Chapters III and 
IV where the impact of outside forces on Arab-Jew relations 
is central to how relations evolve. 
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E. Chapter II demonstrates how European anti-semitism and 
anti-Arabism have influenced historical developments. 
Discuss with students the implications for Arab-Jew 
relations revealed in this chapter. 
F. European-style education had an impact on the lives of 
Jews, Arab Christians and Arab Muslims examined in Chapter 
II. Analysis of the effects of the proliferation of new 
educational experiences introduces students to several 
important issues. First, it can encourage them to further 
examine the goals of education and how this affects ways 
that information is presented. Who controls what they 
learn? A second important discussion is the role of 
education in aiding or hindering interethnic relations. 
Third, what are the benefits and liabilities of a system of 
social organization in which 'advancement' depends upon the 
assimilation of sometimes oppressive concepts absorbed 
through the educational system? 
G. Chapter II includes a lengthly discussion of ways in 
which complementarity and intermingling between Jew and Arab 
continued to provide a basis for stable relations. There 
are two concepts important for students to learn in order to 
absorb this material. The first, introduced in Chapter I 
and continued here, is that history is not merely the story 
of the elite, their politics, wars, diplomatic maneuvers, 
institutions. Oftentimes the daily lives of people will 
tell a different story, one which may or may not be 
critically affected by the decisions of those in power. 
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Here students learn that Jews and Arabs created a folk 
culture that represents a tradition which is traced and 
affirmed in Chapters I-IV. Secondly, this knowledge helps 
to break down the misconception many students have that Jews 
and Arabs are intransigent enemies at cross purposes 
historically and currently. 
H. The notion that Jews were considered by Christian Europe 
as allied to the Muslim, will be new to them, but more 
understandable on the basis of Chapter I. The conclusion to 
Chapter II leaves students with a basis for examining ways 
in which, and under what circumstances, Jew and Arab worked 
together politically. This theme is important because in 
Chapter III students are presented with a historical 
discussion of Zionism and Arab nationalism that 
demonstrates under what circumstances Jews and Arabs had 
similar interests regarding nationalism. 
Suggested Activities 
A. Ask students to identify the forces that brought about 
economic changes in the Middle Eastern lands beginning with 
the eighteenth century: industrialization, imperial 
intervention, changing role of the Ottoman government. What 
roles did Jew and Arab take on in this process? How do 
students evaluate those choices? How were relations 
affected? 
B. Ask students to collect data that demonstrate the role of 
economics in creating both tensions and alliances between 
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'minority' groups in North American society. Have them 
evaluate why some groups are more clearly in the upper 
classes and others comprise the lower classes. On the basis 
of this discussion and of activity (A), what generalizations 
are useful in deciding what kind of economic system is 
workable for society at large? 
C. Ask students to give specific examples of the role of 
education in creating self-identity. List courses taught 
and evaluate content. Are they learning about their 
particular cultural heritage? Ask students to identify any 
bias that affects how they view themselves (either by 
inclusion or omission). On the basis of this data, list 
four ways that education affected Arab-Jew relations in the 
period addressed in Chapter II. 
D. Invite an Arab Jewish woman, an Arab Christian woman and 
an Arab Muslim woman to discuss differences between their 
own and North American culture and how they accommodate to 
and/or resist the demands of those tensions. 
Suggestions for Evaluating Content with Students 
A. Students should be able to identify the following terms: 
Capitulations; Tanzimat Reforms; client-patron relations; 
Alliance Universelle Israelite; protege system. Ask 
students to give several examples of how each of the above 
affected Arab-Jew relations in positive and in negative 
ways. 
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Chapter IV 
Goals 
A. To familiarize students with the main trends in the 
historical development of Arab Nationalism. 
B. To familiarize students with the main trends in the 
historical development of Jewish nationalism. 
C. To examine the interrelationship between Zionism and Arab 
Nationalism. 
D. To examine how industrialization and nationalism in 
western Europe before and during the British Mandate in 
Palestine affected social, economic, political and religious 
life in Palestine. 
Outline 
I. Introduction 
II. Arab Nationalism: 1800-1914 
III. Jewish Nationalism: 1800-1914 
IV. Non-Jewish Zionism 
V. Zionist Goals 
A. Zionist Institutions 
VI. Conclusion 
VII. Ottoman Policy and the Attitude of Arab Nationalists 
toward Jewish immigration, land settlement and Zionism pre- 
World War II. 
VIII. Social, Religious, Economic Consequences of World War 
One and Aftermath for Arab-Jew Relations 
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IX. Arab Jew Relations, 1920-1943- Transformations in 
social, economic and religious life- Palestine 
A. The British Mandate 
X. Conclusion 
Important Themes 
Chapter III corrects popular misconceptions regarding 
two key historical developments for Arab-Jew relations: Arab 
nationalism and Jewish nationalism. Arab nationalism is 
often misrepresented in the west as a monolithic movement 
that uses violence to obtain its goals. Zionism is also 
misrepresented as a monolithic movement. Two general views 
toward Zionism characterize the mass media. One represents 
Zionism as having redeemed Palestine. The second views 
Zionism as a racist, totalitarian ideology. The following 
themes provide useful material for discussion, challenging 
assumptions and demonstrating the complexity of developments 
leading to the creation of the state of Israel. 
A. The introductory material for Chapter III emphasizes how 
forms of social organization and political organization in 
the Middle Eastern lands evolved. The concept of a secular 
state with a national identification unifying the diverse 
peoples included within its boundaries, contradicted the 
organization of peoples within the Dar-Al-Islam (House of 
Islam). An exploration of these differing concepts and of 
the implications of both for Arab-Jew relations in the 
Middle Eastern lands will prepare students for the 
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subsequent material of Chapter III. Two points are 
important to note: on, is that nationalism did not evolve 
solely in reaction to outside influences from Europe. Two, 
it is important to discuss the difference between ethnic 
feeling and national feeling. 
B. Students are generally unfamiliar with developments and 
events that sparked an Arab nationalist movement. In this 
chapter they will learn how European politics, the Young 
Turk Revolution and movements within Islam, contributed. It 
is important for students to examine the significance of the 
literary, cultural renaissance stimulated by Arab 
nationalists for the Middle East as a whole. 
C. Students will learn in Chapter III that Zionism was an 
historical development with many different strands; that 
Jews had a range of reactions to and participatory roles in 
its development. Like Arab nationalism, the way in which 
Zionism evolved was affected by both internal and external 
forces. Both had a range of consequences for Arab and for 
Jews, depending upon geographic location, class, religious 
leanings, political affiliations. 
D. Chapter III introduces students to the history of the 
complex relations between Jews and Arabs involved in 
nationalist movements. Students will learn that the 
polarization of Jew and Arab in terms of nationalist 
movements was a gradual process involving a range of 
external factors, as well as internal differences. 
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E. On the level that world , i 
istorical developments have been 
Shaped by diplomatic history determining alliances and 
antagonisms, war and peace, trust and loss of trust, pre- 
World-War One diplomacy had far reaching consequences for 
Arab-Jew relations, still affecting current events. This 
chapter makes clear how that history framed a new set of 
issues disrupting relations between Arab and Jew. 
F. The period of the British mandate was one of critical 
decision making in the Arab world and in the Jewish world 
This period shows clearly how methods of colonial rule 
designed to create a system of dependence and control, 
further solidified tensions between Jew and Arab. This 
discussion will provide a basis for examining the 
administrative apparatus created by the Zionist organization 
pre-1948 and the Israeli state itself. 
G. The militarization of governments is so often assumed as 
inevitable, that students often do not develop a critical 
consciousness of the consequences for social relations, 
interethnic relations, human survival. This important theme 
is critical for discussion of the way in which Arab-Jew 
relations were affected by the Industrial Revolution and 
consequent expansion of and use of warfare capabilities. 
What kinds of choices were available and pre-determined as 
twentieth century politics determined the forms of social 
organization that evolved? How did those choices frame the 
terms of Arab-Jew relations in the twentieth century? 
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Suggested Activities 
A. Ask students to collect data through personal interviews 
with Jews and non-Jews and through the media, that gives 
them a basis for evaluating how a general sample of the 
public views Zionism. What do persons know about the 
history of Zionism? Compare findings with what they have 
learned in Chapter Three about Zionism. If there is a 
disparity, analyze why. 
B. Ask students to collect data through personal interviews 
with Jews and non-Jews and through the media, that gives 
them a basis for evaluating how a general sample of the 
public views Arab Nationalism. What do these persons know 
about the history of Arab nationalism? Compare findings 
with what they have learned in Chapter III about Arab 
Nationalism. If there is a disparity, analyze why. 
C. Have students develop on the basis of this chapter and 
other research, a definition of anti-semitism. Ask them to 
evaluate solutions proposed by Zionists for eradicating 
anti-Semitism and to propose their own solutions. What are 
the benefits and liabilities of each solution proposed? 
D. Organize students in groups representing: a) Palestinian 
Jews b) European Jews c) British officials d) Arab Muslims 
e) Arab Christians. In a round table discussion have each 
group give a presentation to the others detailing in 
historical context its reactions to the British Mandate over 
Palestine and its demands from the British government. 
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Suggestions for evaluating content with students 
A. Have students divide into groups representing the 
interests of the various groups of Arab Nationalists and 
Zionists discussed in Chapter III. Ask them to present to 
each other their goals; the historical developments 
prompting them to develop those goals and to dialogue about 
ways these goals might contradict or serve the interests of 
other groups. 
B. Have students review the policies of the British 
throughout the Mandate and present a rationale for those 
policies. Were they successful in achieving their goals? 
Why not? 
Chapter V 
Goals 
A. To examine the genesis of the Israeli state and how it 
shapes relations between Jews and Arabs. 
B. To examine fundamental conditions of Jewish and Arab life 
in Israeli society. 
C. To examine how Jews' and Arabs' concepts of one another 
evolved in the period after the creation of the state of 
Israel. 
D. To examine the historical genesis and current 
perspectives of movements in Israeli society regarding 
relations between Arabs and Jews. 
E. To examine forces within Israeli society contributing to 
the dissolution of the Judeo-Arabic heritage and to examine 
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forces within Israeli society contributing to the survival 
of the Judeo-Arabic heritage. 
Outline 
Introduction and Review 
I. Social organization, economic survival, religious and 
political life, 1948-1980 
A. Arab Refugees 
B. Military Administration 
C. Responses of Jews and Arabs 
D. Social, economic, political status of Arabs 
1. Labor 
2 . Law 
3. National Rights 
4. Education 
5. Politics 
E. Jew-Arab interaction 
1. Rakah 
2. Arab Students Committees 
F. Oriental Jews 
G. Naturei Karta 
H. Israel Defense Forces 
I. Gush Emunim 
II. The 1956 War and Consequences of the Occupation, 1967 
for Jewish-Arab Relations 
A. Background 
B. Palestinian Nationalism 
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C. The West Bank 
1. Economic Policies 
2. Politics 
3. Refugee Camps 
III. Conclusion 
Important Themes 
The central theme of Chapter IV is the impact of the 
new Jewish state on the Judeo-Arabic heritage. The chapter 
begins with a review of events culminating in the 1948,1949 
War. One important theme reviewed here and examined 
throughout the Chapter is cooperation of Jews and Arabs. 
Many efforts at cooperation were ultimately fruitless 
because of factors that are important areas for discussion. 
For example, efforts were obstructed by outside forces whose 
interests were not served by Jewish-Arab cooperation. 
Another important theme introduced in subsequent 
chapters is the effect of differences among Arab groups and 
between the Arab states. Similarly intra-communal conflicts 
among Jews gives us important insight into the range of 
perspectives and political goals among Jews during the 
period addressed. 
Two related topics are essential to focus on in regard 
to developments detailed in this chapter. They are 
militarism and racism. Chapters II and III give many 
examples of how racism and militarism connected to 
industrial development disrupted customary relations between 
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Jew and Arab in the Middle Eastern lands. In Chapter IV we 
witness the escalation of this process. By 1948, militarism 
and racism are two predominant forces determining the future 
of Arab-Jew relations. These themes bring into the 
foreground the question raised in Chapter III of how people 
define themselves and each other. Militarism and racism 
foster dehumanization of 'the enemy'. They foster 
stereotypical thinking that serves to distance one group 
from another. Some Jews and Arabs continued to define 
themselves and each other on the basis of historical 
traditions that were 'humanizing'. Given those historical 
traditions, dehumanization can never be completely 
successful. 
Religious fanaticism is a theme connected to militarism 
and racism that students hear a great deal about. At this 
point in their study of Arab-Jew relations students are 
aware that neither Islam nor Judaism are inherently 
'fanatical', but that movements have and continue to arise 
within both communities with extreme ideological positions. 
Nor is there one conclusion to be made regarding these 
groups. As noted in Chapter IV they are varied and the 
consequences of their presentations are varied (Naturei 
Karta and Gush Emunim) . It is important to note that where 
religious fanaticism is connected to militarism the 
consequence is enormous suffering based on discrimination, 
acceptance of only one perspective and acceptance of only 
one outcome. 
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Another important and related theme for discussion in 
Chapter IV is how politics and economics influence the ways 
people define themselves and one another. It is crucial to 
note that some groups of Arabs and Jews respectively 
benefited from political developments stimulating economic 
policies that were very harmful to others. We noted this in 
Chapters II and III where peasants were hurt by policies 
that benefited absentee landowners. Another example in this 
chapter is differences in experiences of Ashkenazi Jews, 
particularly those in power, and Jews indigenous to the Arab 
world. 
In the Introduction to Chapter IV sociological 
literature on Arabs in Israeli society is reviewed. This 
discussion brings out some very important points for 
discussion. Much work in the area of minority relations 
focuses on attitudes of one group toward another based on 
cultural, differences. Some sociologists focus on the 
attitudes of Arabs, for example, toward the Israeli state, 
as the prime factor determining whether or not they are able 
to adjust to the new situation. Others focus on the issue 
of 'modernization' and assert that the conflict of 
traditional values of Israeli Arabs with those of the new 
state creates barriers to adjustment. Other scholars point 
to political and economic policies as factors determining 
the responses of Israeli Arabs to the new state. They 
assert that Zionist goals are inherently inimical o the 
goals and visions of Palestinian Arabs. 
329 
Our analysis adds to this discussion the insight 
(corroborated by scholars in this field) that knowledge and 
understanding of history is essential for the future of 
Arab-Jew relations and for work in the area of minority 
relations in general. Only from this perspective can we 
analyze in depth the range of forces - political, economic, 
educational, cultural, religious- affecting the course of 
Arab-Jew relations. In this case history give us knowledge, 
insight and vision affirming possibilities for the future of 
Arab-Jew relations. 
From an historical perspective, Chapter IV raises the 
question of whether Palestinian Arabs have become the new 
'dhimmi'. This discussion necessitates a detailed study of 
policies outlined in this chapter as well as a review of 
material introduced in Chapter I. 
The role of education is a theme that provides insight 
into the way Arab-Jew relations evolved (Chapters III, IV), 
and is crucial to address in terms of how students are able 
to approach this material. Introducing this curriculum, we 
noted how anti-Arab and anti-Jewish propaganda filter into 
the educational system and that distortion and lack of 
information seriously detract from educational discourse on 
this issue. Students can see this point clearly by 
examining the role of education in Israeli society. How is 
history presented? From whose perspective? Our conclusion 
highlights this critical factor that must determine the 
effectiveness of teaching and learning in this area. 
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Suggested Activiti 
A. A Palestinian Jew and a Palestinian Arab have grown up 
together and are, at the founding of the state of Israel, in 
their early twenties. Have students describe in detail what 
their lives would have been like before 1948 and how they 
would have changed after 1948. How might their friendship 
be affected? 
B. Ask students to choose one 'minority' group with whom 
they are familiar in North America. Utilizing concepts 
discussed in relation to Arabs in Israeli society, of 
accommodation, cooptation, dependence and resistance, give 
examples in each of these categories comparing the minority 
group they choose with Arabs in Israeli society. 
C. Invite an Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab living in 
Israel to describe their experiences, problems, conflicts, 
and what they share. 
D. Divide students into groups representing Arabs and Jews 
working in coalition. Have the groups work together and 
present activities and strategies for developing a type of 
society in Israel beneficial to both. 
Suggestions for evaluating content with students 
A. Ask students to describe in detail some of the policies 
of the Israeli state, beginning in 1948, with a rationale 
for those policies. 
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B. Have students develop a dialogue between a Palestinian 
Arab living on the West Bank and a West Bank Jewish settler. 
The dialogue must present the historic and current situation 
of each and present a political position in regard to their 
current situation that evolves from that history. 
C. Ask students to develop a proposal for resolutions to 
current Arab-Israeli tensions, applying what they have 
learned in studying about the Judeo-Arabic heritage. 
Materials, Other Resources 
1. Maps are an essential tool for this curriculum because 
many students have no geographic familiarity with the areas 
discussed. 
2. Many video-tapes and films are currently being produced 
dealing with various aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
New Jewish Agenda, 149 Church Street, New York, NY 10007 is 
an excellent source. First Run Features, 153 Waverly Place, 
New York, New York, 10014, distributes 'Routes of Exile: A 
Moroccan Jewish Odessey', a film exploring the ancient 
origins of the Jews of Morocco, the impact of colonisation 
on Arab-Jewish relations and the Moroccan Jewish exodus to 
Europe, North America and Israel. 'Routes of Exile' is an 
important supplementary teaching tool for this curriculum. 
The following films about the Middle East were among those 
listed at the Middle Eastern Studies Association Conference 
in Boston, 1987: 
AGAM: 
.LIGHT AND FORM (Israeli n icn. 
13 min. Color 16mm. 
Kahoi DnVld Golds^ein- Dir. Jaques Katmor for Gal- 
on Israel /stitute o£ Students and Faculty 
on Israel. Distributor: Alden Films, 7820-20th Ave 
Brooklyn, NY 11214 (718) 331-1045. interviews with'' 
Israeli artist Yaakov Agam and examples of his 
kinetic art. 
MOU BANOU: THE DAUGHTERS OF UTOPIA (Israel) 1QR! 
85 min Color 16mm 
odnf Politi- Distributor: Jewish Film Festiva 
4560 Horton St. Suite R407, Emeryville, CA 94608. 
(415) 428-1727 Hebrew with English sub-titles. 
Three-generational saga of kibbutz life recounted 
six women who journeyed to Palestine in the 1920's 
to build the society of their 
feminist/socialist/Zionist dreams. 
1, 
by 
FAMILY TIES (Jordan/Tunisia/Egypt^ 1984 
50 min Videotape 
Part 9 of THE ARABS: A LIVING HISTORY series. 
Script: Nadia Hijab. Dir Colin Luke. Courtsey of 
Landmark Films, 3450 Slade Run Drive, Falls Church, 
VA 22042. (703) 241-2030 or 1-800-342-4336. 
Investigation of question: how can Arab women 
preserve the strength of family life and still lead 
their own lives? Journalist Nedia Hijab talks with a 
traditional extended family in Amman, a young 
Tunisian woman seeking more independence, a 
Jordanian pilot caught up in her flying career. 
KARAGOZ (Turkey) 1977 
35 min Color 16mm 
Dir. S.Eyuboglu. Courtsey of Dr Ilhan Basgoz, 
Turkish Studies Program, Indiana University, 143 
Goodbody Hall, Bloomington, IN 47405 (812) 335-2586. 
Turkish Shadow Theater displaying the ethnic, 
cultural and social diversity of the Ottoman-Turkish 
Empire. 
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LEGACY OF THE MAMLUKS (Egypt) 1QS4 
28 min Videotape 
Prod. Mary R. Savin. Dir. R. Sundermeyer for CPTV 
and Hartford Theological Seminary. Courtesy of 
Humanities Council Resource Center, 41 Lawn Ave. 
Wesleyan Station, Middletown, CN 06457 
(203) 347-6888. 
This film was produced to complement the major 
exhibit of Mamluk Art organized for the Smithsonian 
Institute by Dr. Esin Atil: a panorama of artifacts 
placed in historical and artistic context by a panel 
of informed commentors. 
LIKE THE SEA AND ITS WAVES (COMME LA MER ET SES VAGUES) 
Israel 1980 100 min Videotape (PAL) 
Dir/Prod Edna Politi. Courtesy of filmmaker 3-5 
Chemin Tavan, 1206 Geneva, Switzerland. 
Hebrew/Arabic/French; English subtitles. 
Dramatic feature about an Israeli woman of Lebanese 
origin and the childhood friend she encounters while 
both study in Paris, touching on the personal 
dimensions of the political conflict as well as 
their relationship as women. 
MEMORIES OF JEWISH INDIA (India) 1985 
10 min Color 16mm 
Dir/Prod. Benjamin Hayeem. Courtesy of filmmaker, 
132 E 17th St, NY, NY 10003 (202) 674-7048 
Expressionistic montage of Jewish cultural heritage 
in India featuring the synagogues of Bombay, Poona 
and Calcutta. 
jgjBCigweu.,. • ■ 
1982 PERFORMANCE OF THE HAJ (Malaysia) 1983 
64 min Color 16mm 
Filem Negara. Courtesy of the Embassy of Malaysia, 
Office of Information 2401 Massachusetts Ave NW, 
Washington DC 20002 (202) 328-2700 
Chronicle of a group of Malaysian pilgrams starting 
with instructional lectures before departing for 
Mecca, following their participation in the rituals 
of the Haj and ending with the return home. 
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PERMISSIBLE DREAMS (Eovpt) IQRT 
30 min Color Videotape 
Dir. Atiyat Al-Abnoudi 
Movies, 225 lafayette 
925-0606. Arabic with 
titles. 
(PAL) 
. Courtesy of Women Make 
Street, NY, NY 10003 (212) 
English narration and Sub- 
Conversations with Umm Said, a 
Nile Delta, who reflects on her 
wife, mother, and enterpreneur. 
peasant woman in the 
colorful life as 
PRESSURE (LAHATZ) (Israel) 1984 
52 min Color 16mm 
Dir/Prod Michele Ohayon. Loan from Filmmaker c/o 
Annie Ohayon Garth Group, 745 Fifth Ave, NY, NY 
10151 (212) 838-8800. Hebrew/Arabic with Enqlish 
Sub-titles. 
Israeli-Palestinian relations in the microcosm of a 
relationship between two university students and the 
social pressures that drive them apart. 
SHADOW OF THE EARTH (Tunisia) 1982 
90 min Color 16mm 
Dir/Prod. Taieb Louhichi. Distributor: Mypheduh 
Films, 48 Q Street NE, Washington, D.C. 20002 (202) 
529-0220 and P.O. Box 315, Franklin Lakes, N.J. 
07415 (201) 891-8240. Arabic with English sub-titles 
Drama of impact of govermental regulations on 
traditional nomadic society in Tunisian desert. 
SHADOWS OF TURKEY (Turkey) 1986 
17 min Videotape 
Prod. Karen Murphy, Clair Hickman, Walter G. 
Andrews. Dir. Tin Lorang, Instructional Media 
Services, University of Washington. Courtesy of 
Department of Far Eastern Languages and 
Civilizations, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 
98195 (206) 543-6033 
A short documentary to introduce the traditional 
shadow plays of turkey and their historical and 
cultural context. This prefaces THE WITCHES 
(CAZULAR) a shadowplay translated into English and 
adapted for general Americal audiences (to be 
released soon). 
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SHAHSAVAN NOMADS OF IRAN fTran) 1934 
23 min Color 16mm 
Prod/Dir Arlene Dallalfar and Fereydoun Safizadeh. 
Courtesy of filmmakers, is Channing St., Cambridge, 
MA 02138 (617) 868-1562 
Documentary tracing seasonal migration of the 
Shahsavan nomads of northwestern Iran with attention 
given to both the role of women in tribal ecosystem 
and the changes in migratory pattern due to 
sedentarization policies. 
SIYAH KALEM (Turkey^ 1950's 
14 min Black/white 16mm 
Prod/Dir. M. Ipsiroglu and S. Eyuboglu. Narr A. 
Mill. University of Istanbul Cultural Series #2. 
Loan from Dr. Talat Halman, 333 E. 30 St. NY, NY 
10016 (212) 725-4303 
A breif but careful survey of the pages of a 
provocative anonymous 15th century Turkish artist 
whose satirical drawings still fascinate historians. 
Technical limitations are easily surmounted by the 
importance of the material. 
STRANGER AT HOME (Palestine/Israel) 1985 
93 min Color 16mm 
Prod/Dir. Rudolph van den Berg, courtesy of National 
Council on US-Arab Relations. Distributor: Ben van 
Meerendonk, X-I Madia Consultants, 76 Degraw St, 
Brooklyn, NY 10231 (718)596-5104 
Arabic/English/Hebrew with English sub-titles. 
Palestinian artist Kamal Boullata, exiled for 20 
years, returns to Jerusalem with his friend, Dutch 
filmmaker van den Berg. Both confront dreams and 
apprehensions. 
SURNAMEH OF MURAD III (BOOK OF FESTIVITIES) (Turkey) 1960_Ls 
22 min Color 16mm 
Dir M. Ipsiroglu and S. Eyuboglu. Loaned by Dr Talat 
Halman, 333 E. 30 St, NY, NY 10016 (212) 725-4803 
Study of the innovative minatures produced to record 
the forty-day celebration organized by Murad III in 
1582. The album not only displayed, as intended, the 
Sultan's wealth to the world, but also offered a new 
type of documentation of a major event. 
C. Many agencies, periodicals, journals, newspapers focusing 
on the Middle East can be of use in teaching this 
curriculum. 'New Outlook', one such magazine gives an 
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updated guide to Peace networking in Issue 29, May-June, 
1986. This listing includes: 1) Extraparliamentary Peace 
Movements 2) Educational, Cultural and Community Groups 3) 
Civil Rights Groups 4) Research and Policy Institutes 5) 
Academic Institutions 6) Activism in Support of Nonviolence 
7) International Activism 8) Political Parties 9) Cultural 
Activism 10) Palestinian Connection 
The Association of Arab- American University Graduates, 
Belmont, Massachusetts, is an excellent resource for 
literature and other teaching materials. The American 
Friends Service Committee, 2161 Massachusetts Avenue, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02140, provides speakers, films, 
and distributes a slide show on the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict, produced by the Middle East Mobile Education 
Project in 1975, and updated by the American Friends Service 
Committee in New England. The slide show presents 
historical background, an exploration of who Israelis and 
Palestinians are and a review of human rights and repression 
as it applies to Palestinians and Jews of the Middle East, 
d) Sources for Further Readings 
The Middle East and Islam: a Bibliographic Introduction, 
Diana Grimwood-Jones, Derek Hopwood, J.P. Pearson, 
Humanities Press, Inc., Atlantic Highland, New Jersey, 1977 
emphasizes general works, bibliographies, history, politics, 
social conditions, education and economic conditions. It is 
divided into the following sections:1) The Middle East 2) 
The Arab-Israeli Conflict 3) The Arab Countries 4) The 
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Arabian Peninsula 5) The Fertile Crescent 6) The Nile Valley 
7) The Maghrib 8) Turkey 9) Iran, and includes sources for 
Maps and Atlases of the Arab world. 
Arthur Goldschmidt's eighteen page Bibliographic Essay (A 
Concise History of the Middle East. Boulder, Colorado, 
Westview Press, 1983, pp.377-395) "intended to serve 
students and nonspecialist readers", is an excellent source 
for instructors. 
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Glossary 
Arab- In biblical terms, descendants of Ishmael, one of 
Abraham's sons. All those who identify culturally with the 
Arab world, whose native tongue is Arabic or Arabic derived 
dialects. Arabs can be Muslims, Christians or Jews. 
Arab Jew- Arab-Jews share the cultural milieu of the Arab 
peoples. They lived in the Arabian peninsula centuries 
before the rise of Islam. Their native language is Arabic 
or a dialect derived from Arabic. 
Arab Higher Committee- A central voice of the Palestinian 
Nationalist Movement organized in the 1930's during the 
period of the British Mandate. 
Ashkenazi- Ashkenaz means German. Descendants of German Jews 
who migrated to Eastern Europe and whose native tongue was 
Yiddish. 
Arab Nationalism- Emerging in the late eighteen hundreds a 
multi-faceted movement expressing loyalty to the idea of 
Arab unity. Some Arab Nationalists asserted that the Arabs 
constitute a single political community and ought to have an 
autonomous government. 
Balfour Declaration- Statement by the British government 
communicated in a letter to Lord Rothschild by Arthur James 
Balfour, foreign secretary, November 2, 1917, of support for 
Zionist aspirations for a homeland in Palestine. Approved 
on April 24, 1920 at the Allies conference at San Remo and 
incorporated into the Mandate on Palestine given to Great 
Britain by the League of Nations, July 24, 1922. 
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Caliph- Ruler of the Islamic state elected by God, with 
ultimate power in military, civic and religious affairs. 
Capitulations- Treaties signed between the Ottoman sultans 
and Christian states of Europe concerning the 
extraterritorial rights which the subjects of one of the 
signatories would enjoy while staying in the state of 
another, as a result of commercial colonies established in 
various regions of the empire. 
Client-Patron Relations- Reciprocal economic relations 
between Jews and Arabs the terms of which are protection in 
exchange for services. 
Dhimmi- In the Islamic state, 'unbelievers' who followed a 
monotheistic religion. The dhimmi were second-class 
citizens subject to a series of restrictions, but also 
protected by the state in exchange for payment of the 
jizya,or poll tax. 
Hadith- Sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, documented by a 
reliable witness. 
Haganah- Secret Jewish organization for armed self defense 
in Palestine under the British Mandate, which eventually 
evolved into a people's militia and became the basis for the 
Israel army. 
Halacha- Jewish law regulating every aspect of Jewish life 
Hijrah- Migration of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina, 622 
A.D., first year of the Muslim calendar. 
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Hlstadrut- General Federation of Labor in Israel,established 
in 1920, and the largest labor federation in Israel. 
Conducts extensive economic aid and cultural activities and 
investment activities. 
Jewish Agency- An international, non-governmental body, 
centering in Jerusalem, assisted by the World Zionist 
Organization for the purpose of encouraging Jews to help in 
the development and settlement of Israel. Begun in August, 
1929 with the support of the League of Nations, and 
initiated immigration, settlement, youth work,etc. 
Jizya- Poll tax paid by the Dhimmi, symbolic of 
subordination, and paid in exchange for protection by the 
Islamic state. 
Judeo-Arabic Tradition- Basis of the advanced civilizations 
produced by Arab and Jew in the Middle Eastern lands, 
through close social, spiritual, intellectual, commercial, 
political, relations. 
Mellah- Jewish quarter in North African towns. 
Millet- An administrative classification allowing 
incorporation into the Ottoman economic and political system 
without destroying the religious-ethnic identity of the 
various Ottoman peoples. 
Muslim-Christian Association (MCA)- A group of associations 
set up by Muslim Arabs and Christian Arabs during the spring 
and summer of 1916 in response to popular opposition to 
Zionism. 
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Ottomanism- National identification with the Ottoman Empire, 
arising in the eighteen hundreds, as a way of unifying the 
diverse peoples of the Ottoman lands. 
Palestine- Term first used by the Romans to describe an 
administrative unit that became the geographic term for 
Southern Syria. An administrative unit of the Ottoman 
Empire, Palestine became the name of the area mandated to 
the British, 1922-1943. 
Sephardi- Descendants of Jews exiled from Spain and Portugal 
in 1492, who migrated to North Africa, the Balkans, Turkey, 
and other Middle eastern lands, North America, Central and 
South America. Their native language is Ladino. 
Shari'a- Islamic law regulating every aspect of life, 
developed by jurists from the Qur'an and traditions of the 
Prophet Muhammad. 
Sykes-Picot Agreement- Secret agreement for partition of the 
Middle Eastern lands signed during World War One by Britain, 
France,Russia and Italy. 
Tanzimat- (Arrangements)-Reforms instituted by the Ottoman 
government beginning in 1829. 
Ulama- Interpreters of the divine law of Islam. 
Umma- Political-religious community defined by Muhammad, of 
followers of Islam. 
West Bank- Area of Palestine on the west side of the Jordan 
River, annexed by Jordan in 1948 and captured by Israel in 
1967. Called 'Judea and Samaria' by some Israelis. 
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White Papers- Issued by Great Britain as statements of 
policy in connection with Palestine during the British 
Mandate period. Issued in 1922, 1929, 1937, 1938, 1939. 
Young Turk Revolution- Takeover in 1908 of the Ottoman 
government by Turkish nationalist students and army officers 
to restore the constitution and institute western reforms. 
Organizing body was the Committee of Union and Progress. 
Zionism- Root of the term is word 'Zion' which early in 
Jewish history became a synonym for Jerusalem. Modern term 
first appeared at the end of the nineteenth century denoting 
the movement whose goal was the return of the Jewish people 
to the land of Israel. First used to denote philanthropic 
activities, supporting small scale settlement. With the 
First Zionist Congress, became a political movement. 
Qur'an or Koran- Divine book of Islam, a collection of 
revelations given to Muhammad and from which Islamic law, 
literature and culture have evolved. 
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